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It is widely recognized that most politicians are self-interested and desire election rules 
beneficial to their reelection. Although partisanship in electoral system reform is well-
understood, the factors that encourage or constrain partisan manipulation of the other 
democratic “rules of the game”—including election administration, franchise laws, 
campaign finance, boundary drawing, and electoral governance—has received little 
scholarly attention to date. Aotearoa New Zealand remains the only established democracy 
to switch from a non-proportional to a proportional electoral system and thus presents a 
natural experiment to test the effects of electoral system change on the politics of election 
lawmaking. Using a longitudinal comparative case study analysis, this thesis examines 
partisan and demobilizing election reforms passed between 1970 and 1993 under first-past-
the-post and between 1997 and 2018 under mixed-member proportional representation 
(MMP). Although partisan election reforms have not diminished under MMP, 
demobilizing reforms have become less common. Regression analysis uncovers evidence 
that partisan election lawmaking is more likely when the effective number of parties in 
parliament is lower, when non-voters have more leverage, and when reforms are pursued 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
On June 20, 2019, Justice Minister Andrew Little announced a series of election reforms 
the government intends to enact before the 2020 general election (Devlin 2019a). Among 
Labour’s proposed changes are provisions allowing voting booths in malls and 
supermarkets, extending voter registration to election day, and treating special ballot 
declarations as applications for registration. Despite most of these reforms mirroring 
recommendations made by the Electoral Commission in its report on the 2017 election 
(Electoral Commission 2018),1 the proposals quickly came under fire from the opposition. 
The National party’s electoral reform spokesperson, Nick Smith, called the proposals a 
“stich-up”, arguing that “[t]he government is simply cherry-picking electoral law changes 
that will improve its own chances of re-election in 2020” (McCulloch 2019). Smith also 
argued that the government was playing “fast and loose” with the country’s election laws 
by breaching a “convention” for changes to follow the Justice Select Committee’s triennial 
election inquiry (Smith 2019; Interview AG). Little shot back, arguing that the select 
committee ran out of time to make changes before the next election so the government 
decided to move forward with recommendations that were not particularly controversial 
and that make it easier for people to vote (Devlin 2019a, 2019c). 
A few months later, partisan tempers flared again when Little announced the 
intention to pass a partial restoration of prisoner voting rights before the 2020 election 
 
1 The Electoral Commission suggested that extending enrollment to election day would increase voter 
enfranchisement but stopped short of endorsing the change. Rather, it noted that more study needs to be 
undertaken to ensure that election day registration is administratively feasible. It appears that further 
examination of the issue has led the commission to conclude that implementation of election day registration 
in 2020 is feasible but would delay the official election results by up to ten days (Interview AG). 
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(Little 2019). This was in part a response to a report by the Waitangi Tribunal declaring a 
2010 ban on prisoner voting to be in violation of the Treaty of Waitangi (Waitangi Tribunal 
2019; see also Geddis 2019). Opposition leader Simon Bridges quickly responded by 
promising to repeal the reform after the next election (RNZ 2019). 
These recent spats show that inter-party wrangling over the democratic “rules of 
the game” (Massicotte et al. 2004) are a modern reality in Aotearoa New Zealand. Indeed, 
there was nothing particularly special about these episodes. Although the triennial review 
of election law led to relatively uncontroversial reforms in 2017,2 this was not the case 
three years earlier. The Electoral Amendment Act 2014, shepherded by a National-led 
government, was passed in a divided vote amid partisan objections. Recent party-line fights 
over election rules raise questions about how long such disagreements have existed, to what 
extent they occur, and in what ways they have materialized. Has Aotearoa New Zealand’s 
election machinery always been the subject of partisan discord, or have there been 
fluctuations over time? Are non-consensual changes rare or common? Have political 
parties constantly sought to expand the vote, or have politicians used election laws to push 
marginalized communities to the sidelines in favor of a politically beneficial status quo?  
This thesis explores elements of all these questions. However, its focus is on the 
underlying factors that encourage and constrain politicians in amending the democratic 
rules of the game, or in my terminology, engaging in “election lawmaking”. I distinguish 
between two types of election lawmaking: “partisan” reforms lack consensus, whereas 
“demobilizing” reforms increase barriers to participation and diminish voter turnout. The 
 
2 New Zealand First opposed ending the requirement to use allocated broadcasting funds for opening and 
closing addresses and the maintenance of current broadcasting allocation criteria.  
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political considerations that come into play when politicians attempt to change election 
rules are the “politics” of election lawmaking. One such factor is of foremost interest: the 
electoral system. Aotearoa New Zealand switched from a non-proportional to a 
proportional representation (PR) electoral system in 1996, making it the only established 
democracy to do so (Renwick 2010). This presents a natural experiment to test the 
relationship between electoral system and the manipulation of election laws (Shugart 
2005). Two central hypotheses are tested: (1) that Aotearoa New Zealand’s switch to 
mixed-member proportional (MMP) has reduced the incidence of partisan election 
lawmaking, and (2) that the switch to MMP has reduced the incidence of demobilizing 
election lawmaking. 
Although partisanship in electoral system reform is well-understood, the factors 
that encourage or constrain partisan manipulation of other types of election laws, including 
election administration, franchise rules, campaign finance, boundary revision, and electoral 
governance, have received little attention to date. Some scholars have suggested that the 
overt partisan manipulation of election laws experienced in the United States is an anomaly 
(Kohler and Rose 2010) or have assumed that “minor” election reforms are not worthy of 
consideration (Lijphart 1994; Renwick 2010). Others have called for a reconceptualization 
of election reform as including all types of changes to election law (Jacobs and Leyenaar 
2011; Leyenaar and Hazan 2011; Katz 2005). Researchers have theorized that proportional 
electoral systems reduce the incentives to engage in partisan (James 2012; Kohler and Rose 
2010) and demobilizing (Minnite 2010; Piven et al. 2009) election reforms but have not 
yet tested these relationships empirically.  
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This study uses a longitudinal comparative case study analysis to examine whether 
there was more partisan and demobilizing election lawmaking in Aotearoa New Zealand’s 
last 24 years of first-past-the-post (FPTP) parliaments (1970 to 1993) than in its most recent 
22 years of MMP parliaments (1997 to 2018). Each piece of election-related legislation 
passed during these periods is analyzed and classified into a novel six-part matrix of 
partisanship and participatory effect. This scheme demonstrates that MMP has coincided 
with a reduced incidence of demobilizing election reforms. Coupled with the strong 
theoretical argument for a causal relationship between electoral system and demobilizing 
election lawmaking, I conclude that switching to MMP caused the reduction in passage of 
demobilizing election reforms in Aotearoa New Zealand and that, in general, PR systems 
discourage demobilizing election lawmaking.  
The data indicates that MMP has not coincided with a reduction in the number of 
partisan reforms. However, statistical tests reveal a relationship between partisan election 
lawmaking and fewer effective number of parties in parliament.3 Considering the strong 
link between electoral system and party system evidenced by existing scholarship, I 
conclude that PR systems indirectly discourage partisan election lawmaking by increasing 
party fragmentation in parliaments.  
 Questions around electoral integrity and barriers to participation are of increased 
importance in an era of democratic backsliding. Countries around the world are facing 
eroding faith in democratic institutions, diminishing electoral participation, and a rise in 
 
3 The “effective number of parties” accounts for the relative size of each party in parliament, providing a 
direct measure of the degree of fragmentation in a party system (Laakso and Taagepera 1979). Except for 
where all parties are of equal size, the effective number of parties will be lower than the number of 
parliamentary parties. It is not a measure of which parties are politically “effective” or a proxy for the actual 
number of parties in parliament. The metric is further explained in Chapter 4. 
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polarization and extremism (Freedom House 2019). In this environment, it is more vital 
than ever for scholars to study which electoral arrangements best inoculate democracies 
against deleterious electoral politics. This is especially so in Aotearoa New Zealand, where 
elections are the only real line of defense against virtually unfettered parliamentary 
sovereignty (Geddis 2016, 2017). Research into the politics of election lawmaking has thus 
far been hindered, however, by the belief that a norm of consensus-based election reform 
exists in this country. Politicians, journalists, and scholars alike have assumed that 
American-style election shenanigans and voter suppression do not take place in Aotearoa 
New Zealand, and thus have not devoted effort to studying the phenomenon. My analysis 
demonstrates that, contrary to common belief, partisan election reforms are a regular 
occurrence throughout Aotearoa New Zealand’s parliamentary history. I also find that 
politicians have occasionally enacted election reforms that prevent or discourage 
democratic participation.  
The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 analyzes existing scholarship on the 
effects of electoral system reform, applying lessons learned from electoral system change 
to sketch a broad view of the politics of election lawmaking. Chapter 3 examines what 
makes Aotearoa New Zealand a valuable case study. Chapter 4 details my central 
hypotheses, data, and methodology. Chapter 5 concerns the core data analysis, including 
assessments of descriptive data, chi squared and logistic tests of partisan and demobilizing 
election lawmaking, and multiple linear regression (MLR) analysis of a complex measure 
of partisanship. The chapter also includes an analysis of proposed election reforms, the 
relationship between party and election lawmaking, and an examination of the types of 
election laws passed. Chapter 6 puts the pieces of this analysis together, evaluating the 
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evidence for Aotearoa New Zealand’s supposed consensus-based election lawmaking, the 
core hypotheses and causal mechanisms, and a variety of other explanatory factors. Chapter 
7 concludes by reevaluating the claims made in Chapter 4, examining the implications of 



















CHAPTER 2: THE POLITICS OF ELECTION LAWMAKING 
 
 
Over the past few decades, the literature on comparative electoral systems has expanded to 
become one of the most mature subfields in political science (Gallagher and Mitchell 
2005b; Shugart 2005). Its primary goals have been to explain the effects of various electoral 
system changes on polities (in Gallagher and Mitchell’s words the “political science of 
electoral systems”) and to explain when and why electoral system change takes place (the 
“politics of electoral systems”). More recently, a United States-focused field of scholarship 
has examined a broader set of election laws beyond electoral system reform, including 
voter administration, franchise rules, and campaign finance (see James 2012). This body 
of work has also focused on the effects and causes of such laws. These threads of 
scholarship have previously been siloed, yet much can be learned from their connection.  
I present a framework in this chapter for understanding the politics of partisan and 
demobilizing election lawmaking in the context of electoral systems. By “election 
lawmaking” I mean the legislative process of amending the democratic rules of the game. 
The “politics” of election lawmaking refers to the political considerations that come into 
play when politicians change or attempt to change the rules of the game. Partisan in this 
context means reforms that lack consensus, whereas demobilizing means rules that increase 
barriers to voter participation and diminish voter turnout. By presenting this framework, I 
identify an important gap in electoral systems research concerning its effects on the politics 
of election lawmaking. I also reconsider the presently confused definition of “electoral 
reform”, arguing for terminological exactness and demonstrating the importance of a 
broader consideration of election laws in the study of the politics of election reform. These 
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propositions are vital to the broader point of the chapter: establishing the structural factors 
that encourage election lawmaking that is partisan and demobilizing. I conclude by 
explicating a theoretical foundation blending elite agency and neo-institutionalism and 
illuminating the importance of studying the politics of election lawmaking.4   
 
The Political Science of Electoral Systems 
Scholarship examining the comparative effects of electoral systems has proliferated since 
the 1980s, quickly growing from a neglected field to one of the most developed in political 
science (Lijphart 2005). A survey of this literature reveals a paradox: despite the vast 
breadth and depth of scholarship on electoral systems, the effects of electoral systems on 
the politics of election lawmaking remain largely ignored.5 The core question of previous 
scholarship has been the role electoral systems play in concentrating or dispersing political 
authority, especially through such metrics as proportionality, the number of parties, and 
governing arrangements (Shugart 2005).6 Studies have considered the effects of electoral 
systems on governability, representation, accountability, and participation (Bogdanor and 
Butler 1983; Gallagher and Mitchell 2005b; Klingemann 2009; Leyenaar and Hazan 2011; 
Lijphart 2012; Norris 2004; Powell 2000; Shugart 2005). The ‘psychological’ effects of 
electoral systems on voters’ strategic decisions has been studied (Benoit 2002; Cox 1994; 
 
4 “Elites” and “political elites” refer to all politicians. It is used to emphasize their agency as actors, their 
divergent interests from the rest of the population, and their privileged concentration of power. I explore 
these points in greater detail near the end of this chapter.  
5 Book-length treatments of the effects of electoral systems include edited volumes by Lijphart (1994), Cox 
(1997), Katz (1997), Farrell (2001), Norris (2004), and Gallagher and Mitchell (2005b) and books by Jones 
(1995), Lijphart (2012), Powell (2000), Shugart and Carey (1992), Colomer (2004), and Klingemann (2009). 
6 See also Amorim Neto and Cox 1997; Duverger 1954; Lijphart 1984; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; 
Riker 1982; Taagepera and Grofman 1985; Taagepera and Shugart 1989. 
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Lijphart 1994; Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 1993), as well as the partisan biases of certain 
electoral designs (Grofman and Lijphart 2002; Rae 1967).7 Scholars have also examined 
the intraparty effects of electoral systems, or the internal organization of parties and the 
ways in which individual legislators and candidates relate to constituents. 8 This line of 
inquiry includes the demographics of MPs (Duverger 1955; Matland and Studlar 1996; 
Norris 1985; Rule 1981), the level of turnover (Darcy et al. 1994; Henig and Henig 2001; 
Matland and Brown 1992; Norris 2004), and the cultivation of the “personal vote” (Cain 
et al. 1987; Carey and Shugart 1995; Shugart et al. 2005).  
More recent literature has moved to less direct and harder-to-measure variables 
such as the effects of electoral systems on regime stability (Goldstone and Ulfelder 2004), 
the management of ethnic conflict (Reilly 2001, 2006), and government performance 
(Lijphart 2012). The problem with examining indirect factors—and perhaps the reason why 
research has yet to further explore additional promising connections—is the increasing 
difficulty in identifying the theoretical link between electoral systems and these second-
order effects. In the words of Shugart, it becomes harder to identify “how mechanical 
effects of the electoral system generate incentives for politicians to behave in certain ways, 
once elected” (2005: 50). This has not stopped scholars from trying to disentangle the 
theoretical chain of causality, nor should it: it is the very point of scholarship to attempt to 
unearth previously unknown relationships. In practical terms, the increased difficulty in 
measuring the indirect effects of electoral systems has meant that only recently have 
scholars moved on from the low-hanging fruit of proportionality and party systems and 
 
7 For instance, see Iversen and Soskice 2006 (left-leaning and redistributive bias of PR); Elklit and Roberts 
1996; Monroe and Rose 2002; Calvo and Murillo 2004 (urban/rural bias in districted PR systems); Samuels 
and Snyder 2001 (malapportionment in PR). 
8 See generally Grofman 1999; Haspel et al. 1998; Katz 1986; Marsh 1985; Stratmann and Baur 2002. 
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begun trying to discern such effects as committee assignments (Stratmann and Baur 2002), 
pork-barreling (Ames 1995; Carey and Shugart 1995; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1994; 
Samuels 2002), corruption (Golden and Chang 2001; Reed 1994), and overall democratic 
quality (Doorenspleet 2005; Gallagher 2005; Lijphart 2012). 
Despite the broadening research focus of electoral system outcomes, the 
relationship between electoral systems and the politics of election lawmaking remains 
paradoxically understudied. Previous scholarship has concentrated on only the most major 
cases of reform (see Lijphart 1994; Renwick 2010).9 When studies have considered lesser 
election reforms, they have usually eschewed an explanation of their politics of change, 
instead analyzing their effects. Rare exceptions include reports by Katz (2005) and 
Leyenaar and Hazan (2011). Even Toby James’ (2012) book on the politics of election 
administration excludes all other types of election laws from consideration.10  
 
A More Expansive View of Election Laws: From “Electoral Reform” to “Election 
Reform” 
It seems the reasons for the above paradox are due to both terminological confusion and a 
general devaluation in the study of election laws beyond electoral system reform. As 
previously mentioned, the lion’s share of scholarship on election lawmaking concerns 
electoral systems, especially electoral reform. But “electoral reform” has been used to 
mean both the type of election law that alters the translation of votes into seats (electoral 
 
9 A typical definition for “major” reform is wholesale between-category change (i.e., proportional 
representation, single-member plurality, and mixed systems) or within-category reform that substantially 
alters either the degree of disproportionality in elections or the number of parties in parliament (see Benoit 
2004; Blais 2008; Rahat 2008; Lundell 2009; Renwick et al. 2009; Renwick 2010). 
10 See Table 4.1 for a typology of election laws. 
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system reform) and every kind of election law change (including voting administration, 
franchise rules, and electoral governance). Renwick uses the former definition of electoral 
reform, defining it as “concerning the nature of the vote and its translation into seats” 
(2010: 3; see also Celis et. al 2011; Gallagher and Mitchell 2005a; James 2012; Lijphart 
1994; Massicotte et al. 2004). On the other hand, Jacobs and Leyenaar use the latter 
meaning when they define it as (2011: 500; see also Katz 2005): 
… a change in the legislation (versus practice) that regulates the process of voting, 
which includes who can vote, what voters are allowed to do in the voting booth 
(e.g. voting for a party or a person), what they vote for (e.g. national, provincial, 
local, executive, recall elections) and how these votes are afterwards translated into 
seats. 
Compounding the situation is that there is no agreement on categories for the degree of 
reform—that is, what constitutes “major”, “minor”, or “technical” changes (Katz 2005; 
Jacobs and Leyenaar 2011). Sometimes “major reform” has referred simply to major 
electoral system reform (Lijphart 1994; Renwick 2010), while in other cases it has referred 
to multiple types of election rule changes that all happen to be particularly impactful in 
some way (Katz 2005; Jacobs and Leyenaar 2011). Even when the same general definition 
of “major” reform is used, the specific criteria applied is unique.  
There is also no consensus over the categorization of types of election reform. 
Massicotte et al. (2004) define the components of election laws to include electoral 
systems, the right to vote and be a candidate, the registration process, who conducts 
elections, how people vote, and how winners and losers are sorted out. Alternatively, James 
(2011) groups scholarship into election administration, suffrage legislation, election 
boundaries, electoral finance, electoral systems, and electoral governance (2011, 2012). 
Jacobs and Leyenaar, in attempting to establish clear terminology, propose the dimensions 
of electoral reform to be the proportionality of the electoral system, ballot structure, 
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inclusiveness of the electoral legislation, election level, and practical organization of an 
election (2011: 500). But these dimensions are far afield from previous typologies, thus 
making their use limited. To make matters worse, “election administration” is itself just as 
terminologically confused as “electoral reform”, with its meaning ranging from 
encompassing voting and registration procedures (James 2011, 2012), to electoral 
governance laws (Massicotte et al. 2004), to the actual running of elections (Hayduk 2005). 
The best way to cut through such terminological confusion is to eschew any usage 
of “electoral reform” altogether.11 Rather, I define “electoral system reform” as a 
dimension of election reform concerning the preferences voters can express and the 
translation of votes into seats (à la James, Lijphart, and Renwick). “Election reform” and 
“election lawmaking” refer to the full gamut of rules concerning democratic elections. I 
also use James’ (2012) categorization of election laws as the basis for my own 
classification scheme (detailed in Chapter 4). I make no attempt to classify laws by their 
degree of importance. 
The lack of terminological uniformity may have contributed to the lack of linkages 
between scholarship on electoral systems and scholarship on other election laws.12 This 
missed connection is also likely due to the general devaluation given to election law 
changes that are not considered “major” (however defined) or do not concern electoral 
systems. Up until now, only electoral systems—and particularly only the most impactful 
 
11 Future quoted material using “electoral reform” is clarified as either electoral system reform or election 
reform. Note that “electoral law” and “election law” are used interchangeably throughout to refer generally 
to the rules that govern democratic elections.    
12 With this terminology, I am able to neatly demarcate the four bodies of research on the democratic rules 
of the game: the political science of electoral systems, the politics of electoral system reform, the political 
science of election laws, and the politics of election lawmaking. This study examines one aspect of the 
political science of electoral systems: their effect on the politics of election lawmaking.  
13 
 
elements of electoral system reform—have received the lion’s share of scholarly attention 
focused on election laws. Lijphart (1994) provides a typical example, only examining 
election reforms that substantially affect the electoral formula, district magnitude, or 
electoral threshold. Similary, Renwick (2010) limits his study to wholesale shifts between 
one of 14 electoral system categories. 
Some scholars have recently argued for a more expansive view of election laws 
beyond major electoral system reform, both in terms of the degree (i.e., minor versus 
major) and type (i.e., voting administration, campaign finance, electoral governance) of 
reform (Celis et al. 2011; Farrell 2001; Jacobs and Leyenaar 2011; Katz 2005). As argued 
by Leyenaar and Hazan (2011: 447, 499): 
… there is no reason, nor has there ever been, why changes in legislation regarding 
the (financing of) campaigns, pre-voting and smart voting systems, ballot access 
or polling, etc. should not be defined as electoral [election] reform and included 
within the scope of research on this topic….Those who stubbornly cling to the 
study of only ‘major’ reform have overlooked the fact that there have actually been 
a large number of ‘minor’ changes, sometimes in quick succession, that in 
combination not only culminate in ‘major’ reforms, but in their own right have 
also had significant political consequences. 
This concentration of scholarship on only the most major instances of electoral system 
change has started to disperse. Some scholars have expanded research into sub-national 
electoral systems (Bowler and Donovan 2008; Dalton and Gray 2003), while others have 
looked at less wholesale electoral system reform (Celis et al. 2005; Jacobs and Leyenaar 
2011) or gone beyond electoral systems to consider other types of election law (Elklit and 
Reynolds 2001; James 2012; Massicotte et al. 2004).13 A large body of American 
scholarship has examined state-level voting administration changes, though as mentioned 
 
13 See also Handley and Grofman 2008; Hartlyn et al. 2008; López-Pinter 2000; Mozaffar and Schedler 2002; 
Parkinson 2001; Qvortrup 2005; van Biezan 2004. 
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this literature has had little cross-pollination with comparative electoral system 
scholarship.14 
 The broadening of the research agenda is an encouraging development in the field. 
It has started to uncover the importance of so-called “minor” electoral system reforms and 
previously neglected areas of election law such as election administration, campaign 
finance, redistricting, and the franchise. These laws have been shown to affect voter 
turnout, representation, electoral outcomes, election integrity, and voter confidence in the 
legitimacy of the system (see generally James 2011, 2012). They also occur with much 
greater frequency than major changes to the electoral system. Lijphart (1994) counts 30 
electoral system reforms in 27 countries between 1945 and 1990, Katz (2005) counts 14 
instances of major electoral system reform in advanced democracies between 1950 and 
2005, and Renwick (2010) identifies only six cases between 1985 and 2005. By way of 
comparison, Jacobs and Leyenaar (2011) identify no fewer than 32 changes to national 
election law in the Netherlands alone between 1989 and 2007 when considering all types 
and degrees of election reform. A study of Aotearoa New Zealand using a similarly 
inclusive definition tallied 66 changes to national electoral law between 1927 and 2007 
(Christmas 2010), whereas more than 100 election reforms that affect voter turnout were 
passed in the United States between 2011 and 2017 (Ferrer 2017). 
 
 
14 A sampling of this literature includes: Bentele and O’Brien 2013; Piven and Cloward 1988, 2000; 
Schlozman and Yohai 2008; Uggen and Manza 2002; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980. 
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The Politics of Election Lawmaking  
An expanded consideration of election reform reveals the great frequency with which it 
occurs, underscoring its importance as an area of study. I now move to exploring the 
politics of election lawmaking, or the political factors that affect how and when politicians 
reform election rules. To do so, scholarship on the politics of electoral system reform and 
on state election reforms in the United States is incorporated. I pay particular attention to 
the potential for election laws to change electoral outcomes, as this is assumed to be the 
primary reason why such laws are passed. My goal is to explain why politicians change 
election laws, the factors that make partisan election reforms more likely to occur, and the 
factors that make demobilizing election reforms more frequent. To do so, it is first 
necessary to examine the roots of partisan interest in election lawmaking. 
 
Can Election Laws Shape Electoral Outcomes? 
A wide range of scholarship has shown that election laws affect turnout. Voter 
administration laws have received a great deal of attention in this regard.15 Scholars have 
found turnout effects for changes to voter registration (Ansolabehere and Konisky 2006; 
Groarke 2000; Neiheisel and Burden 2012),16 polling places (Amos et al. 2017; Brady and 
McNulty 2011), voter identification (Alvarez et al. 2008; Stewart 2013), voting by mail 
(Gronke and Miller 2012), and compulsory voting (Banducci and Karp 2009; Birch 2009, 
2016; Franklin 1999; McAllister 1986; Norris 2004). Franchise laws (The Sentencing 
 
15 See generally Hayduk 2005; James 2011, 2012; King and Hale 2016; Massicotte et al. 2004; Rosenstone 
and Wolfinger 1978, 1980 
16 See also Brians and Grofman 1999, 2001; Burden et al. 2014; Hall 2013; Highton 2004; Goel et al. 2019; 
Hanmer 2012; Larocca and Klemanski 2011; Street et al. 2015 
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Project 2016; Uggen and Manza 2002) and electoral systems (Kostadinova 2003; 
Massicotte 2008) have also been examined. On the contrary, some scholars argue that the 
effects of election laws on turnout are typically small or overstated (Alvarez et al. 2012; 
Calvert and Gilchrist 1993; Erikson and Minnite 2009; Hershey 2009; Voris 2016).  
 For election laws to shape electoral outcomes, it is not enough for them to simply 
increase or decrease turnout. They must also shape who votes—the composition of the 
electorate that participates in elections (James 2012: 50–61). This might be due to the 
general characteristics of low-turnout voters (as not being represented in current 
electorates) and to the discriminatory effects that barriers imposed by election laws have 
on different segments of the electorate. The theoretical link connecting turnout and 
electoral outcome is the relationship between socioeconomic status, turnout, and 
partisanship. Low–socioeconomic status (SES) electors—those who are low-income, less-
educated, and racial or ethnic minorities—generally support left-wing parties and generally 
vote at lower rates (Lijphart 1997; Schattschneider 1960; Verba et al. 1995). Lutz and 
Marsh have gone so far as to call the link between lower turnout and lower support for left-
wing parties and policies the “standard view” (2007: 540).  
Several studies in the United States have found that higher turnout benefits 
Democrats (Brunell and DeNardo 2004; Citrin et al. 2003; DeNardo 1980; Herron 1988; 
Martinez and Gill 2005; Wattenberg and Brians 2002). Similar trends have been found in 
Eastern Europe (Bohrer et al. 2000), Germany (Kohler 2011), the United Kingdom 
(McAllister and Mughan 1986), Australia (McAllister 1986), New Zealand (Nagel 1988), 
and developing countries (Aguilar and Pacek 2000). But other scholars have argued that 
no clear relationship between turnout and partisanship exists—or at least not across time 
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and geography (Bernhagaen and Marsh 2007; Birch 2009; DeNardo 1980; Erikson 1995; 
Fisher 2007; Grofman et al. 1999; Kohler and Rose 2010; Radcliff 1994, 1995; Rose 1974; 
Rubenson et al. 2007; van der Eijk and van Egmond 2007). Neiheisel and Burden (2012) 
have even found these effects to run in the opposite direction, with increased turnout 
benefiting right-wing parties. Some scholars argue that non-voters have unformed or fluid 
policy positions and thus cannot be depended upon to consistently swing elections in a 
certain direction when they turn out (Banducci and Karp 2009; Bennett and Resnick 1990; 
Berinsky et al. 2005; Brians and Grofman 1999; van der Eijk and van Egmond 2007; 
Fieldhouse et al. 2007; Highton 2004; Nagel and McNulty 1996; Schmitt 2009; van der 
Brug et al. 2007; Wattenberg 2002). 
If there are indeed demographic and partisan differences between voters and non-
voters, then increased or decreased turnout caused by election reforms can alter the 
demographic and partisan composition of the voting population. A large body of 
scholarship has found evidence that election reforms affect the composition of the 
electorate (for a meta-analysis specific to the United States, see Ferrer 2017). As with 
research on turnout, the scholarly focus has been on the effects of election administration 
procedures.17 Studies have found partisan and compositional effects for changes to 
registration procedures (Rigby and Springer 2011; Rugeley and Jackson 2009; Wolfinger 
and Rosenstone 1980), voter identification requirements (Ansolabehere and Konisky 2005; 
Barreto et al. 2009; Brady and McNulty 2011; Overton 2007; Stewart 2013), early voting 
(Herron and Smith 2014; Weaver 2015), polling place locations (Brady and McNulty 
2011), the franchise (The Sentencing Project 2016; Uggen and Manza 2002), and 
 
17 See generally Avey 1989; Cunningham 1991; James 2012; Hershey 2009; Piven and Cloward 1988. 
18 
 
compulsory voting (Hooghe and Pelleriaux 1998; Irwin 1974; Irwin and van Holsteyn 
2005). Alternatively, some scholars have discerned the partisan/compositional effects of 
certain election laws to be small or nonexistent (Calvert and Gilchrest 1993; Citrin et al. 
2003; Grimmer et al. 2017; Rocha and Matsubayahsi 2014; Southwell and Burchett 2000; 
Teixeira 1992; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980) or to run counter to initial expectations 
(Berinsky 2005; Neiheisel and Burden 2012; Voris 2016).  
The last step in the causal chain between election laws and electoral outcomes is 
for reforms to shift the partisan composition of the electorate enough to prove 
determinative on election day. This is a difficult task to answer empirically because it 
involves a counterfactual: what would the electorate have looked like if ceteris paribus the 
election reform had not happened?18 This is especially tricky because parties adapt their 
behavior in the face of changes to the rules of the game, which could mitigate or even 
reverse the intended partisan outcomes of reform (Rocha and Matsubayashi 2014; Schaffer 
2008; Valentino and Neuner 2017; Voris 2016). Kohler and Rose conclude that (2010: 
132): 
The conjunction of conditions [in which maximizing turnout could alter an election 
result] are relatively rare: it is an accident of history that low turnout and close 
elections tend to occur most frequently in American presidential elections, where 
the largest amount of research is conducted on voting behaviour. The conjunction 
of conditions…are not often found in European proportional representation 
parliamentary election systems.  
But the very fact that voting laws can change the composition of the electorate might mean 
they influence politics in other ways, fragmenting the party system (Jensen and Spoon 
 
18 This is more easily discernible in the case of franchise laws where those affected by reforms can be readily 
identified. For instance, Manza and Uggen (2008) conclude that felon disenfranchisement statutes in the 
United States have altered the outcome of a presidential election and several Senate and gubernatorial races. 
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2011), altering policy decisions (Hicks and Swank 1992; Martin 2003), and shifting the 
degree of inequality (Birch 2009; Chong and Olivera 2005).  
There is both a substantial body of scholarship showing that election reforms can 
have partisan effects and substantive criticisms of that finding. But in moving toward a 
politics of election lawmaking, it is important to recognize that perceptions can matter just 
as much as reality. Politicians are imperfect human beings making decisions based on their 
understanding of the world. The widespread perception that changing certain election laws 
will confer a partisan benefit and pave the way to electoral victory will shape politicians’ 
actions, even if that belief is erroneous. There is certainly enough scholarship supporting a 
“partisan gain” view of election laws that it would be reasonable for politicians to assume 
election lawmaking to be an electoral strategy worth pursuing. The fact that politicians 
regularly change election laws19 (Christmas 2010; Jacobs and Leyenaar 2011; James 2012) 
lends credence to this argument and makes election lawmaking worthy of study, regardless 
of whether reforms in fact prove electorally determinative. 
 
Constraints and Non-Constraints: Lessons from the Politics of Electoral Systems  
It is necessary here to make a distinction between the factors that affect variations in the 
politics of election lawmaking (such as the amount of partisan and demobilizing bills 
passed) and the context-specific triggers that bring instances of election reform onto the 
political agenda (such as administrative failure, technological advancements, and judicial 
 
19 Contrary to Richard Katz’s (2005) claim that “minor” election reforms happen infrequently, although the 
claim was made without attempting a systematic search for instances of such lawmaking.   
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decisions). Although the literature on the politics of electoral system reform has covered 
both topics, the triggers of major electoral system reform are not generalizable to election 
lawmaking (Jacobs and Leyenaar 2011).20 Therefore, this thesis centers on the factors that 
affect the incidence of election lawmaking rather than the reasons that specific bills are 
brought onto the legislative agenda.21  
 The oldest and simplest argument from scholars of electoral system reform is that 
politicians are self-interested, rational actors who will seek to change electoral systems for 
personal gain (Benoit 2004; Boix 1999; Brady and Mo 1992; Kellner 1995; Lispon 1959; 
Riker 1984; Rokkan 1970). In this formulation, the primary goal of politicians is to 
maximize the seat share of their party. They will thus seek electoral changes that benefit 
them to the greatest extent possible. Benoit (2004) provides a small modification to the 
self-interest argument, recognizing the agency of individuals as separately self-interested 
and thus behaving strategically to maximize both their individual chances of electoral 
success and the party’s overall political fortunes.  
 If naked electoral self-interest were the only part of the equation, then we might 
expect electoral system change to be a frequent occurrence. But as noted earlier, major 
change is exceedingly rare (Lijphart 2012; Katz 2005; Renwick 2010). Scholars have 
complicated this theory of self-interest in three major ways: (1) by expanding the arena of 
power and value considerations politicians face, (2) by expanding the number of actors 
 
20 For an analysis of electoral system triggers, see Renwick 2010. 
21 The policy triggers that have brought election reform onto the legislative agenda in Aotearoa New Zealand 
are considered briefly in Chapter 6. 
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involved in decision-making beyond politicians, and (3) by utilizing an institutionalist 
framework to recognize the barriers faced by these actors. Each is examined in turn. 
 First, recent scholarship has recognized that politicians have more complex self-
interest matrices—and face more obstacles to reform—than was previously understood 
(Renwick 2010). Some scholars have questioned the degree to which politicians single-
mindedly pursue their own electoral goals, arguing that normative (democratic) values are 
also important to these actors (Andrews and Jackman 2005; Blais and Massicotte 1997; 
Katz 2005; Nagel 2004). In changing the rules of the game, politicians may seek 
ideological goals such as fairness, equality, representation, accountability, and maximum 
participation—values that may clash with electoral self-interest. Even when actors try to 
pursue naked self-interest, they face numerous complications. Politicians are not 
omnipotent, but rather must deal with imperfect information about the effects of reform. 
This is especially true in the case of major reforms, as the rarity of such changes means 
that there is greater uncertainty about their electoral impact. In some circumstances, this 
makes it impossible to predict the electoral outcome of legislative action (Andrews and 
Jackman 2005). Limited information also means that politicians are not able to consider all 
potential reform options and define the most optimal one. Rather, they are limited by which 
options they readily know about (Renwick 2010). Politicians also usually have short time 
horizons, only considering the immediate impacts of electoral changes and discounting 
longer-term effects (Renwick 2010; Rose 1983). Rarely will they worry about any election 
beyond the next one, yet rule changes that aid them in the short run may prove detrimental 
in future election cycles. In multiparty and minority government situations, parties must 
also consider a more complex playing field. Bargaining and negotiation are necessary steps 
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in crafting a legislative majority. Election reform can be used as a bargaining chip to win 
another party’s support.  
 Politicians additionally must consider public opinion when engaging in election 
lawmaking (Renwick 2010). This can broadly be termed “act-contingent considerations”, 
or the effects of the act of legislating itself, which contrasts with “outcome-contingent 
considerations”—the effects of the law change (Reed and Thies 2001; see also James 2012; 
Shugart and Wattenberg 2001). Politicians can be constrained by act-contingent 
considerations in two ways: being forced to support reforms they would otherwise oppose, 
and not being able to pass reforms that they would otherwise support. As Richard Katz puts 
it, “[e]ven when a reform would clearly be costly to the parties in power, they may expect 
resistance to be even more costly; even when parties have the capacity to tweak the rules 
to their advantage, the expected benefits may be outweighed by the potential backlash” 
(2005: 75). The more substantial the reform, the higher the act-contingent considerations. 
This is because the electoral changes are more visible, increasing the chances that the next 
election becomes a referendum on those changes (Quintal 1970). The public’s values may 
also come into play with substantial reform proposals. If the public views certain options 
as illegitimate, they can impose harsh electoral penalties on politicians who enact them 
(Leyenaar and Hazan 2011).   
Second, scholars have recognized that a greater number of actors are involved in 
decision-making than originally considered. The recognition of act-contingent 
considerations is the recognition that actors besides politicians exert power. Politicians 
cannot just care about themselves; if their goal is to maximize their electoral control, then 
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they must care about how the (voting) electorate views them. Katz writes eloquently on the 
matter (2005: 73): 
It is not necessarily the case that parties in power fail to pursue their self-interest, 
but rather that, paradoxically (perhaps the true paradox), it is not in their self-
interest to pursue their self-interest because other actors in the political process—
including many voters—react badly to excessive partisanship. In other words, even 
if parties are simply motivated by self-interest, and unrestrained by any normative 
commitment to democratic principles, they might still find abstaining from even 
the appearance of electoral manipulation to be to their advantage. 
In other words, politicians will be constrained in manipulating the rules of the game for 
their benefit when they fear public backlash for being viewed as manipulators of the 
system. This is because the broader effects of such a move may prove more deleterious to 
their electoral prospects than the advantage gained through the reform. Similarly, 
supporting popular reforms that mechanically hurt a party may bring them more electoral 
support than preventing the wanted changes would. Other external actors may play a role 
as well. Academic and government experts can help determine the menu of reform options 
considered, judges can provide an independent check on legislative power, and NGOs can 
mobilize publics for or against reform proposals. All these actors are outside the direct 
control of parties and politicians and thus present additional barriers to reform. 
 Finally, some scholars have utilized an institutionalist approach to electoral system 
reform, putting the constraints imposed by political institutions front and center. This 
framework starts with the proposition that politicians’ actions are constrained by the 
structure of the system within which they operate. For politicians to achieve desired 
reforms, they must overcome every procedural obstacle imposed by the system, for “if they 
do not successfully overcome each and every one of them they will fail” (Rahat and Hazan 
2011: 480; see also van der Kolk 2007). These barriers can include the procedural 
superiority of the status quo, political tradition, systemic balance and efficiency of the 
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system, actors’ vested interests, and coalition politics (Jacobs and Leyenaar 2011). In the 
language of Tsebelis, politicians face a number of veto players who can prevent legislative 
action from taking place (2002). The more veto players exist (in the form of second 
chambers, judges, executives, supermajority requirements, and even public opinion via 
referendums), the more difficult it is for politicians to achieve their desired ends.  
In sum, scholarship on electoral system reform has found that a variety of factors 
inhibit politicians from altering the rules of the game for their personal benefit. Political 
actors have complex self-interest and value matrices, contest power with other actors and 
the public, and face institutional barriers to action. Now I will adapt the lessons learned 
from studies of electoral system reform to the unique terrain of election lawmaking.  
 
From The Politics of Electoral System Reform to The Politics of Election Reform 
The existing scholarship on the politics of electoral system reform has provided a great 
deal of insight into the incentives and constraints faced by actors in passing these changes. 
Many of these lessons hold true for the study of election reform beyond major electoral 
system change, including the recognition of complex power and value considerations, act-
contingent constraints, multiple actors and veto players, and the imperatives of coalition 
politics. But there are a few critical differences between a phenomenon that occurs only a 
few times a decade worldwide and one that occurs on a yearly basis in a typical country. 
With the greatly expanded number of cases that can be considered, there is also the 
opportunity to develop a more systematic theory of election lawmaking than the politics of 
electoral system reform allows (Jacobs and Leyenaar 2011). 
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When comparing broadly defined “election reform” with major electoral system 
reform, perhaps the biggest difference is that the barriers to change are significantly lower. 
This is because both act-contingent and outcome-contingent constraints to lawmaking are 
diminished. Act-contingent constraints are lower because there is less public interest in 
election reforms than in major electoral system change, and therefore greater invisibility 
of political manipulation. Academics have long noted how the subject of election law 
causes people’s eyes to glaze over (see Gallagher 2005). Even wholesale electoral system 
change rarely garners broad public interest (Katz 2005; Renwick 2010); it should therefore 
be no surprise that changes to registration provisions and voting procedures are even further 
from people’s minds. As the public is less likely to notice or care about minor changes to 
election rules, politicians will feel less constrained by fears of public backlash at being 
viewed as manipulators of the system. Therefore, they are more easily able to manipulate 
election laws for their benefit. This is normatively worrisome. Representative democracies 
supposedly function by allowing voters to choose politicians to represent them, who are 
then held accountable for their actions when they face reelection. If politicians can game 
the system without repercussions, this marks a fundamental breakdown in the contract 
between voter and officeholder.  
Election reforms are also easier to pass than major electoral system because they 
face less opposition from politicians. By their very nature, non-major changes to the rules 
of the democratic game are less likely to alter the outcome of that game. Kohler and Rose 
(2010) theorize that only in rare cases would any type of election change alter an electoral 
outcome. It follows that small changes to voting administration rules, polling hours, or 
prisoner voting rights will rarely make the difference on election night. As there is less to 
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be lost from small rule changes, politicians opposed to them will be more likely to allow 
the majority to have its way without a fight. This also means that politicians may be less 
motivated by pure electoral self-interest when considering minor election reforms as there 
is less to be gained electorally. Instead, they will care more about ideology, democratic 
norms, and public opinion—in other words, act-contingent considerations trumping 
outcome-contingent ones.22 As put by Jacobs and Leyenaar, “it seems that, when it comes 
to minor reforms, the costs of opposing the reform are more easily outweighed by the costs 
of supporting it when the reform ‘increases democracy’” (2011: 509). This suggests that 
non-partisan election reforms might be a common occurrence, especially ones that expand 
participation. Reduced information barriers for politicians may also play a role. Because 
there are more cases of election reform than major electoral system reform, legislators 
generally have a more accurate picture of what impact the reform will have. The presence 
of better information can make politicians more eager to pursue legislative changes.  
The fact that barriers to election reform outside major electoral system changes are 
relatively low has led Katz to question why “minor” election reforms do not happen more 
frequently: “[s]ince [parties] could gain partisan advantage by changing the rules of the 
game, why do parties not do so more often?” (2005: 69). One possible answer is that the 
combination of constraints remains significant. Fears of public backlash, complex coalition 
politics, imperfect information, and the desire to use precious legislative time to focus on 
other policy priorities may all combine to create an environment that is quite inhospitable 
to frequent election law changes. Another possible answer is that election reforms are 
 
22 Less potential gain from election reforms should also theoretically reduce the ruling party’s interest in 
pursuing such changes. However, the extensive record of election lawmaking stands as strong evidence that 
this is not the case.   
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rarely likely to prove determinative in an electoral outcome. In the vein of Kohler and Rose 
(2010), minor election reforms are simply too unlikely to make much of a difference to be 
worth pursuing. It is an accident of history, in their reckoning, that the only country where 
the combination of factors happens to make minor election reforms worthwhile—the 
United States—is also the one where most political science scholarship takes place. The 
most plausible response to Katz, however, is that “minor” election reforms do occur with 
greater frequency but that this has been ignored by most existing scholarship. The paucity 
of studies on election lawmaking means it is hard to say which is the case for sure, but the 
scholarship that has been undertaken points to this reason as the most compelling. When 
scholars have closely examined cases of election lawmaking in single-country studies, they 
have found frequent instances of legislative change.23  
 
Partisan Election Lawmaking 
Given that politicians face fewer barriers in enacting minor election reforms and that they 
engage in election lawmaking on a routine—even “politics as usual”—basis (Jacobs and 
Leyenaar 2011: 504), the study of the politics of election lawmaking lends itself much more 
readily to general theorizing than does the politics of major electoral system reform. One 
important research topic concerns the factors that encourage or discourage the 
manipulation of election laws for partisan interest. Although this topic has received 
substantial attention within the United States (where studies compare states with one 
 
23 For the Netherlands, see Jacobs and Leyenaar 2011; for New Zealand, see Christmas 2010; for the United 
States, see Ferrer 2017. 
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another), it has unfortunately received scant attention elsewhere, leading James to label 
most scholarship in the field as “parochial” (2011: 221).  
In the United States, a wave of highly partisan election lawmaking across dozens 
of states has led scholars to examine which factors lead to the passage of voting restrictions, 
or reforms that increase the burden on electors and decrease opportunities to cast a ballot. 
These studies have found the passage of restrictions to be driven by politicians, strategic in 
nature, and highly racialized (Bateman 2016; Bentele and O’Brien 2013; Biggers and 
Hanmer 2017; Hicks et al. 2015; Hicks et al. 2016; McKee 2015; Rocha and Matsubayashi 
2014; Vandewalker and Bentele 2015; Voris 2016). Scholars have found relationships 
between restrictive law proposal/passage and electoral competitiveness, Republican 
legislative and executive control, and racial and class factors (Bentele and O’Brien 2013; 
Vandewalker and Bentele 2015). In terms of race, larger African American populations, 
increases in minority turnout, and greater prevalence of anti-black stereotyping are all 
correlates of restrictive election bills. By identifying the determinants of voting restriction 
passage, these studies have detected which political and demographic factors make partisan 
election lawmaking more likely. They face two major shortcomings. The narrow concern 
of the literature on voting restrictions to the exclusion of voting expansions and 
participatorily neutral reforms has left an incomplete picture of the politics of election 
lawmaking in the United States. And the inherent limitations of within-country analysis 
have meant that these studies are unable to test the effects of electoral and party systems 
on the partisanship of election reforms.  
To my knowledge, James is the only scholar outside the United States to undertake 
an empirical study of the correlates of partisan election lawmaking (2011, 2012). 
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Comparing Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the United States, James identifies five 
“systematic legal and political features” that make partisan election lawmaking more 
likely: greater constitutional control given to legislatures over election procedure, a 
federalized constitutional system, a less proportional electoral system, a two-party political 
system, and the presence of a left-right SES cleavage (2012: 216–19). Kohler and Rose 
(2010) analyze the factors that make higher turnout more likely to determine electoral 
outcomes, which should closely relate to greater incentives for parties to pass partisan 
election laws. In addition to the importance of the electoral and party systems mentioned 
by James, they propose that higher turnout is more likely to be determinative in the 
following circumstances: (1) when turnout is lower and therefore non-voters have more 
leverage, (2) when there is greater divergence between the party preferences of non-voters 
and voters, and (3) when the electoral environment is more competitive. 
Existing scholarship has suggested a few additional factors. Partisan election 
lawmaking may become more likely under increased economic inequality (Minnite 2010; 
Interview B), within divisive and polarized political cultures (Minnite 2010; Interview B), 
when legislative procedures are more streamlined (Christmas 2010), and when the 
desirability of consensual lawmaking is diminished (Christmas 2010; McLeay 2018). The 
importance of a government mandate for action can make previously promised election 
reforms easier to pass and previously unmentioned reforms more difficult to achieve 
(Christmas 2010; Interview H). Coalition formation dynamics are also important, though 
they are closely related to the electoral system (Malone 2008; McLeay 2018). Finally, the 
specific politics of election lawmaking will be shaped by the type (James 2012), degree 
(Jacobs and Leyenaar 2011), and participatory direction (Ferrer 2017) of change. Franchise 
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laws will be treated differently than voter identification reforms, major changes to early 
voting will be looked at more closely than technical changes, and expansions of the 
electorate will bring into play different value and ideological considerations than will 
contractions to the voting population.  
Of the factors listed, the electoral system has most consistently been suggested as 
playing a critical role in affecting the politics of election lawmaking (James 2011, 2012; 
Kohler and Rose 2010; Minnite 2010; Piven et al. 2009; Interview B). Previous studies 
have usually only hinted at this connection rather than testing it explicitly. Where it has 
been tested empirically, only one aspect of election reform—election administration— has 
been considered (James 2011, 2012). 
 
Demobilizing Election Lawmaking 
An important component of election reform study is examining when politicians 
manipulate the rules of the game to prevent or discourage electors from participating. This 
kind of legislative action has been called “voter suppression” or “voting restrictions” in 
American contexts (Ferrer 2017; Minnite 2010; Overton 2007; Piven et al. 2009; Roth 
2016; Wang 2016), but more generally can be referred to as “demobilization” 
(Cunningham 1991; Valentino and Neuner 2017).24 The existence of demobilizing election 
laws is counter to the traditional view of party competition, which held that parties 
constantly seek new ways to mobilize voters and expand the electorate in order to win 
 
24 Non-legislative procedures and campaign tactics have also been included in the definitions of voter 
suppression and voter demobilization, but I focus here only on legislative actions. For a typology of election 
administration restrictions, see James 2011, 2012. 
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additional support (Dahl 1967; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Schattschneider 1942). The 
substantial body of scholarship documenting cases of voter demobilization in the United 
States clearly refutes this theory (Hayduk 1996, 2005; Keyssar 2009; Minnite 2000, 2010; 
Piven and Cloward 1988, 2000). Responding to an environment where restrictions are 
passed on a nearly daily basis and a history where black Americans have routinely been 
prevented from voting, Piven et al. (2009) theorize that pursuing voting restrictions is a 
rational political strategy in polities that contain marginalized subjects with discordant 
preferences. If the inclusion of an easily identifiable underrepresented group were to force 
policy changes that would antagonize existing members of a party’s electoral coalition, the 
party may seek to avoid upsetting the current members of its coalition by continuing to 
exclude the group. The authors also posit that the same factors that increase partisan 
election lawmaking should encourage voter demobilization, including non-proportional 
electoral systems, fewer parties, close elections, high inequality, and a large divergence in 
the preferences of voters and non-voters (Piven et al. 2009: 16–17; Minnite 2010; Interview 
B). 
 Demobilizing election lawmaking can at times be synonymous with partisan 
election lawmaking, as when one party attempts to push through voting restrictions that 
other parties oppose. But it can also be distinct, for instance when all parties with legislative 
representation agree to implement barriers to the ballot box that disproportionately burden 
the most marginalized and politically disengaged communities. Even more common is a 
form of passive demobilization, where parties tacitly approve maintaining a series of 
election rules designed to exclude certain minorities from democratic participation.  
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Although the extensive amount of American scholarship on the subject has 
uncovered important lessons, it has failed to shed light on the role electoral systems play 
in encouraging or discouraging demobilizing election reforms. The study of demobilizing 
election lawmaking is even more neglected than partisanship, as even James’ (2011, 2012) 
studies fail to analyze the correlates of demobilizing reforms. To my knowledge, no 
research has empirically examined the link between electoral systems and demobilization. 
This thesis brings the issue of voter restrictions front and center, disentangling them from 
partisan election lawmaking and empirically testing the relationship between electoral 
systems and demobilizing election lawmaking.  
 
Theoretical Foundation: Elite Agency, Statecraft Theory, and Neo-Institutionalism 
Rather than adhering to specified formal political theories, I emphasize certain theoretical 
elements that form the basis of this work. The first is a recognition that politicians are 
“political elites” who (1) hold divergent interests from the mass public (generally skewing 
wealthy and conservative), (2) possess the agency to set the political agenda and shape 
public debate (à la Lukes 2005), and (3) use power to achieve their own interests to the 
detriment of society. Murray Edelman shows how politicians, acting as political elites, 
utilize mass media and rhetoric to shape the public’s perceptions of reality and 
achieve/maintain ingrained political and economic inequalities (1960, 1975, 1977, 1988). 
Because the stakes of elections are so high—and the spoils of office so (personally) large—
political elites value winning elections and being reelected above virtually all else. They 
achieve these goals through successful “statecraft”, which involves party management, a 
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winning electoral strategy, the predominance of elite debate, and governing competence. 
This theory was initially developed by Jim Bulpitt (1986, 1996), but has been more fully 
developed by James, who added “bending the rules of the game” as a viable statecraft 
strategy (2012: 81–85; see also James 2016). Two elements of this theory are particularly 
relevant for my purposes: the understanding that political elites care very deeply about 
winning elections, and the recognition that election lawmaking is a viable strategy that 
politicians can use to achieve this goal.  
Neo-institutionalism is concerned with the role institutions play in the 
determination of social and political outcomes (Hall and Taylor 2003). It is a recent 
evolution from the much older theory of institutionalism, which focused on institutional 
structures to the exclusion of the role of actors and narratives of change. More specifically, 
neo-institutionalism concerns the historical context and temporal development of 
institutions, the concept of critical junctures as creating path dependencies that shape future 
events and decisions, and a theory of actor motivations that assumes self-interest and 
rationality (James 2016). Whereas statecraft theory focuses on actors (i.e., political elites), 
neo-institutionalism focuses on institutions. An analysis of the politics of election 
lawmaking must recognize the role of both politicians and the institutional structures they 
shape and are shaped by. These legislative and electoral structures constrain and incentivize 
the actions taken by political elites, who also may change those structures to further their 
own self-interested ends. In this thesis, therefore, neo-institutionalism is used as a 
framework to study the effects of institutional change on politicians’ ability to carry out 




The Importance of Studying the Politics of Election Lawmaking in an Era of Democratic 
Decline 
The world is undergoing a period of democratic decline (Dalton 2004; Hay and Stoker 
2009; Marsh and Miller 2012). Many countries are facing diminishing participation rates, 
increasingly disengaged electorates, and backslides into semi-democratic and non-
democratic states. According to Freedom House (2019), the world has experienced 12 
consecutive years of declining global freedom, spanning countries in every region and at 
every level of democratization. In their words, “the pattern is consistent and ominous. 
Democracy is in retreat” (2019: 1). Given that elections are the keystone of modern 
democracies (Powell 2000), understanding how and when politicians change the rules that 
govern elections is of critical importance. This chapter has developed a framework for 
analyzing the politics of election lawmaking. It concludes by examining the implications 
of both partisan and demobilizing election reforms. 
 Partisan election lawmaking is deleterious because it erodes faith in the democratic 
process (James 2011, 2012). The legitimacy to bestow collective decision-making power 
on certain representatives is the primary purpose of elections. When politicians are (seen 
as) manipulating the rules of the game for their benefit, this can lead to the delegitimization 
of election results and a rejection of the democratic process. One example of this 
delegitimization is a body of scholarship linking partisan voter identification laws passed 
in the United States with an erosion of Democratic voter confidence in elections (Bowler 
and Donovan 2016; King 2017; Hasen 2014; Stewart et al. 2016). 
 In addition to eroding confidence in the democratic process, demobilizing election 
lawmaking skews electorates, leading to unrepresentative government, unrepresentative 
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policies, and greater inequality (Bentele and O’Brien 2013; Lijphart 1997; Mueller and 
Stratmann 2003; see also Wong 2017). Discouraging participation and exacerbating 
political inequalities are also undesirable for normative reasons (Barber 1984; Lacroix 
2007; Pateman 1970; Verba 1996). Excluding marginalized groups from participation 
means their needs will not be adequately considered by decision-makers, leaving them 
materially worse off. The resultant inequality ends up leaving the entire society worse off 
(Guinier and Torres 2002). 
 Distinguishing between partisan and demobilizing election lawmaking permits the 
unique negative effects of each to be examined. Previous scholarship has failed to clearly 
make this demarcation. Doing so allows me to analyze normatively ambiguous situations 
such as partisan election laws that mobilize voters, identifying the deleterious effects of 
controversial passage along with the beneficial effects of increased participation. The 
utility of this distinction becomes evident when considering cases such Labour’s election 
bill mentioned in Chapter 1. A matrix of election lawmaking utilizing this distinction is 
presented in Chapter 5. 
 Considering the positive and normative factors at stake, it is vital to better 
understand which institutional structures encourage partisan and demobilizing election 
lawmaking. It is clear this area has been neglected by scholars thus far. It is equally clear 
that the existing scholarship on electoral system change has left clues to analyze the politics 
of election lawmaking: as a phenomenon characterized by self-interested politicians 
seeking electoral advantage but constrained by the institutions they operate within. This 
thesis uses these clues as the basis for empirical analysis, testing the effects of systemic 
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CHAPTER 3: WHY AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND? 
 
 
Aotearoa New Zealand presents a unique case as the best opportunity to test the 
relationship between a nation’s electoral system and partisan/demobilizing election 
reforms. This is because it is the only established democracy in the world to permanently 
switch between a non-proportional and a proportional electoral system (Renwick 2010). 
This chapter explores the implications of Aotearoa New Zealand’s 1996 move from FPTP 
to MMP for studying the politics of election lawmaking. It also explores a few other unique 
characteristics of the country, including extreme party cohesion, the concentration of 
executive power, and the presence of a large marginalized indigenous population. Aotearoa 
New Zealand’s reputation as a model democracy is also scrutinized. 
 
 Aotearoa New Zealand’s 1996 Electoral System Reform 
A summary of the differences between the FPTP and MMP electoral systems in Aotearoa 
New Zealand is provided in Table 3.1 (below). The narrative of how and why Aotearoa 
New Zealand went about fundamentally transforming its electoral system has been 
extensively covered elsewhere.25 The process was long and complex, involving a Royal 
Commission, multiple broken political promises, misread debate notes, and two national 
referendums. The aftershocks of reform led to a binding referendum on retaining MMP in 
2011 that was approved. It has also led to two official reviews of the MMP system, in 2001 
 
25 See Aimer 2008; Atkinson 2003: 201–33; Boston et al. 1996; Denemark 2001; Geddis 2014; Hawke 1993; 
Jackson and McRobie 1998; Mackerras 1994; Malone 2008; Nagel 1994, 2004; Palmer 2014; Renwick 2007, 
2010; Vowles 1995; Vowles et al. 1995. 
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and 2012, both of which have failed to result in legislative reforms (on the 2001 review, 
see Church and McLeay 2003; on the 2012 review, see Geddis 2013). By all indications, 
MMP is here to stay (Palmer and Butler 2016).  




Size of Parliament 99 120, with overhangs26 
Number of 
electorates 
99, allocated on a FPTP basis 65, allocated on a FPTP basis27 
Voting Method One vote, for electorate 
candidate 
Two votes, one for electorate candidate and 
one for party 
List seats None 55, allocated to make each party's 
parliamentary representation proportional to 
their nationwide party vote27 
Threshold N/A 5% or win at least one electorate seat 
Māori electorates Fixed at 4 Proportional to size of Māori electoral 
population 
Governance No Electoral Commission28 Electoral Commission established to regulate 





representation from each 
major party 
Unchanged 
Entrenched statutes FPTP method of voting MMP method of voting 
 
The rarity of the occurrence is particularly relevant. Aotearoa New Zealand is 
unusual simply for being considered an established democracy, which Lijphart defines as 
 
26 Overhangs occur when a party wins more electorate seats than its share of the party vote entitles it to. In 
Aotearoa New Zealand, parties keep the extra seat(s) won but other parties are still awarded the number of 
seats they would otherwise be entitled to. This means that the size of parliament is temporarily increased by 
the number of overhung seats.   
27 The number of South Island general seats are fixed at 16. This number is used to determine the number of 
North Island and Māori electorates. If the North Island or Māori electoral population grow disproportionately 
to the South Island general population, then additional electorate seats are added at the expense of list seats. 
“Northern drift” has resulted in a significant increase in the number of electorate seats and a significant 
reduction in the number of list seats. There are currently 71 electorate seats (comprised of 64 general and 
seven Māori) and 49 list seats. The repercussions of fewer list seats are explored in Chapter 7.  




a country rated by Freedom House as being “free” for at least the past 20 years (2012: 46–
52). Lijphart identifies only 36 countries that meet this criterion.29 Scholars have focused 
their study of democratic institutions on established democracies, partially because of 
Eurocentrism (devaluing research in non-Western countries) and partially because these 
are the only countries where certain types of studies of electoral systems can take place. 
As explored in the previous chapter, only a handful of these countries have experienced 
significant changes to their electoral system since WWII. Major electoral changes to long-
running democracies are nearly unprecedented. A categorical change to the proportionality 
of an electoral system is unprecedented; as already noted, Aotearoa New Zealand is the 
only established democracy to permanently switch between non-proportional and 
proportional electoral systems. In a study of major electoral system reforms among 
established democracies, Renwick describes Aotearoa New Zealand’s change as the “most 
momentous” of them all (2010: 6): 
Aside from brief use of a two-round system in 1908 and 1911, New Zealand had 
never deviated from plurality rule, and single-member plurality became universal 
there before even in the UK. In 1993, however, New Zealand broke all 
Westminster tradition. Not only did it adopt proportional representation: it also 
opted for a form of PR—MMP—never before used in the Westminster world. A 
country that previously had shown exceptional electoral system conservatism 
stepped decisively into the unknown. 
In short, Aotearoa New Zealand is special. 
 This shift has by no means been ignored by the academic community. In addition 
to providing a narrative of electoral transformation and examining why the change took 
place (Jackson and McRobie 1998; McRobie 1997; Renwick 2007, 2009, 2010; Vowles 
 
29 Note that countries with populations of less than a quarter of a million are excluded. This number has 
remained the same in both the 1999 and 2012 editions of Patterns of Democracy because Argentina, Uruguay, 
and Korea aged into the “established” democracy status in the latter edition while Colombia, Venezuela, and 
Papua New Guinea no longer had free and fair democracies. Worldwide democratic decline might perpetuate 
this trend, demoting previously longstanding democracies as newer democracies reach maturity. 
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1995), scholars have studied the effects of electoral system change. The most immediate 
and direct effects have been to political parties and parliament. MMP has significantly 
decreased the degree of disproportionality in elections, or the degree to which the 
percentage of votes the parties receive diverge from the percentage of seats they win. 
Between 1946 and 1993, Aotearoa New Zealand’s average disproportionality was 11.10 
according to the Gallagher index, but between 1996 and 2014 (under the MMP system) 
this sharply declined to 3.00, indicating that seats are now allocated to political parties 
mostly proportional to the number of votes each party receives (Arseneau and Roberts 
2015; Lijphart 2012). Electoral system reform has increased both the number of parties that 
contest elections and the number of parties that are represented in parliament (Barker and 
McLeay 2000), brought legal recognition and statutory obligations to political parties 
(Geddis and Morris 2004; Geddis 2014), and arguably increased the fairness and legitimacy 
of the democratic process (McRobie 1997; Nagel 2012). MMP has also increased the 
gender and ethnic diversity of MPs (Maoate-Cox 2018; McRobie 1997) and has shifted the 
focus of political campaigns from a handful of swing voters in marginal electorates to the 
nationwide party vote (Vowles 2010). Parties must now find coalition partners to govern 
and minority governments are frequently formed (Boston and Bullock 2009; Boston 2011). 
Select committees are oftentimes controlled by the opposition party (Malone 2008), while 
public and parliamentary deliberation have become part of the natural legislative process 
(Aroney and Thomas 2012; Malone 2008). These factors have slowed the legislative 
process and diluted executive power—which several scholars recognize was the primary 
goal of switching to MMP (Malone 2008; Palmer and Palmer 2004). Electoral system 
reform has also seemed to increase public faith in Aotearoa New Zealand’s democracy and 
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governance. Trust and confidence in parliament had atrophied from 32 percent in 1975 to 
only 4 percent in 1992 (McLeay et al. 1996), but this had rebounded to 49 percent in 2018 
(Institute for Governance and Policy Studies 2018). On the other hand, electoral system 
reform has not turned the tide in falling turnout rates (Vowles 2002, 2010), nor has it 
cleaned up “dirty” campaign tactics (Hager 2006, 2014; Interview O), improved the level 
of government accountability (Aroney and Thomas 2012), reduced the level of polarization 
between political parties (Gibbons 2011; Interview C), or reinvigorated mass participation 
in parties (Miller 2005). The effects of electoral system reform on the politics of election 
lawmaking itself has yet to be examined. 
 Scholars have begun to recognize that major electoral system reform provides 
important opportunities for study. Shugart labels studies that examine the effects of 
electoral system reform within a single country as comparative, calling them “outstanding 
examples of theoretically significant research inasmuch as they allow much to be held 
constant, and thus help us understand both the power of electoral rules and their limits to 
changing political behavior” (2005: 29). Instances of electoral system change can be 
thought of as natural experiments (or, in Shugart’s words, “crucial experiments”) where 
the variable of interest is manipulated by nature, allowing more direct causal relationships 
to be formed. Although studies of electoral systems that focus on within-country reform 
are still observational in nature, they cut out much of the noise inherent in between-country 
observational studies. Shugart details this phenomenon (2005: 34): 
In the case of electoral [system] reform, the crucial experiment allows us to see in 
one country how electoral politics responds to changes in the electoral system. 
Thus we can hold constant numerous other factors that might confound the 
relationship being tested for when we are using observations from separate 
countries with distinct political histories, cultures, and so on. Of course, it is not a 
perfect control, as other factors—for example, demographic changes, or the rise or 
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decline of issue cleavages—may have been the underlying cause of the change of 
electoral system in the first place. Nonetheless, electoral [system] reform offers a 
more controlled environment than we normally confront. The cases of New 
Zealand and Italy have proven especially fruitful for this type of controlled 
experiment. 
As such, Aotearoa New Zealand is thricely unique for scholarly study: one of only 36 
established democracies in the world, one of only six established democracies that has 
recently experienced major electoral system reform, and the only established democracy 
to experience an electoral system reform that has wholly shifted its democracy between 
non-proportionality and proportionality. Aotearoa New Zealand is thus the only possible 
case study of an established democracy shifting from a non-proportional electoral system 
to a proportional one and the only natural experiment available for testing the effects of 
proportional electoral systems on the politics of election lawmaking.30 
 It is worth making the broader point that Aotearoa New Zealand provides the best 
grounds for doing studies that examine the indirect effects of proportional representation. 
Nowhere else can a study pinpoint the effects of a sudden change in the degree of 
proportionality on any number of indicators—whether it be the level of divisiveness and 
partisanship in politics, the responsiveness of government to public opinion, the budgeting 
process and provision of public goods (Boston and Church 2002), or the degree to which 
election laws are manipulated for partisan purposes. It has now been 24 years since New 
Zealanders voted in the first election using MMP and 27 years since New Zealanders voted 
for MMP via popular referendum. As the country’s FPTP era slides ever further into the 
past, it is becoming increasingly difficult to conduct research comparing the FPTP and 
MMP eras, and therefore more difficult to pinpoint the effects of electoral systems on a 
 
30 There is in fact no case of wholesale, long-lasting electoral system reform from proportionality to non-
proportionality among established democracies. 
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wide array of political, economic, and social phenomena. As it is unclear when the next 
such opportunity will arise around the world, now is the time for scholars to take full 
advantage of the country’s singular political history. 
 
Beyond Electoral System Reform: Aotearoa New Zealand’s Unique Political System 
While electoral system reform makes Aotearoa New Zealand worthy of study, it is 
important to consider several other factors that make this country an outlier compared to 
other established democracies. The country was long considered to be the purest example 
of the Westminster model of government, or the concentration of power in the executive 
(Lijphart 2012). The absence of a written constitution and (since 1951) a second chamber, 
the unitary concentration of power in the central government, and the lack of judicial 
review of legislation—coupled with a FPTP, two-party parliamentary system—meant that 
executive government was virtually unchecked (Palmer 1990). The only mitigating factor 
was an unusually brief three-year term of office. Furthermore, political parties in Aotearoa 
New Zealand exhibit extreme party cohesion, with party leadership demanding unanimous 
member support on almost all legislative votes (Duncan and Gillon 2015). It was largely 
to restrain such unbridled executive power that academics and the public supported the 
switch to MMP, and consequently proportionality, multiparty representation, and coalition 
parliaments (Malone 2008; Palmer and Palmer 2004). There are other countervailing trends 
to the concentration of executive power. The Central Bank has grown more independent 
over the past several decades (Lijphart 2012) and the judicial system has strengthened 
(Joseph 2014)—a movement toward “juristocracy” in line with other Western democracies 
44 
 
(Hirschl 2004). Although these developments mean Aotearoa New Zealand is no longer 
the purest example of the Westminster system, the country remains an outlier for its 
unusual concentration of executive power (Geddis 2016; Lijphart 2012; Palmer and Butler 
2016). In terms of election lawmaking, this means that the legislative and judicial branches 
are unlikely to prove very stringent checks on the goals of the executive, which might open 
the door to more frequent partisan changes to national election laws. The lack of 
parliamentary and constitutional constraints are explored further in Chapter 6.  
 Aotearoa New Zealand is also distinct for its biculturalism. Māori currently 
comprise 15 percent of the total population. As tangata whenua, the indigenous inhabitants 
of the land, Māori have faced systemic racism and endured numerous atrocities committed 
by Pākehā (white European) colonizers, including being stripped of nearly all their land, 
treated as second-class citizens, and forcibly assimilated (Hamilton 2018). The Treaty of 
Waitangi, signed in 1840, established a formal relationship between Māori and the Crown. 
In the decades that followed, the Crown regularly infringed on Māori treaty rights, leaving 
Māori with few resources and even fewer options for political recourse by the turn of the 
twentieth century (King 2003). The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 has helped to facilitate 
the negotiation and settlement of some historical claims of Treaty breaches (Hayward 
2019). Although Māori were given token representation in parliament starting in 1867, 
Māori election administration was treated with indifference and neglect by Aotearoa New 
Zealand’s government (Atkinson 2003; Geddis 2014).31 “Full blood” Māori were not 
 
31 Four Māori electorates were set aside in 1867 even though the size of the Māori population should have 
earned them 14 or 15 seats (King 2003: 257; see also Geddis 2006a). The number of Māori electorates 
remained fixed at four until 1996.   
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allowed to vote on the general electoral roll until 1975, and Māori were not represented in 
proportion to their population until 1996. 
There has been something of a renaissance in Māori culture since the 1970s, with a 
celebration of Māori history, language, art, food, ideas, and traditions, as well as growing 
acceptance of biculturalism (Derby 2011; Hill 2009; Kennedy 2016). The adoption of 
MMP and changes to the Māori electoral option have facilitated Māori representation in 
parliament and the formation of indigenous rights-based parties such as the Mana Māori 
Movement and the Māori party (Sullivan 2016). Aotearoa New Zealand is increasingly 
becoming multicultural as well, with growing Asian (12 percent) and Pasifika (7.5 percent) 
populations, as well as recent immigration from the Middle East and Africa (Phillips 2015; 
Singham 2006). Non-Pākehā New Zealanders face a range of economic, social, and 
political barriers to full inclusion in society (Marriott and Sim 2015; Walters 2018), 
including income and wealth inequality (Easton 2010; Stats NZ 2016b); inferior health, 
housing, professional, and educational outcomes (Pearson 2018); harsher criminal 
penalties (Independent Police Conduct Authority 2016); elevated incarceration rates (NZ 
Department of Corrections 2019); and political underrepresentation (Fitzgerald et al. 2007; 
Vowles et al. 2017). These inequities are due to both the past effects of racial and ethnic 
discrimination and the continuing effects of present-day racism. In short, these 
communities are marginalized. The presence of marginalized groups within the country 
provides an important opportunity to test theories about the determinants of demobilizing 
election lawmaking, as the existing literature on the subject has drawn a connection 
between the two (Minnite 2010; Piven et al. 2009).   
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 Finally, Aotearoa New Zealand has had one of the most radical economic 
transformations of any other Western democracy. In the aftermath of World War II, the 
country enjoyed a postwar Keynesian consensus, including generous social spending, 
strong state intervention in the economy, a large public sector, and robust labor unions. 
This abruptly changed in the 1980s and 1990s with the advent of “Rogernomics”, Aotearoa 
New Zealand’s version of neoliberal ideas simultaneously sweeping many other 
postindustrial countries. Both major parties supported a series of economic reforms that 
resulted in market liberalization, privatization of state industry, lower taxes, reduced social 
spending, and weaker labor unions (Kelsey 1997). The ultimate effect of these policy 
changes was ballooning income inequality, which has persisted to the present (Dalziel 
2002; Vowles et al. 2017: 25–47). Currently, 10 percent of households in Aotearoa New 
Zealand hold 53 percent of all wealth, while the country’s Gini coefficient has skyrocketed 
from 0.27 in 1982 to 0.35 in 2015 (Fyers 2017).32 This transformation immediately 
preceded electoral system reform—in fact, it was likely one of the impetuses for that reform 
(Renwick 2010)—but neoliberal policies have continued under MMP. The timing of these 
policy changes makes it difficult to disentangle the effects of elevated inequality from the 
politics of election lawmaking. 
 
 
32 The Gini coefficient measures how unequal the distribution of income is within a country. Higher values 
indicate a less equal distribution, such that 0 represents perfect equality and 1 indicates maximal 
concentration of income (i.e., one person has all the income). 
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A Model Democracy or an Imperfect One? 
Aotearoa New Zealand has widely been considered a model democracy, as one of the most 
stable, robust, participatory, and transparent governing systems. Freedom House (2019) 
ranks Aotearoa New Zealand’s democracy sixth best out of 195 countries, behind only 
Sweden, Finland, Norway, the Netherlands, and Canada. The country granted universal 
women’s suffrage in 1893, making it the first in the world to do so. Lijphart considers 
Aotearoa New Zealand to have the best claim as the “first genuinely democratic [system] 
of government”, as it had also granted universal suffrage for Māori by 1893, albeit with 
gross underrepresentation (2012: 47). Although turnout has declined in recent decades, it 
remains high compared to most other countries, with 75 percent of voters casting ballots in 
the 2017 general election (Desilver 2018). Aotearoa New Zealand has very strong anti-
corruption, campaign finance, and transparency laws (Geddis 2014), as well a free press 
and public deliberation as part of the normal legislative process.  
Other elements of Aotearoa New Zealand’s democracy are commendable. Since 
1956, core components of the country’s election infrastructure have been entrenched, 
requiring supermajority parliamentary support or a majority referendum to alter (McLeay 
2018). This mechanism provides one line of protection against the concentration of 
executive power and parliamentary supremacy. The innovation of an independent 
Representation Commission since 1956 has meant that redistricting is mostly done free 
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from partisan imperatives (Geddis 2014).33 And as of 2012, Aotearoa New Zealand’s 
election management body (EMB), the Electoral Commission, is a fully independent 
Crown entity. These provisions provide robust protections to the country’s democracy that 
limit the potential for corrosive partisanship.  
 Indeed, using Aotearoa New Zealand as a case study in some ways creates a 
baseline for the presence of partisan and demobilizing tendencies in election lawmaking. 
Its democracy is viewed as so strong—and the protections against partisan manipulation 
so robust—that partisan election rulemaking could not possibly be a problem. As one 
scholar put it bluntly, “you’ve chosen the wrong country to do this study in”. This sentiment 
reflects a widespread belief among the country’s political science community that its 
election reforms are largely consensual and that voter demobilization does not occur here 
(Arseneau and Roberts 2015; McLeay 2018; Interviews D, E, H, I, O, S). This belief 
persists despite clear evidence that election laws are not always changed consensually 
(Christmas 2010; Edgeler 2013; Geddis 2008, 2014, 2017), and despite the common 
understanding among academics, election officials, and campaign operatives that parties’ 
worries about the political effects of increased turnout color debates on rule changes 
(Geddis 2014: 299; Interviews D, F, G, J, L, M, S, T, X, Z, AA, AB, AD, AF).  
Considering that systematic study of the politics of election lawmaking has only 
been undertaken in five countries—Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United 
 
33 The Representation Commission has been nominally independent since 1887, but governments regularly 
altered the membership, country quota, and population tolerance provisions until the entrenchment of these 
rules in 1956 (McLeay 2018). Labour and National representatives still have voting member status on the 
commission, although they are outvoted by statutorily independent members and have little leeway to 




States, and the United Kingdom—it is impossible to determine the degree to which 
deleterious forms of election lawmaking take place in most nations around the world.34 
That being said, four of those countries were found to have frequent and consequential 
changes to election rules, and high levels of politicization have been found in three of 
them—New Zealand (Christmas 2010), the United States (James 2012), and the United 
Kingdom (James 2012). Recognizing Aotearoa New Zealand’s reputation as one of the 
oldest and strongest democratic systems in the world and its reputation as a place where 
consensual election lawmaking is a norm, if this study turns up problematic instances of 
election lawmaking it might indicate the ubiquitous nature of such legislative politics. In 
layman’s terms, if it happens here, it happens everywhere. Such a finding would certainly 
underscore the need to take the politics of election lawmaking seriously. 
 Even the world’s supposedly “best” democracies are far from perfect. As described 
in Chapter 2, worldwide democratic decline has touched virtually every country—and 
Aotearoa New Zealand is no exception. At least 25 percent of those eligible to vote 
routinely do not participate in elections. In the 2017 election, this equated to more than 
930,000 people (Electoral Commission 2018).35 Non-voters are disproportionately low-
income and non-Pākehā; in fact, as general turnout has decreased, Māori turnout has sunk 
even lower (Vowles 2014). The political values of these communities skew away from 
 
34 The systematic study of Ireland, the United States, and the United Kingdom only considered changes to 
election administration (James 2011, 2012). The study of the Netherlands focused its analysis on a singular 
reform episode (Jacobs and Leyenaar 2011), whereas the study of New Zealand failed to analyze the 
relationship between electoral system and the politics of election lawmaking (Christmas 2010). 
35 This figure is derived from the Electoral Commission’s Report on the 2017 General Election by taking 
into account the number of votes cast (2.63 million), the turnout rate as a percentage of enrolled voters (79.8 
percent), and the percentage of eligible voters enrolled (92.4 percent). This breaks down into approximately 
670,000 people who are enrolled but did not vote, and an additional 270,000 people who are eligible to vote 
but not enrolled. See Appendix G for a list of VEP turnout since 1969.  
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National and toward small parties (Vowles et al. 2017: 252), and thus are underrepresented 
in parliament. Widespread disengagement with democracy and government continues to 
be prevalent, especially among younger generations (Stats NZ 2018). The country’s local 
democracies are weak, with limited authority and extremely low participation rates (Drage 
and Cheyne 2016), while political parties contain little grassroots activism or input (Miller 
2005). New technologies have also contributed to a lack of civic engagement (Putnam 
2000) and open public deliberation (Fishkin 2009). Additionally, several of the country’s 
present election laws inhibit full participation and further marginalize disadvantaged 
communities. Most notable are the disenfranchisement of all prisoners, a high threshold 
level that shuts out minor parties from representation, the absence of automatic voter 
enrollment, and the lack of a meaningful public ballot initiative (Geddis 2014). The absence 
of a written constitution also means that there is no judicially protected positive right to 
vote (Palmer and Butler 2016, 2018; Interview M). 
Other factors have played a role in the country’s democratic erosion. High 
inequality is corrosive to democracy, as it can exacerbate rates of nonparticipation, skew 
policy discussions to the well-off, and erode the legitimacy of democratic governments 
(Ferejohn 2009). In the case of Aotearoa New Zealand, income-based turnout disparities 
skew tax and social policies in favor of the wealthy, further exacerbating inequality and 
reinforcing low turnout (Vowles 2015b). Lingering racial tensions have also created fault 
lines in society (Pack et al. 2016), which has repercussions for democratic unity and the 
legitimacy of its elections (Gelbman 2007). The presidentialization of politics has meant 
more campaigning occurs on sound bites rather than substantive policy proposals, while 
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the news media has shifted its focus from policy concerns to the “game” of campaigns and 
elections (Bahador et al. 2016).  
 Considering the reality of Aotearoa New Zealand’s imperfect democracy, it is 
important to find ways to improve and revitalize the country’s election system. The 
concentration of power within the executive makes elections for representatives incredibly 
important, as these are the moments when virtually all decision-making power is conferred 
on a select group of politicians for the next three years. This is doubly so considering the 
retention of parliamentary sovereignty, which means that such decision-making power is 
practically limitless. The all-important nature of elections in these conditions increases the 
threat of political manipulation in the electoral process, as it can easily translate into 
tarnished democratic legitimacy, unrepresentative decision-making, and further 
exacerbated inequality. In Geddis’ words, “…given the role that elections play as the key—
perhaps even the only—legitimating feature in New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements, 
how changes to its election laws occur matters a great deal” (2017: 229). It is therefore 
vital to understand if and when manipulation of the rules of the game occurs—for Aotearoa 
New Zealand, to ensure fair elections and improve a democracy struggling with the modern 
realities of disillusionment and disengagement; and for the rest of the world, to discover 
which electoral systems best protect elections against manipulation by the politicians who 





































CHAPTER 4: HYPOTHESES, METHODOLOGY, AND DATA 
 
 
The first part of this thesis has explored the underexamination of the politics of election 
lawmaking and the importance of studying the Aotearoa New Zealand case. I now turn to 
an empirical examination of the politics of election lawmaking in Aotearoa New Zealand 
over the past 50 years. This chapter establishes the groundwork for that examination, 
explaining the central hypotheses tested, methods employed, and data utilized. 
 
Hypotheses 
This study contains two central hypotheses. Both concern the relationship between the 
electoral system and the politics of election lawmaking. 
Hypothesis 1: Aotearoa New Zealand’s switch from a plurality to a 
proportional electoral system has reduced the incidence of partisan election 
lawmaking. 
Considering the close relationship between proportionality and the number of parties, it is 
also hypothesized that switching from a two-party to a multiparty system has reduced 
partisan manipulation of election laws. There are two proposed causal mechanisms: (1) 
that PR has reduced the incentives to pursue marginal electoral shifts, and (2) that PR has 
increased the number of veto players. The first proposition posits that the reason for 
reduced partisanship lies in decreased demand for partisan election lawmaking. Rather than 
one vote tipping the difference between the spoils of office and zero representation, in 
MMP each vote (usually) matters an equal amount in calculating the parliamentary 
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representation of parties. Mathematically, it is the difference between 50 percent plus one 
vote equaling 100 percent of the representation and 50 percent plus 1 vote equaling 50 
percent of the representation. Because individual electoral districts matter less, small shifts 
in turnout are less likely to alter the election outcome. This diminishes the importance of 
the marginal voter and reduces the chance that election reforms could prove electorally 
determinative. The second causal mechanism focuses on the ability of politicians to achieve 
election reforms. Because proportionality tends to lead to multipartyism and coalition 
governments, there are more political players standing in the way of partisan election 
changes. An increased number of veto players should translate into a decreased likelihood 
of legislative success (Tsebelis 2002). Rather than a select group of senior cabinet officials 
or a single party leader having their way, under MMP governments must garner the consent 
of multiple parties with divergent views and interests to pass legislation. This should make 
partisan election rule changes more difficult to adopt. 
Electoral competitiveness and leverage of non-voters are directly tested as 
explanatory factors. It is expected that partisan election lawmaking is more likely when 
elections are competitive and when the leverage of non-voters is higher. A number of 
additional explanatory factors are examined but not directly tested. I predict partisan 
election lawmaking is more likely with a left-right SES cleavage structure, a high level of 
inequality, a large preference gap between non-voters and voters, a high degree of 
federalism, and few procedural or constitutional constraints. Finally, I also examine 
whether Aotearoa New Zealand’s switch to MMP has shifted the areas of election 
lawmaking that are partisan. Whereas earlier attention might have focused on manipulating 
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marginal electorate seats, MMP might be expected to focus attention upon the rules 
regarding the representation quota and the regulation of political parties. 
Hypothesis 2: Aotearoa New Zealand’s switch from a plurality to a 
proportional electoral system has reduced the incidence of demobilizing 
election lawmaking. 
As with Hypothesis 1, the expectation is that increasing the number of parties in parliament 
also reduces the incidence of legislative voter suppression. The two proposed causal 
mechanisms are (1) a reduction in the incentives to change marginal votes, and (2) an 
increased difficulty in passing reforms intended to decrease participation. The mechanisms 
work largely the same as described above, with an important caveat for the second one. 
The flip side of additional veto players is greater barriers to passing election reforms that 
increase participation. It is therefore expected that switching to MMP has reduced the 
incidence of both mobilizing and demobilizing election reforms. This reveals a key irony 
of proportionality: electoral systems that protect against voter demobilization also inhibit 
reforms that expand participation. 
Electoral competitiveness and leverage of non-voters are directly tested as 
explanatory factors. It is expected that demobilizing election reforms are more likely when 
elections are competitive and when non-voters have increased leverage. The relationship 
between political party and demobilization is also examined, with the expectation that 
right-leaning parties will be more likely to pass demobilizing bills than left-leaning ones. 
The presence of marginalized subjects with discordant preferences is indirectly examined 




A mixed methods longitudinal comparative case study analysis is employed. Mixed 
methods analyses incorporate both quantitative and qualitative data to produce stronger 
evidence than could be mustered with the consideration of only one type of data (Creswell 
2018; see also Malone 2008). Qualitative data sources include parliamentary debate 
transcripts, legislative texts, newspaper articles, and interviews. Quantitative data sources 
include opinion polls, election results, turnout rates, and measures of party system. A few 
qualitative metrics are transformed into quantitative indicators, including measures of 
partisanship and participatory effect.  The study takes place within a single country—
Aotearoa New Zealand—and compares two roughly equal time periods, 1970–93 (referred 
to as the FPTP era) and 1997–2018 (referred to as the MMP era). The intervening years 
are skipped because they were an unstable interim between electoral systems characterized 
by party fragmentation. This is a case study in the sense that the findings are applicable to 
other countries around the world. 
 The unit of analysis is each piece of legislation concerning election law. There are 
55 enactments in total and an additional 28 proposed bills that were debated in the House. 
A description of each election enactment is found in Appendix A and a description of each 
proposed bill in Appendix B. This project follows a three-step analysis procedure. First, a 
micro analysis of each piece of legislation is conducted to determine its degree of 
partisanship and participatory effect. All bills and enactments from within each era are then 
pooled to discern overall levels of partisanship and participatory effect. Finally, these 
overall levels are compared between eras. In addition to descriptive data analysis, chi-
squared tests and logistic and MLR regressions are employed. 
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Scope of Analysis 
There are three dimensions to the scope of this study: jurisdictional, legislative content, 
and longitudinal. This is a study of proposed and enacted legislative changes to Aotearoa 
New Zealand’s national parliamentary elections. Judicial decisions, executive actions 
(such as Orders in Council, regulations, and non-statutory changes), and local/regional 
bodies are excluded from analysis. 
In terms of legislative content, the study consists of all pieces of parliamentary 
legislation that concern general elections or the ballot initiative process. This includes both 
those that originated as government bills and as members’ bills. The rules governing by-
elections are excluded from analysis, except for legislation that affects whether a by-
election is held altogether. There is unfortunately no scholarly consensus over a typology 
of election laws, reflecting the general neglect of their study. As shown in Table 4.1 
(below), I categorize election laws into a nine-part typology derived in part from James’ 
(2011, 2012) and Christmas’ (2010) classifications: electoral system (subdivided into 
major and minor reforms), registration administration, voting administration, franchise, 
boundaries, finance and electioneering, governance, member qualifications, and ballot 
initiatives. A full explanation for each type is provided in Appendix C. This categorization 
of election laws is expansive compared with other scholars’ groupings. Virtually all 
changes to the rules governing elections are included, even indirect reforms. For instance, 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights 1990 has been included as establishing formal electoral 
rights, even though this change failed to make any substantive difference to existing 
election law. There are a few exceptions worth noting. Bills making parliamentary 
procedural changes have been excluded from analysis, even where their bill title might 
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indicate relevant changes to election law. Such is the case with the Electoral Amendment 
Bill 1976, which proposed changes to the number of parliamentary sitting days and transfer 
of power rules.36 Legislation that simply amalgamates previous acts (such as the 
Constitution Act 1986) and constitutional changes that do not alter election laws (such as 
the Human Rights Act 1993) are both excluded from analysis.  
The study includes both successful and failed attempts at reform, analyzed 
separately. Acts are included because they alter the legal-institutional rules of the game. 
Proposed bills that were introduced and debated in the House but were not enacted into law 
are used to capture failed attempts at reform. Unsuccessful bills serve three purposes: as a 
sign of aspirational reforms to election law, as a sign of partisan disagreement in election 
lawmaking, and as a proxy for instances of inaction. Most bills that failed to become acts 
are members’ bills, whereas most enactments originated as government bills. The instances 
when politicians are given the opportunity to act but choose not to are important to 
incorporate in analysis, but also notoriously difficult to research (Bachrach and Baratz 
1963; Interviews G, H, I).37 This is because most non-decisions happen in private cabinet 
or caucus discussions, resulting in no written record. Members’ bills are admittedly not a 
perfect proxy for such non-decisions, but they do demonstrate the times when members 
have felt strongly about the need for various election reforms. 
 
36 Bills have short titles, but do not formally have years attached to them. They are instead allocated a number 
in the order they are introduced each parliamentary session. They can also be informally associated with their 
year of introduction. For consistency, I name each bill using its year of introduction.  
37 See Andrew Geddis’ (2013b) analysis of National’s refusal to take up the Electoral Commission’s review 
of MMP recommendations in 2012. 
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Table 4.1: Types of Election Laws 




The mechanism by which 
votes are translated into seats 
(i.e., FPTP or MMP). 
Electoral Act 1993 
 
  
Replaced the FPTP voting 










The mechanics of the 
translation of votes into seats, 
such as the number of seats, 
the number of Māori 
electorates, the electoral 









Allowed for fluctuations in 
the number of Māori 
electorates based on the size 







The rules governing the 








The rules governing the 
administration of voting. 
  
Electoral (Finance 
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prisoners from those with 
sentences of greater than 





The drawing and redistricting 





Required the Representation 
Commission to consider 





The rules governing campaign 
finance, broadcasting, and 
promotion of political parties 
and candidates. 




Placed extensive limits on 
political party electioneering 





The regulation of institutions 




Amendment Act 2010 
Merged the Electoral 






The circumstances under 
which elected representatives 
lose their office outside 
elections. 
Electoral (Integrity) 
Amendment Act 2018 
 
  
Allowed the party leader to 
replace MPs who leave their 






The rules governing direct 
democracy including the 
holding of initiatives and 
referendums. 
Citizens Initiated 
Referenda Act 1993 
 
  
Instituted procedures for the 






In terms of longitudinal scope, the study covers the periods 1970–93 and 1997–
2018. Aotearoa New Zealand’s binding referendum replacing FPTP with MMP took place 
alongside the 1993 election. The first election using MMP occurred in October 1996, 
although a coalition did not form until December of that year. The three intervening years, 
1993–96, present something of a conundrum for study. Members of Parliament had been 
elected under the non-proportional FPTP rules in 1993 but knew they would face a 
proportional electoral system at the next election. This altered their parliamentary behavior 
(Interview W). Several parliamentary parties fragmented, while dozens of new parties 
formed. The period includes several notable instances of election lawmaking. However, its 
in-between nature does not fit well with the parameters of this study. It has therefore been 
excluded from analysis to create clearer non-proportional and proportional groupings. The 
last 24 years of FPTP-era Aotearoa New Zealand and the 22 most recent MMP-era years 
are covered. These dates are chosen to balance the benefits of a longer time period 
providing more bills for inclusion with the disadvantages of fewer primary sources further 
back in time. The dates are also chosen to roughly balance FPTP and MMP eras, allowing 
for easier comparison of each period’s election lawmaking.  
 
Data 
This thesis integrates several primary data sources to analyze election lawmaking in 
Aotearoa New Zealand, including legislative texts, debate transcripts, select committee and 
Electoral Commission reports, newspaper articles, interviews, and opinion polls.  
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Most important are the legislative primary sources directly related to election law 
changes. Parliamentary bills, acts, and Supplementary Order Papers (last-minute bill 
amendments) are from the New Zealand Legal Information Institute (NZLII) and the New 
Zealand Parliament website.38 Parliamentary debate is recorded in the Hansard Reports, 
and can occur upon a bill’s first reading,39 upon receipt of a select committee report, at its 
second reading, at the committee of the whole House stage, and at its third and final 
reading. Select committee reports are from the Hansard Appendix to the Journals I series. 
Certain select and special committee reports and the Electoral Commission’s committee 
submissions and external reports are from the Electoral Commission’s archives. 
Parliamentary select committee reviews fall into three categories: those that occur on a 
triennial basis as part of a routine post-election review, those that occur as part of the 
normal legislative process of scrutinizing proposed legislation, and those that occur in 
response to an election-related crisis or some broader political directive. 
Extraparliamentary committees have sometimes been created as well, such as the 1986 
Royal Commission that initially recommended the switch to MMP. Since the passage of 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, all legislation has received Bill of Rights Act 
(BORA) compliance advice from the Attorney General, determining whether the proposed 
legislation is consistent or inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. This advice is non-binding, 
with the Attorney-General only required to advise the House if they conclude that a bill is 
 
38 The Elections and Polls Bill 1978, the Electoral Amendment Bill 1980, the Second Ballot Bill 1980, and 
the Popular Initiatives Bill 1983 were unavailable from these sources but could be located by the 
Parliamentary Information Service. The text of the MMP Representation Poll Bill 1990 could not be found.  




BORA inconsistent.40 BORA reports are collected from the Department of Justice website 
and NZLII. Additionally, since 2013 the Justice Department has produced Disclosure 
Statements and Regulatory Impact Statements for proposed bills. These are collected from 
the New Zealand Legislation Disclosures website. Bill digests, providing a summary of 
legislative texts, are collected for each bill going back to 1997.41 
 Contemporaneous newspaper articles also provide a valuable source of 
information, indicating the level of public awareness of election reforms and whether they 
were viewed favorably at the time of passage. All major Aotearoa New Zealand 
newspapers are used for analysis from 1997 to 2018 and were located using Factiva and 
the ProQuest Australia & New Zealand Newstream online databases. Newspaper articles 
from 1970 to 1993 are only available on microfilm, forcing a more judicious selection.42 
Three of the country’s largest-circulation newspapers are used for this earlier period: the 
New Zealand Herald, the Otago Daily Times, and the Evening Post (which merged with 
the Dominion to become the Dominion Post in 2002). The Herald and the Evening Post 
microfilms are from the National Newspaper Collection held at the National Library of 
New Zealand, while the Otago Daily Times microfilms are located at the Hocken 
Collections, University of Otago. Microfilm articles were located by examining the dates 
surrounding major legislative progression.43  
 
40 Adverse reports have frequently resulted in the infringing provision being amended or dropped. This was 
the case with the Electoral Amendment Act 2002, which originally included a provision banning the 
publication of public opinion polls in the month before an election. On the other hand, the Electoral 
(Disqualification of Sentenced Prisoners) Amendment Act 2010 passed despite being ruled inconsistent with 
the Bill of Rights Act.  
41 Those prior to 2007 are located by the Parliamentary Information Service. Those produced since 2007 are 
available on parliament’s website.   
42 The only exception being a small number of New Zealand Herald articles that are available online as far 
back as 1989. 
43 These dates were identified from both the Parliamentary Bulletin and the Hansard Reports. 
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 Interviews were conducted with key actors involved with or otherwise 
knowledgeable about Aotearoa New Zealand election lawmaking.44 These sessions probed 
individual’s memories of specific instances of election lawmaking, their general thoughts 
on partisanship in the election reform process, changes caused by the introduction of MMP, 
and relevant non-electoral changes such as shifts in parliamentary procedure and the use 
of manifesto pledges. Those interviewed include current and former MPs, a former Prime 
Minister, former Ministers of Justice, and members of the Justice and Electoral Committee. 
They also include Justice Department civil servants, members of the Electoral Commission 
and the Chief Electoral Office, and those involved with the Royal Commission on Electoral 
Reform. Academics, journalists, and historians were also interviewed. A list of 
interviewees and corresponding interview reference letters can be found in Appendix D.45  
 A few additional primary sources are used. The Electoral Commission produces a 
review of each general election, including recommendations for reform. Opinion polling 
data from Colmar Brunton provides a regular and consistent measure of the political 
environment going back to 1974. This data is used to calculate an electoral competitiveness 
index. Unfortunately, little polling has been conducted on election laws themselves (except 
for the 1992, 1993, and 2011 referendums on electoral system reform), preventing their use 
as a fruitful data source. Turnout data from the Electoral Commission and Stats NZ is used 
to calculate the leverage of non-voters.  
 
44 Ethics approval from the University of Otago was obtained for these interviews. Participants were informed 
of the nature of the project and signed consent forms agreeing to an open-questioning interview technique 
and acknowledging that the results of the study will be made publicly available. Participants were offered the 
choice to remain anonymous and to not be audio taped. 
45 Several interviewees requested anonymity considering the politically sensitive nature of questioning. 
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Explanation and Operationalization of Variables 
Due to the multistage nature of analysis, several variables are considered that cannot be 
easily grouped together. For instance, electoral competitiveness fluctuates on a day-to-day 
basis whereas inequality fluctuates on a yearly to decennial basis. Some variables cannot 
be quantified within the scope of this analysis, including parliamentary procedures, the 
desirability of consensual lawmaking, and the degree of federalism. Even where this is the 
case, it is still valuable to consider these variables. I operationalize variables where possible 
and consider non-operationalizable variables where appropriate. This section first 
examines dependent variables, and then explanatory variables at the individual bill, within-
era, and between-era levels of analysis. 
 
Dependent Variables 
Because partisanship is central to this thesis, it is important to clarify its meaning before 
examining its operationalization. Previous scholarship has focused on partisanship in one 
of three ways: at the individual level, examining party identification and individuals’ voting 
history (Converse and Pierce 1985; Dalton and Weldon 2007; Holmberg 2007; Wright et 
al. 1985); at the legislature level, examining balance of power (Klarner 2003) and party 
discipline via the voting behavior of elected representatives (Cox and Poole 2002; 
Hetherington 2001; Krehbiel 2000); and within a specific policy area, such as 
environmentalism (Farstad 2016; Gershtenson et al. 2006; McCright 2014). I am concerned 
with a combination of the last two cases, specifically the degree of legislative party-line 
disagreement for a specific policy area. The literature on partisanship in the Aotearoa New 
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Zealand context is relatively thin. Most of it focuses on individual voting behavior and 
party identification (see Aimer and Miller 2002; Karp et al. 2002; Lamare 1984; Leithner 
1997; Medeiros and Noël 2014; Vowles 1994, 1997). A handful of studies examine 
partisanship in certain policy areas, including Māori affairs (Barber 2006) and nuclear-free 
foreign policy (Capie 2019). The only other examples of Aotearoa New Zealand 
scholarship on partisanship that I am aware of are Matthew Gibbons’ (2011) analysis of 
polarization using party manifestos and Christmas’ (2010) examination of consensus in 
election reforms.  
In terms of measuring legislative partisanship, the most common route taken by 
previous scholarship is to examine the voting record of individual legislators (see Cox and 
Poole 2002; Krehbiel 2000). This provides a measure of the strength of party influence on 
lawmakers. It does not work well in Aotearoa New Zealand, where MPs virtually always 
vote along party lines. One method used to test partisanship in a policy area is to measure 
differences in the degree of issue saliency between parties as expressed, for instance, in 
party manifestos (Farstad 2016). This also proves unhelpful, as I am interested in the degree 
of overall unity for a specific policy area rather than the saliency of election issues for each 
party. Christmas (2010) proves the closest approximate to the task at hand. His study uses 
original measures of the level of contention and vote outcome to examine the dichotomy 
between politicians’ self-interest and altruism in changing the rules of the game. Christmas 
does not utilize the language of partisanship. I view party-line disagreement as the crux of 
the issue, and therefore use Christmas’ model as a point of departure to construct an original 
measure of partisanship. 
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It is important to note that there is nothing inherently wrong with partisan 
lawmaking. In fact, parties are a central ingredient in responsive, accountable governments. 
In societies with competing interests and priorities, political parties provide voters with 
clear choices at the ballot box and can carry out coordinated legislative programs 
(Schattschneider 1942). Partisanship is the force that attracts voters to parties and binds 
parties together to carry out a shared legislative agenda. Partisan lawmaking can simply be 
a sign that difficult decisions are being made, for instance in allocating scarce resources 
and pursuing certain ideological values. As explored in Chapter 2, however, partisanship 
presents inherent objective and normative problems in the case of election law that makes 
it deleterious to democracy and worthy of study.  
Two measurements of partisanship are used for election-related parliamentary 
enactments, one a simple binary and one a complex ordinal metric. They are constructed 
and analyzed separately. The simple binary measure is based on the third reading vote as 
recorded in Hansard Reports. Bills that receive only government support are marked as 
partisan, while those that receive support from non-coalition parties or do not receive a 
division are marked as non-partisan.46 This measure is extremely parsimonious, providing 
an easy and consistent way to gauge the level of party-line disagreement at a bill’s passing.  
The complex measure of partisanship is a composite of three elements of partisan 
lawmaking: as characterizing the legislative process, as reflected in the outcome of 
recorded votes, and as demonstrated by the intended electoral effects of the legislation. A 
partisan legislative process is one marked by contention, disagreement, and divisiveness. 
 
46 For vote-based measures of partisanship, “government” includes all parties that hold confidence-and-




This is judged based on the Hansard debate record. Is there partisan disagreement 
expressed in deliberation? Are the arguments technical in nature and conducted in a matter-
of-fact manner, or is debate intensely emotional and concerns core values? Are matters of 
privilege invoked against members in the course of the debate? Are there claims that the 
bill is partisan or a gerrymander? Using a combination of these factors, a four-point ordinal 
score for the degree of partisanship in the legislative process is constructed with levels 
none, low, moderate, and high. As the content of bills can change significantly from 
introduction to passage, the latter stages of debate are privileged above earlier ones when 
making this determination. 
The record of votes is the most direct measure of the level of disagreement among 
parties. Votes may be recorded at the first reading, in select committee, on the report of the 
select committee to the House, at the second reading, in committee of the whole House, 
and at the third reading. The last recorded vote is most reflective of the divisions on the act 
as passed, so the third reading vote is used. A three-part ordinal scale of partisanship is 
constructed, distinguishing unanimous (no division), multiparty, and government only 
support. 
The intended or likely electoral effects of legislation can indicate partisan election 
lawmaking. Electoral effects in this sense do not refer to participatory impact per se but 
rather benefits to a party in contesting elections. If a reform clearly benefits certain parties 
over others, it is likely that the reforms will not be agreeable to all parties. The existence 
of electoral effects can be indicated within legislative debates (where politicians directly 
claim a bill will benefit the other party), by contemporaneous newspaper articles, through 
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interviews, or by an examination of the bill’s provisions using existing scholarship as an 
indicator. A yes/no binary measurement for electoral effects is used. 
 These three components of partisanship are transformed into numerical measures, 
with legislative process on a 0–3 scale, recorded vote on a 0–2 scale, and electoral effects 
on a 0–1 scale (with high numbers indicating more partisanship). They are then added 
together, creating a 0–6 complex partisanship scale for each election law. This numerical 
measurement is then divided into levels of partisanship for analysis: 0 indicating no 
partisanship, 1–2 indicating a low level of partisanship, 3–4 indicating a moderate level of 
partisanship, and 5–6 indicating a high level of partisanship. Even though the simple and 
complex partisanship scales are constructed separately, Figure 4.1 shows they match 
closely when compared with one another. Every election law measured as partisan in the 
simple binary is measured as a having a high level of partisanship on the complex scale. 
Furthermore, there are only two acts that are truly borderline cases with scores of 4. This 
indicates a good degree of robustness between both measures, and a sign that the simple 




 Unsuccessful election bills necessitate a different measurement of partisanship. 
Bills that are proposed but fail indicate disagreement over voting laws and thus are almost 
always instances of partisan election lawmaking. In most cases, these are members’ bills 
introduced by opposition MPs. There still are discernible gradations in the level of 
partisanship. The degree of legislative advancement is used to discern less partisan cases 
from highly partisan ones. This is based on a binary classification: passed first reading and 
died at first reading.47 The first reading debate is designed to focus on the basic premise of 
the policy proposal. Rejection at this early stage is an indication that the bill is not even 
 
47 Note that prior to 1997, the first reading was labeled as the “introduction” debate and therefore members’ 
bills voted down at first reading were “refused introduction”. This terminology is confusing because the 
procedural act of placing a bill on the order paper for debate can also be referred to as the bill’s introduction. 
This administrative step is not voted upon and cannot be stopped by a government (although governments 
can prevent all members’ bills from being debated by passing urgency motions). The procedure changed in 
1992 from allocating order paper slots for members’ bills on a “first come, first served” basis to a random 
draw. Due to the terminological confusion, I refer to this “introduction” debate as the first reading and to 
being “refused introduction” as dying at the first reading. Also note that between 1997 and 1999, changes to 
the standing orders meant that no debate occurred at the first reading. Instead, it too became a simple 
procedural event, with the first debate occurring at the “second reading”. For the three members’ bills 
concerning election rules introduced over that period, their “second reading” is coded as the first reading for 

































Figure 4.1: Partisanship Scale Comparison
Simple Partisanship: Non-Partisan Simple Partisanship: Partisan
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regarded as being worth a select committee’s time (Interview AD). Allowing members’ 
bills from the opposition to proceed past their first reading is therefore a gesture of 
goodwill, even if both parties know the legislation will not ultimately be enacted. 
Members’ bills that fail their first reading division are considered highly partisan, while 
those that pass are considered less partisan.48 
 The participatory effect of each election law and proposed bill is determined by 
identifying each provision that affects voter turnout, determining whether it is likely to 
increase or decrease democratic participation, estimating the magnitude of the change, and 
summing the effects (see Appendix E for a list of identified provisions in election 
enactments and Appendix F for a list of identified provisions in proposed bills). Legislative 
texts, debate transcripts, select committee reports, newspaper articles, bill digests, and 
interviews are used in combination with existing scholarship to discern participatory effect. 
As few election provisions studied have Aotearoa New Zealand–specific scholarship on 
their turnout effects, I rely on international research into the effects of various election 
laws, especially James’ (2011, 2012) classification of election administration changes. A 
three-part ordinal division is used for the participatory effect of each piece of legislation: 
demobilizes (likely to decrease turnout), neutral (likely to have no effect on turnout), and 
mobilizes (likely to increase turnout). I also create two binary metrics, one measuring 
whether legislation demobilizes participation overall, and another measuring whether 
legislation contains any provision that demobilizes turnout. The magnitude of participatory 
 
48 There are five cases of members from a government or support party introducing election-related bills that 
passed their first reading on a divided vote. The Proportional Representation Indicative Referendum Bill 
1990 received mixed support from both major parties. The Electoral Access Fund Bill 2018 has passed its 
second reading without a division and appears likely be enacted in 2020. Although the advancement 
distinction works less clearly for the remaining three cases, these are still instances where a government has 
allowed non-government policy to receive additional deliberation. As such, these are coded as less partisan.  
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effect measures the estimated absolute percentage point change in turnout at parliamentary 
elections.49 A three-part categorical scheme is employed. Marginal changes impact turnout 
by less than 2 percentage points, minor changes alter turnout by 2 to 5 percentage points, 
and major changes alter turnout by greater than 5 percentage points. Due to the difficulty 
in estimating the magnitude of participatory effects, this metric is not used in logistic or 
MLR regressions. Indirect participatory effects compound the difficulty of this 
classification. Election bills can reduce participation by signaling to certain populations 
that their democratic participation is unwanted. Parties might attempt to counteract the 
electoral effects of such bills by increasing the intensity and altering the focus of their voter 
mobilization efforts (Galicki 2017, 2018; Interview AA). These indirect effects are noted 
where relevant. 
 
Explanatory Variables at the Legislative Level 
Three explanatory variables vary enough to measure at the individual legislation level: 
leverage of non-voters, electoral competitiveness, and number of parties. All three metrics 
are measured based on the date of each act’s introduction. Leverage of non-voters is 
calculated by subtracting voting eligible population (VEP) turnout at the prior election 
from 100 percent (see Appendix G for a data table of turnout and leverage).50 VEP is a 
more accurate measure of turnout than simply taking the percentage of registered voters, 
 
49 Ballot initiative reforms are assigned participatory directions but not magnitude scores. This is because the 
amount of direct democracy can be clearly seen to increase or decrease democratic participation but does not 
map clearly onto changes in the amount of turnout for legislative elections.  
50 Note that for ease of interpretation, this figure is multiplied by 100 for use in regression analysis in Chapter 
5. Leverage is otherwise expressed as a percentage. 
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as some eligible voters do not register to vote (Holbrook and Heidbreder 2010).51 The 
degree of electoral competitiveness is measured by the electoral gap between the two 
biggest parties (Kohler and Rose 2010), as indicated by the latest election result or opinion 
poll released prior to the legislation’s introduction. The effective number of parties is 
measured for each election law (Laakso and Taagepera 1979),52 in addition to three 
additional measures used for robustness checks: the number of parties represented in 
parliament, the number of parties with at least one percent support at the ballot box (Kohler 
and Rose 2010), and the number of parties on the ballot (see Appendix H for a data table 
of these measures). 
 Several legislative-level variables are used as controls. The presence of a provision 
that specifically affects Māori voters and the presence of an entrenched clause are both 
recorded. The former case includes reforms to the Māori roll, the Māori electoral option, 
and the formula for determining the number of Māori electorates. The latter case includes 
reforms to the ballot paper, the membership of the Representation Commission, and the 
legal voting age. The government or sponsoring party and the era (FPTP or MMP) of each 
piece of legislation are also collected.  
 A number of data points are recorded for each piece of legislation that do not 
constitute explanatory variables but help inform their analysis. This includes identifier 
 
51 This formulation is different from Kohler and Rose (2010), who use a supposed “maximum” turnout rate 
calculated to be 85.8 percent. They argue that using maximum turnout reflects a more accurate measure of 
the power of non-voters to alter an electoral outcome, given that even with compulsory election rules not 
everybody votes and that a percentage of those who vote invariable produce invalid or spoiled ballots. I take 
issue with the idea that 100 percent turnout—full participation—could not theoretically be achieved.  





 where n is the number of parties in 
parliament and 𝑝𝑖
2 is the square of each party’s proportion of all seats (with all proportions normalized to 
fractions of 1).  
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variables such as the legislation’s name, year, and bill/act number; the Parliament and 
Prime Minister under which it is proposed; the introducer of the legislation; the bill’s 
classification as members’ or government; and the select committee that the legislation is 
referred to. The “type” of each bill measures which area(s) of election law it affects (see 
Table 4.1; Appendix C). Bills frequently alter multiple types of election law.  
 
Explanatory Variables at the Within-Era Level 
Several explanatory variables change infrequently enough to be considered at the within-
era level. These variables are measured as two data points, one describing 1970–93 and the 
other 1997–2018. The proportionality of the electoral system is measured as the average 
degree of disproportionality between the two eras. Inequality is measured as the average 
Gini coefficient for each era. Other within-era explanatory variables are more difficult to 
measure. Political culture refers to the level of divisiveness in society and the level of 
polarization within politics. One aspect of this is measured by the degree of polarization 
between parties based on their campaign manifestos (Gibbons 2011). The percentage of 
fulfilled manifesto pledges is used as a proxy to measure the importance of the government 
mandate (Gibbons 1999; McCluskey 2008). Institutional changes to the legislative process 
have also occurred, most importantly to the role of select committees but also to 
parliamentary session length, the order of legislative steps, the length of debates and “stand 
down” periods, urgency procedures, and the treatment of members’ bills. Some of these 
changes are endogenous to electoral system change, but many are exogenous (Martin 2004; 
McGee 2017). Although not directly operationalized, these changes are referenced in the 
analysis where appropriate. 
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Explanatory Variables at the Between-Era level 
A few explanatory variables have not changed over the past 50 years or have changed so 
marginally as to be considered de facto constants. The presence of a left-right SES cleavage 
structure has undergone some fluctuations in strength but has retained its primacy in 
Aotearoa New Zealand politics (Aimer 2015; Gibbons 2011; Miller 2005). It can be 
measured as the relationship between SES status (income, education, occupation, assets) 
and voting. The presence of marginalized subjects can be measured as the degree of 
economic and social inequality between Māori and Pasifika minorities and the Pākehā 
majority. Whether marginalized subjects hold discordant preferences is measured by the 
degree of political preference divergence between these groups. The preference gap 
between non-voters and voters in Aotearoa New Zealand is more difficult to discern, but 
recent scholarship has led to some quantitative measurements (Vowles et al. 2017). The 
degree of parliamentary constitutional control over election procedures, the degree of 
federalism, and the desirability of consensual lawmaking as a norm are all vitally important 
to the topic of study and best considered through descriptive analysis.  
 This chapter has presented hypotheses that MMP has reduced the incidence of 
partisan and demobilizing election lawmaking. It has also theorized several additional 
variables that affect the politics of election lawmaking. The following two chapters use the 





CHAPTER 5: DATA ANALYSIS  
 
 
In this chapter I lay out a conceptual framework of election lawmaking, analyze descriptive 
data of passed election reforms, and conduct a series of chi-squared, logistic, and MLR 
tests on the correlates of partisan and demobilizing election lawmaking. Both simple and 
complex measures of partisanship are analyzed. The relationship between the party in 
power and election lawmaking, the types of election laws passed, and proposed members’ 
bills are also examined.  
 
Matrix of Election Lawmaking 
The core analysis is conducted using a six-part matrix developed to classify election-related 
parliamentary enactments by partisanship and participatory effect. This matrix is detailed 
in Table 5.1, with examples of each provided in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 (below). The 
categorization of every enactment is found in Appendix I and of every proposed bill in 
Appendix J. 
 Table 5.1: Matrix of Election Lawmaking 
  
Participatory Effect 
Demobilizing Neutral Mobilizing 
Partisanship 
Partisan A B C 
Non-partisan D E F 
 Key: 
 
 Partisan election lawmaking: A, B, C 
 Demobilizing election lawmaking: A, D 
 Deleterious election lawmaking: A, B, C, D 
 Neutral/potentially positive election lawmaking: E 
 Positive election lawmaking: F 
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A. Partisan demobilizing: This category includes legislation that is passed along party 
lines and diminishes electoral participation. It is normatively the least desirable. 
Only three such bills have been passed over the period of analysis. One example is 
the Electoral Amendment Act 1977. Passed by National under Robert Muldoon, it 
repealed many provisions that were implemented in Labour’s Electoral 
Amendment Act 1975. The legislation increased the residency requirement in an 
electorate from one month to three months, disqualified all prisoners from voting, 
and disqualified unregistered but otherwise qualified electors from voting. National 
had promised in its 1976 election manifesto to repeal most of Labour’s election 
revisions. Even so, the strongly demobilizing effect of the overall package and its 
likely electoral effects (benefiting National at the expense of Labour) led the 
opposition to vehemently oppose the legislation at all three of its readings. 
B. Partisan neutral: This category consists of enactments that are partisan but do not 
affect turnout. Most of the 10 identified acts concern either finance and 
electioneering laws or MP qualifications. One example is the Electoral Finance Act 
2007. This wide-sweeping enactment was passed by Labour in the aftermath of the 
2005 election funding scandal, after both major parties were accused of illicit 
electioneering practices. It placed extensive limits on third-party advertising, 
strengthened rules for political donations and election expenses, and implemented 
a new regime of compliance and enforcement. The National party strongly opposed 
these changes and pledged to repeal the measure if elected in 2008, which they 
subsequently followed through on. 
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C. Partisan mobilizing: These acts mix good and bad, increasing participation but 
doing so in a way that diminishes faith in the democratic system (this clash of 
normative values is further explored in Chapter 7). There have been only five such 
acts over the period of analysis. One example is the Electoral Amendment Act 
2002, which was the first substantive reform to election law since 1996. Passed by 
the Labour party under Helen Clark, it included many uncontroversial amendments 
to election administration, finance, and governance. Several mobilizing provisions 
were hotly contested by National, including counting the party vote of those who 
vote in the wrong electorate and implementing continuous enrollment. 
D. Non-partisan demobilizing: These enactments are a particularly worrisome case 
where politicians agree to discourage participation. They can be a warning sign that 
representatives are disadvantaging marginalized communities by preventing their 
democratic inclusion (Piven et al. 2009). There have only been four examples over 
the period of analysis. One case is National’s Electoral Amendment Act 1976, 
which returned the number of Māori electorates to four after the Electoral 
Amendment Act 1975 had allowed them to vary according to the size of the Māori 
electoral population. The Labour party put up token opposition to the first two 
readings but little substantive debate. They allowed the bill to receive a third 
reading without division in recognition of National’s manifesto pledge to enact the 
legislation. This act reinstated the discriminatory underrepresentation of Māori 
voters, who would continue to receive four fixed electorates in parliament until the 
introduction of MMP in 1996.    
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E. Non-partisan neutral: This category includes legislation that is neither controversial 
nor affects participation. It is the most common group, with 18 such acts, and 
primarily consists of omnibus, technical, and administrative bills. A typical 
example is the Electoral (Administration) Amendment Act 2010. This bill 
combined the Chief Electoral Office with the Electoral Commission and established 
the commission as an independent Crown entity. It was the first step in a two-stage 
process to centralize the country’s electoral governance under a single independent 
agency. The legislation was passed through all its stages without division. 
F. Non-partisan mobilizing: This category consists of normatively ideal cases of 
election lawmaking: consensus-based legislation that increases democratic 
participation. It is fortunately one of the most common kinds of election reform in 
Aotearoa New Zealand, with 15 acts over the period of analysis. One such case is 
National’s Electoral Amendment Act 1974, which lowered the voting age from 20 
to 18. This move had been desired by Labour for some time, but because the voting 
age is an entrenched provision passage required support from both major parties. 
National eventually acceded to the franchise expansion, and the bill passed through 
all its stages without division. 
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Table 5.2: Matrix of Election Lawmaking—FPTP Era 





Increased residency length requirement, disqualified 
prisoners from voting, disqualified unregistered but 




Amendment Act (No 2) 
1990 
Established a new system and procedures for the 





Created more leniency for voters to determine their 










Prevented a candidate from being nominated under a 






Lowered the voting age from 20 to 18. 
 
Table 5.3: Matrix of Election Lawmaking—MMP Era 
Category Example Law Key Provisions 
A: Partisan 
demobilizing 
Electoral (Disqualification of 
Sentenced Prisoners) 
Amendment Act 2010 
Disenfranchised all currently serving prisoners. 
B: Partisan 
neutral 
Electoral Amendment Act 
2007 
Placed extensive limits on third-party 
advertising, strengthened rules on political 
donations and election expenses.  
C: Partisan 
mobilizing 
Electoral Amendment Act 
2002 
Counted the party vote of those who voted in 








Amendment Act 2010 
Amalgamated the Chief Electoral Office with 
the Electoral Commission. 
F: Non-partisan 
mobilizing 
2017 Electoral Amendment 
Act 






The descriptive data provides initial evidence to evaluate whether switching to MMP has 
reduced the incidence of partisan and demobilizing election reforms. There is no evidence 
to support Hypothesis 1, of a supposed decrease in partisan election lawmaking from FPTP 
to MMP. Rather, the descriptive data reveals more partisan election lawmaking under a PR 
electoral system. Seven partisan acts affecting electoral law were passed during the FPTP 
era, whereas there were 11 such changes in the MMP era. In relative terms, 24 percent of 
FPTP-era acts affecting electoral law were partisan compared with 42 percent of MMP-era 
acts. The increase in partisan electoral acts passed under MMP is entirely due to an 
increased number of partisan neutral laws. Two such acts were passed under FPTP, while 
seven have been passed under MMP—a jump from 7 percent to 27 percent of all electoral 
acts passed during each era. In fact, the number of partisan acts that affect participation 
decreased slightly from five to four. This means that under MMP, partisan election 
lawmaking has concentrated on rules that do not affect participation.  
The descriptive numbers do provide evidence to support Hypothesis 2, that MMP 
has diminished the amount of demobilizing election lawmaking. Five demobilizing acts 
passed in the FPTP era, whereas only two have passed under MMP. This trend is similar 
when expressed as a percentage of all election laws. In the FPTP era, 17 percent of election 
enactments demobilized participation, while under MMP only 8 percent of election 
enactments demobilized voter turnout. The entirety of this decline is attributable to fewer 
non-partisan demobilizing enactments. The same number of partisan demobilizing acts 
passed in each era (two), but whereas three non-partisan demobilizing acts passed under 
FPTP, none of this category have passed thus far under MMP. This data also evidences a 
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decline in the incidence of election enactments that mobilize voters. Twelve mobilizing 
election laws passed under FPTP, but only seven have passed under MMP. Expressed as a 
percentage of all election-related enactments, 41 percent of FPTP-era election acts 
mobilized participation compared with only 27 percent of MMP-era enactments. As with 
demobilizing enactments, most of this decrease comes from a reduction in the number of 
non-partisan mobilizing acts passed under MMP. A similar number of partisan mobilizing 
acts were passed in both eras. The combination of participatory effect data reveals a 
decrease in the passage of participatorily impactful acts under MMP, as predicted in a 
corollary to Hypothesis 2. Seventeen election enactments in the FPTP era affected 
participation compared with only nine enactments in the MMP era. 
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 and Figure 5.1 detail electoral acts passed under the FPTP era. 
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 and Figure 5.2 detail electoral acts passed under the MMP era. Table 
5.8 and Figure 5.3 show the total counts of each era for the normative categories of election 








Table 5.4: FPTP-Era Election Lawmaking— 
Number of Election Enactments 
  
Participatory Effect Total 
  Demobilizing Neutral Mobilizing 
Partisanship 
Partisan 2 2 3 7 
Non-partisan 3 10 9 22 
Total 5 12 12 29 
 
 Table 5.5: FPTP-Era Election Lawmaking—
Percentages 
  
Participatory Effect Total 
  Demobilizing Neutral Mobilizing 
Partisanship 
Partisan 7% 7% 10% 24% 
Non-partisan 10% 34% 31% 76% 
Total 17% 41% 41% 100% 
 
Table 5.6: MMP-Era Election Lawmaking— 




Demobilizing Neutral Mobilizing 
Partisanship 
Partisan 2 7 2 11 
Non-partisan 0 10 5 15 
Total 2 17 7 26 
 
 Table 5.7: MMP-Era Election Lawmaking—
Percentages 
  
Participatory Effect Total 
  Demobilizing Neutral Mobilizing 
Partisanship 
Partisan 8% 27% 8% 42% 
Non-partisan 0% 38% 19% 58% 












































Three additional observations are apparent from the descriptive data.  First, partisan 
election lawmaking is far from uncommon. Of the 55 electoral enactments passed over the 
period of analysis, 18 were highly partisan. This means that nearly one out of every three 
election-related enactments have been passed in a partisan fashion—a clear sign that 
partisan election lawmaking is a regular occurrence in Aotearoa New Zealand. Second, 
cases of election laws that prevent or discourage electoral participation are rare but present. 
There have been seven instances of demobilizing election lawmaking throughout the period 
of analysis, significantly less than the 19 enactments that have increased participation. 
Although this balance is a positive one, the record shows that politicians have at times 
altered the rules of the game to suppress democratic participation. Third, the overall 
normative balance of election lawmaking is less encouraging. There have been equal or 
greater instances of deleterious election lawmaking in both the FPTP and MMP eras than 
clearly positive cases. Furthermore, the introduction of MMP has not seemed to decrease 
the incidence of deleterious election lawmaking (consisting of partisan and demobilizing 
reforms). There has been a slight increase in the passage of deleterious acts, from 10 under 
FPTP to 11 under MMP, which is entirely due to the passage of more partisan acts. This 
does not directly bear on either hypothesis, though it does fail to substantiate an applied 
assumption that PR systems inherently diminish corrosive forms of election lawmaking. 
This point is further explored in Chapter 7. 
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Table 5.8: Normative Election Lawmaking FPTP  MMP 
Total Partisan 7 11 
Total Demobilizing 5 2 
Total Deleterious 10 11 
Total Positive 9 5 
Total Potentially Positive 19 15 
 
 
Table 5.9 displays results for a chi-squared test of partisanship and era, whereas 
Tables 5.10 and 5.11 (below) display results for chi-squared tests of participatory effect 
and era. Chi-squared tests are conducted to see whether the observed counts are statistically 
different from a random distribution. In both cases, a small n-size complicates this analysis 




































Figure 5.3: Comparison of FPTP and MMP-Era Election 
Lawmaking
FPTP Era MMP Era
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differences.53 The test of partisan differences shows that a greater number of partisan 
election laws and fewer non-partisan election laws have passed under MMP (though with 
a p-value of 0.15, this finding is not statistically significant). This test fails to provide 
evidence for Hypothesis 1, that MMP should lead to fewer partisan election enactments. 
 
Table 5.9: Is Partisanship Independent of Era? FPTP MMP Total 
Non-Partisan 22 15 37 
Partisan 7 11 18 
Total 29 26 55 
 Pearson's Chi-Squared Test 
 
 χ2  = 2.0557, df = 1, p-value = 0.1516 
 
Two tests of participatory effect are conducted: one with the familiar tri-part 
classification and one measuring participatory effect versus no participatory effect. 
Significance is not reached when dividing between demobilization, neutral, and 
mobilization. However, there is a relationship significant at p < 0.10 between era and the 
passage of election laws that impact turnout, suggesting a non-random distribution. It 
seems that there have been fewer election laws passed under MMP that affect 
participation—both mobilizing and demobilizing—than under FPTP.  Fifty-nine percent 
of FPTP-era election laws affected participation, but only 35 percent of MMP-era election 
laws have affected participation. There were 17 participatorily impactful election acts 
passed between 1970 and 1993, but only 9 passed between 1997 and 2018. This is in line 
 
53 This is generally true for all chi-squared tests conducted in this chapter. Results should therefore be 
interpreted cautiously. Yates’ correction is not used for 2 x 2 tables (5.9, 5.11, and 5.18) because expected 
counts are above 5 and because this is an exploratory analysis (see Haviland 1990). The goal of this analysis 
is to discover prospective relationships. Thus, eliminating Type 2 errors (false negatives) is privileged over 
eliminating Type 1 errors (false positives). The results are broadly similar when Yates’ continuity correction 
is applied, with p-values slightly higher.  
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with expectations for Hypothesis 2, that MMP should lead to both less mobilizing and less 
demobilizing election lawmaking. 
 Table 5.10: Is Participatory Direction Independent of Era? FPTP MMP Total 
Demobilizes 5 2 7 
Neutral 12 17 29 
Mobilizes 12 7 19 
Total 29 26 55 
 Pearson's Chi-Squared Test 
 
 χ2  = 3.3098, df = 2, p-value = 0.1911 
 
 
Table 5.11: Is Participatory Effect Independent of Era? FPTP MMP Total 
Mobilizes/Demobilizes 17 9 26 
Neutral 12 17 29 
Total 29 26 55 
Pearson's Chi-Squared Test 
 




Logistic regression tests can discern relationships between a binary variable of interest and 
multiple explanatory variables. I conducted two sets of tests: one using partisanship as the 
dependent variable, and one using demobilization as the dependent variable.  
 
Partisanship Logistic Tests 
A series of logistic regressions are conducted using partisanship as the dependent variable 
to consider the effects of a variety of explanatory variables. The primary variables of 
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interest—era and effective number of parties—cannot be tested in the same regression 
because of high collinearity.54 To avoid this problem, two regressions are run with these 
variables included alternatively. Results with era are displayed in Table 5.12 and results 
with effective number of parties are displayed in Table 5.13. Four control variables are 
used: ruling party (Labour- or National-led), participatory effect (demobilizes, neutral, or 
mobilizes), inclusion of an entrenched clause, and inclusion of a clause that affects Māori.  
The statistical analysis fails to evidence the effects of proportionality on partisan 
election lawmaking. It does provide some initial evidence for the hypothesized relationship 
between the number of parties and partisan election lawmaking, and thus may indirectly 
indicate a relationship between proportionality and partisan election lawmaking due to the 
strong causal link between electoral system and number of parties. As shown in the models, 
election laws have been more likely to be partisan in Aotearoa New Zealand when they are 
participatorily demobilizing, when non-voters have more leverage, and when Labour is in 
charge. 
In both regressions, there is a strong and statistically significant relationship 
between the party in power and partisan election lawmaking. All else equal, National 
governments are far less likely to engage in partisan election reforms than Labour 
governments. In both models, legislation without a participatory effect is less likely to be 
partisan (significant at p = 0.05), as is legislation that has a mobilizing participatory effect 
(significant at p = 0.10). Additionally, both models fail to show a relationship between 
election laws that affect Māori and partisan reforms.  
 
54 r = 0.91. Inclusion of both variables in the same regression would cause multicollinearity issues, leading 
to unreliable results. 
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Table 5.12: Logistic Regression with Era 
                               Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)    
(Intercept)                    -1.48545    2.96009  -0.502  0.61579    
Era                             0.09957    1.44657   0.069  0.94512    
Government National            -4.33767    1.46007  -2.971  0.00297 ** 
Māori                           0.86666    0.98003   0.884  0.37653    
Entrenchment                   -1.44312    1.55493  -0.928  0.35336    
Participatory Effect Mobilizes -2.95546    1.45334  -2.034  0.04200 *  
Participatory Effect Neutral   -3.91305    1.65782  -2.360  0.01826 *  
Competitiveness                 0.08218    0.06367   1.291  0.19676    
Leverage                        0.19933    0.16921   1.178  0.23878    
—- 
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
    Null deviance: 69.545  on 54  degrees of freedom 
Residual deviance: 46.115  on 46  degrees of freedom 
AIC: 64.115 
 
Table 5.13: Logistic Regression with Effective Number of Parties 
                               Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)    
(Intercept)                    -1.07305    2.24226  -0.479  0.63225    
Parties Effective              -2.44918    1.43660  -1.705  0.08822 .  
Government National            -6.42907    2.15236  -2.987  0.00282 ** 
Māori                           0.52329    0.97493   0.537  0.59145    
Entrenchment                   -3.33506    1.98360  -1.681  0.09270 .  
Participatory Effect Mobilizes -2.97462    1.54372  -1.927  0.05399 .  
Participatory Effect Neutral   -4.67786    1.90703  -2.453  0.01417 *  
Competitiveness                 0.06118    0.06637   0.922  0.35658    
Leverage                        0.54189    0.24019   2.256  0.02406 *  
—- 
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
    Null deviance: 69.545  on 54  degrees of freedom 
Residual deviance: 42.208  on 46  degrees of freedom 
AIC: 60.208 
 
The model that includes era does not show any additional statistically significant 
relationships, whereas the model that includes the effective number of parties tells a more 
complex story. In the latter model, the expected relationships with the effective number of 
parties, leverage, and entrenchment appear. The higher the effective number of parties in 
parliament, the less likely it is that election changes are partisan (significant at p = 0.10). 
Additionally, the larger the non-voting population (and therefore the more voters that could 
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potentially be mobilized with election reforms), the more likely that reforms are partisan 
(significant at p = 0.05). Finally, election reforms that affect entrenched provisions are also 
less likely to be partisan (significant at p = 0.10), which is logical considering that these 
bills require supermajoritarian support for passage and thus are extremely difficult to enact 
without consensus. 
 Why do the regressions with era and effective number of parties differ so 
dramatically, especially considering the high correlation coefficient between these factors? 
Robustness tests with three other measures of party system are found to not have a 
significant relationship with partisanship, and instead reflect similar findings to the 
regression with era displayed in Table 5.12 (see Appendix K). Either the relationships 
shown in Table 5.13 are spurious, or the inclusion of the effective number of parties reveals 
a more particular dynamic of parliamentary politics than other indicators. The fact that the 
model with effective number of parties is more explanatory than the other models suggests 
that the latter scenario is the case.55 There are also compelling reasons to believe that 
effective number of parties is a better measure of the number of veto players than any of 
the other metrics. This issue is further explored in Chapter 6.  
 
 
55 The model with effective number of parties has substantially lower residual deviance and Akaike 
information criterion (AIC). The residual deviance for the model with effective number of parties is 42.2, 
compared with 46.1 for the model with era. This indicates that the former model better predicts which election 
enactments are partisan than the latter model. The AIC is a measure that estimates the amount of information 
lost by a given model. Models that lose less information are considered of higher quality. The difference in 
AIC between the models is 3.9 (64.1 − 60.2), indicating there is considerably more support for preferring the 
model with effective number of parties than the model with era. In mathematical terms, this means that the 
model with effective number of parties is seven times more likely than the model with era to minimize 
information loss. Additionally, a MLR model run using a more complex measure of partisanship produces 
even stronger relationships between effective number of parties, leverage, and partisan election lawmaking 
(see Table 5.17 below). This provides further evidence that the results in Table 5.13 are not spurious. 
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Demobilization Logistic Test 
To test the correlates of demobilizing election lawmaking, I fitted a logistic regression with 
a demobilization binary as the dependent variable. The results are shown in Table 5.14. 
Table 5.14: Logistic Regression of Demobilizing Election Lawmaking 
                     Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)    
(Intercept)         -1.800381   4.376185  -0.411   0.6808    
Era                  0.486868   2.064917   0.236   0.8136    
Government National  3.322814   1.529409   2.173   0.0298 *  
Māori                0.170407   1.429260   0.119   0.9051    
Entrenchment        -0.079048   1.703056  -0.046   0.9630    
Partisan Scale       0.940662   0.353573   2.660   0.0078 ** 
Competitiveness      0.007548   0.083282   0.091   0.9278    
Leverage            -0.282541   0.266466  -1.060   0.2890    
—- 
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
    Null deviance: 41.929  on 54  degrees of freedom 
Residual deviance: 26.517  on 47  degrees of freedom 
AIC: 42.517 
 
This model fails to show a statistically significant relationship with era. A 
robustness check with the effective number of parties substituted for era reveals a similar 
result (see Appendix K).56 These findings are in line with the chi-squared analysis, which 
also failed to find a statistically significant relationship. The small number of cases 
involved (seven demobilizing acts out of 55 laws analyzed) makes it difficult for the result 
to reach statistical significance and increases the chance for bias. Although the descriptive 
 
56 The test with effective number of parties provides an indication that higher leverage of non-voters (in the 
form of low-turnout elections) decreases the likelihood of demobilizing election lawmaking. This is counter 
to initial expectations but has a certain logic to it. Perhaps in low-turnout environments, most infrequent 
voters are already sitting on the sidelines and thus there is little to be gained by trying to decrease turnout 
even further. In parallel logic, it should be easier to use election rules to depress participation when turnout 




results still stand as evidence for Hypothesis 2, the statistical tests serve as an important 
caveat to the relationship between electoral system and demobilizing election lawmaking.  
The regression does reveal a statistically significant relationship between 
demobilizing election lawmaking and National-led governments. In other words, National-
led governments have been more likely than Labour-led governments to enact election laws 
that discourage democratic participation. The model also shows that the more partisan an 
election law is, the more likely that it demobilizes participation. Election reforms that 
decreased voter turnout were more likely to incite partisan disagreement than election 
enactments that did not diminish participation. This is in line with the findings of the 
logistical regression models of partisanship and makes intuitive sense.57  
I also fitted a logistic model considering whether each election law contained any 
provision that demobilizes participation (Table 5.15). Although only seven enactments had 
an overall demobilizing effect on participation, 16 laws contained at least one provision 
that diminishes turnout. The relationships with National-led governments and partisanship 
appear again. Additionally, it seems that election laws that directly affect Māori voters are 
more likely to contain demobilizing provisions (p < 0.10). Removing the effects of 
partisanship from the equation reveals an even stronger relationship between demobilizing 
provisions and provisions affecting Māori voters, significant at the 0.05 level of confidence 
(see Appendix K). This suggests the hypothesized relationship between election 
demobilization and the presence of Māori—that demobilization efforts have centered on 
Aotearoa New Zealand’s marginalized communities with discordant preferences.  
 




Table 5.15: Logistic Regression of Demobilizing Election Provisions 
                    Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)    
(Intercept)         -1.06956    3.66809  -0.292  0.77060    
Era                  0.91786    1.80092   0.510  0.61029    
Government National  2.93213    1.39340   2.104  0.03535 *  
Māori                1.81239    1.06158   1.707  0.08778 .  
Entrenchment         2.23481    1.51671   1.473  0.14063    
Partisan Scale       0.82247    0.27912   2.947  0.00321 ** 
Competitiveness     -0.01812    0.06970  -0.260  0.79490    
Leverage            -0.25724    0.22756  -1.130  0.25829    
—- 
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
    Null deviance: 64.455  on 54  degrees of freedom 




Analysis Using Complex Measure of Partisanship 
I ran another set of tests substituting the binary classification of partisanship for a complex 
scale. The descriptive data, displayed in Figures 5.4–5.6, are in line with the binary 
measurement (see Appendix L for data tables). Under FPTP, there were six instances of 
grossly partisan election reforms passing; under MMP, there have been seven. Aggregated, 
there were 12 moderately or highly partisan enactments in the FPTP era, compared with 
13 such enactments in the MMP era. There has been an increase in the number of 
completely non-partisan bills passed under MMP, from four to eight. In aggregate, 
however, there were more instances of election laws passing with little or no partisanship 
under FPTP (17 versus 13). In short, there does not appear to be any decrease in the number 







































Figure 5.4: Level of Partisanship by Era (Scale)

































Figure 5.5: Level of Partisanship by Era (Categories)




The MLR model including era, shown in Table 5.16, is largely identical to the 
logistic regression displayed in Table 5.12. Election laws passed by National-led 
governments are less likely to be partisan than reforms passed by Labour-led governments, 
while participatorily neutral and mobilizing bills are less likely to be partisan than 
demobilizing ones.  These relationships are all statistically significant at p = 0.01. Once 
again, no evidence is found to substantiate the relationship between era and level of 
partisanship proposed by Hypothesis 1. 
The model incorporating effective number of parties, shown in Table 5.17, also 
reveals similar results to its logistic counterpart (Table 5.13). The same relationships are 
observed between partisan election reforms and Labour-led governments, demobilizing 
laws, higher leverage of non-voters, and lower effective number of parties. The model 
provides additional evidence for the corollary to Hypothesis 1, that a greater effective 


































Figure 5.6: Level of Partisanship by Era (Complex Binary)
FPTP Era MMP Era
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is significant at the 0.05 level of confidence, indicating it is unlikely that the observed 
association is spurious.  
Table 5.16: MLR with Complex Partisanship Scale and Era 
                               Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)                     2.75449    2.31333   1.191  0.23988    
Era                            -0.73538    1.06821  -0.688  0.49465    
Government National            -2.29082    0.66740  -3.432  0.00128 ** 
Māori                           0.51973    0.73286   0.709  0.48179    
Entrenchment                   -0.29642    1.01045  -0.293  0.77057    
Participatory Effect Mobilizes -2.53738    0.93208  -2.722  0.00913 ** 
Participatory Effect Neutral   -2.99950    0.91644  -3.273  0.00202 ** 
Competitiveness                 0.05657    0.04410   1.283  0.20598    
Leverage                        0.14777    0.12106   1.221  0.22844    
—- 
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Residual standard error: 2.072 on 46 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0.3176, Adjusted R-squared:  0.1989  
F-statistic: 2.676 on 8 and 46 DF,  p-value: 0.01673 
 
Table 5.17: MLR with Complex Partisanship Scale and Effective Number of 
Parties 
                               Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)                     4.42355    1.65323   2.676 0.010296 *   
Parties Effective              -1.53876    0.73851  -2.084 0.042780 *   
Government National            -3.00204    0.72683  -4.130 0.000151 *** 
Māori                           0.44505    0.70432   0.632 0.530592     
Entrenchment                   -0.69664    0.98297  -0.709 0.482082     
Participatory Effect Mobilizes -2.61418    0.89239  -2.929 0.005269 **  
Participatory Effect Neutral   -3.23622    0.88661  -3.650 0.000668 *** 
Competitiveness                 0.04412    0.04102   1.076 0.287684     
Leverage                        0.26312    0.11241   2.341 0.023637 *   
—- 
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Residual standard error: 1.991 on 46 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:   0.37, Adjusted R-squared:  0.2605  
F-statistic: 3.377 on 8 and 46 DF,  p-value: 0.00397 
 
Both models fail to evidence a relationship between partisanship and the inclusion 
of entrenched provisions. This is explained by the differences in measurement between the 
binary and complex partisanship metrics. The binary measurement only considers third 
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reading divisions. The four election laws that included entrenched provisions passed 
without division in their third readings, which was virtually required by the need for 
supermajoritarian support. The complex partisan measure, on the other hand, also considers 
the level of contention in debate and the partisan effects of the bill. Two of these four 
enactments, the Electoral Amendment Act 1980 and Electoral Act 1993, had both partisan 
electoral effects and significant partisan disagreements in the parliamentary debate, 
elements that are masked by the binary partisan variable. The evidence presented here is 
counter to claims that entrenchment protects Aotearoa New Zealand against partisan 
election reforms. When all elements of partisanship are taken into account, election acts 
that alter entrenched provisions are no less likely to be partisan than election acts that do 
not contain entrenched provisions. 
 
Analysis of Government Party 
The logistic regression displayed in Table 5.17 revealed a statistically significant 
relationship between legislation sponsored by the National government and non-partisan 
election lawmaking. This section further explores this relationship. As shown in Table 
5.18, Labour-controlled governments have passed 14 of the 18 partisan election laws 
identified, whereas National-led governments have passed 25 of the 37 non-partisan 
election laws. Fourteen of Labour’s 26 election reforms have been partisan, compared with 
only four of National’s 29 election reforms. A chi-squared test shows the relationship 
between government party and partisanship to be statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
of confidence.  
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Table 5.18: Partisan Election Lawmaking by Party Labour National 
Non-partisan 12 25 
Partisan 14 4 
 Pearson’s Chi-Squared Test 
 
 χ2  = 9.9892, df = 1, p-value = 0.001575 
 
Several factors help explain this divergence. First, five of Labour’s 14 partisan 
election reforms were passed between 2006 and 2007 and all concern one political episode, 
the 2005 election funding controversy (Geddis 2008). Second, several of National’s most 
controversial election reforms did not receive third reading divisions because Labour 
accepted National’s authority to fulfill manifesto pledges to repeal previous legislation. 
This was the case with both the Electoral Amendment Act 1976 (returning the number of 
Māori electorates to four) and the Electoral Amendment Act 2009 (repealing parts of 
Labour’s 2007 finance reform). Two explanations are more systematic. One is that the 
National party in opposition has been less willing to go along with Labour’s desired 
election reforms than Labour has when the tables are turned. This argument places the 
blame on National for stonewalling the government’s agenda. The other explanation lies 
in the inherent dynamics of left- and right-wing parties as agents of change and stability. 
As a left-wing party (or the head of a left-leaning coalition), Labour has a tendency to want 
to change the established rules of the game to broaden participation, especially as the rules 
were written at an earlier age with a less inclusive democracy in mind (Atkinson 2003). 
National (and National-led coalitions), on the other hand, generally adhere to conservative 
values of stability and tradition. In terms of democratic law, this might translate into a 




Even if all these explanations are true, ultimately Labour has a record of regularly 
altering the rules of the game in the face of partisan opposition. To make a normative 
judgement of whether this record of election lawmaking is “good” or “bad”, it is instructive 
to examine the participatory effects of Labour’s partisan enactments. Only four fit into the 
normative quandary of category C—acts that are partisan and mobilize participation. Nine 
partisan laws did not affect participation and one enactment demobilized participation. On 
balance, then, Labour’s frequent partisan election lawmaking is not substantially mitigated 
by the normative good of increasing participation. This record reflects poorly on them.  
On the other hand, as shown in Table 5.19, National is responsible for five of the 
seven demobilizing enactments—a record that reflects poorly on them. This finding is in 
line with the expectations of Hypothesis 2, though it is not a statistically significant 
difference (in no small part because both parties have passed similar numbers of mobilizing 
and neutral acts). It makes sense when considering the implications of Aotearoa New 
Zealand’s left-right SES cleavage structure (Miller 2005). Because lower turnout tends to 
benefit National, the party should have a greater interest in passing demobilizing election 
laws than Labour. Surprisingly, National is also responsible for more mobilizing election 
laws, even though these should tend to benefit the Labour party. The normative popularity 
of increasing participation likely plays a role here. National could offset the SES effects of 
increased turnout by gaining support through the passage of popular mobilization laws. 
This so-called “act-contingent” strategy (Reed and Thies 2001), where politicians pursue 
legislation for the sake of benefiting from the act of passage itself, was certainly at play 
when National passed the 1993 Electoral Referendum and Electoral Acts and was likely at 
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play when it passed the Electoral (Finance Reform and Advance Voting) Amendment Act 
2010, accounting for three of the four most significant mobilizing acts passed by National. 
Table 5.19: Participatory Effect of Election Lawmaking by Party Labour National 
Demobilizes 2 5 
Mobilizes 8 11 
Neutral 16 13 
Pearson’s Chi-Squared Test 
 
 χ2  = 1.9118, df = 2, p-value = 0.3845 
 
An examination of election lawmaking by government, depicted in Figure 5.7, 
reveals whether these relationships are driven by specific governments or are true across 
all governments. It appears the relationship between Labour and partisan election 
lawmaking holds across every Labour government studied. One of two election enactments 
in the Third Labour government, four of 11 in the Fourth Labour government, and eight of 
12 in the Fifth Labour government were partisan. The one election law passed by the 
current Labour government was also partisan, and it appears that at least one more partisan 
election law will be passed this term. In comparison, no National government has passed 
more than two partisan election laws. The relationship between National and demobilizing 
reforms also applies across governments, though concentrates in the Third National 
government led by Muldoon (1975–84). Three of the six election laws enacted in that 
government demobilized voter participation. No demobilizing laws were passed in the last 
three years of the Second National government, and one each was passed in the Fourth and 
Fifth National governments. In comparison, no Labour government has passed more than 
a single demobilizing law. Almost every government has passed multiple mobilizing 




Can overall value judgements be made based on this analysis? As shown in Figure 
5.8, most governments have passed a mix of both deleterious and positive election reforms. 
The Sixth Labour government has only passed a single election reform, while the Second 
National and Third Labour governments also have small sample sizes with two election 
laws each. Furthermore, the broad distinctions of “deleterious” and “positive” election 
lawmaking mask as much as they reveal. With these limitations in mind, it is clear that 
some governments hold a more commendable record of election reform than others. Both 
the Third National and Fourth Labour governments passed more deleterious election 
reforms than positive ones. The Fifth Labour government has a particularly disreputable 
record of election lawmaking and the current Labour government has a completely 
disreputable record thus far, whereas the Fourth and Fifth National governments have 
notably reputable ones. No government’s record is perfect, though the Second National 











































Figure 5.7: Election Lawmaking by Government





Analysis of Election Law Type 
This section examines the relationship between partisanship and election type to determine 
whether the areas of election lawmaking that are partisan have changed under MMP, which 
was proposed as a component of Hypothesis 1. Tables 5.20 and 5.21 show the breakdown 
of partisan election lawmaking in the FPTP and MMP eras by the type of electoral 
provisions included in each enactment. An important caveat is warranted. These tables 
indicate whether bills that contain the relevant election law type were partisan overall, not 
whether the election law type was the reason for the bill’s partisanship. The following 
analysis does consider partisanship of specific provisions, using the tables as quantitative 





























































Partisan 0 2 5 3 5 1 6 0 1 1 3 
Total Partisan 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Total Acts of Type 3 6 13 11 11 10 15 2 4 2 13 
Percent Partisan of 
Partisan Acts in Era 0% 29% 71% 43% 71% 14% 86% 0% 14% 14% 43% 
Percent Partisan of 






















Partisan 0 1 2 2 2 0 7 0 1 3 2 
Total Partisan 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Total Acts of Type 1 1 5 6 2 1 15 1 4 4 4 
Percent Partisan of 
Partisan Acts in Era 0% 9% 18% 18% 18% 0% 64% 0% 9% 27% 18% 
Percent Partisan of 
Acts of Type in Era 0% 100% 40% 33% 100% 0% 47% 0% 25% 75% 50% 
104 
 
Overall, this analysis evidences that switching to MMP has significantly altered the 
areas of election lawmaking that are partisan. Partisan energy has shifted from registration 
administration, voting administration, franchise, and boundaries rules to finance and 
electioneering and member qualification provisions. There have also been significant shifts 
in partisan attention within each area of election law. Each election type is analyzed in turn. 
 
Electoral system  
No major electoral system changes were passed in a partisan fashion throughout either era. 
There are three instances of minor electoral system reforms being passed in partisan bills. 
Only in the case of the Electoral Amendment Act 1975 was the reason for the legislation’s 
partisanship at least partly due to electoral system reform. This case is important, however, 
as the provision allowed for variations in the number of Māori electorates based on the 
results of the Māori electoral option. The two other recorded cases of partisan change are 
misleading, as the provisions concerned were not themselves controversial—in the 
Electoral Amendment Act 1993, adding a requirement for registered parties to follow 
democratic procedures in candidate selection; and in the Electoral Amendment Act 2014, 
clarifying the requirement that list seats be reallocated in the event of a successful election 
petition. This means that only a single partisan change to the electoral system was passed 
in the FPTP era and that no such partisan changes have passed under MMP. This appears 
to align with Elizabeth McLeay’s (2018) claim that consensus-based election reform has 
been a norm in Aotearoa New Zealand since passage of the Electoral Act 1956, at least 
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when electoral system reforms are concerned.58 This has become more so under MMP, as 
no partisan changes to the electoral system have thus far been enacted—although there has 
been significant disagreement over electoral system reform that is not reflected by third 
reading divisions. This issue is explored further in Chapter 6. 
One reason why partisan electoral system reform is so rare is because of 
entrenchment. Several aspects of the electoral system are protected, including the method 
of voting, term length, and the number of electorates. Any changes to these provisions must 
garner three-fourths parliamentary support or majority support in a popular referendum. 
This requirement prevented the Labour party from enacting a provision in the Electoral 
Amendment Act 1975 increasing the size of parliament to 121 members. It has preempted 
many other calls for reform that were not supported by both major parties, and virtually 
guarantees that a major electoral system reform cannot pass without the support of both 
National and Labour.59 
Because legislation altering an entrenched provision must receive supermajority 
support, the record of legislative enactments is a poor measure to view shifted partisanship 
in electoral system reform under MMP. Rather, members’ bills reveal the significant 
changes that have taken place: from a focus on wholesale electoral system reform to a focus 
on tinkering with the rules of an MMP system, especially the electoral threshold and one-
seat coattails provisions (Interview M). Three constants have been disagreements over the 
 
58 A consensus-based electoral system reform is not automatically a commendable one. The Electoral 
Amendment Act (No 2) 1987 was an ad hoc agreement between Labour and National to scrap a by-election 
because they felt it was an “irritation” to hold one so close to the general election (Interview X). This had the 
effect of preventing members of the public from expressing their democratic voice in an election. Both parties 
agreed to make this mechanism permanently available with the Electoral Act 1990 and utilized the provision 
to skip another by-election in 1996 (Martin 2004).  
59 It does not prevent changes to entrenched provisions that are opposed by all minor parties. Such was the 
case with the alteration of the ballot paper in the Electoral Amendment Act (No 2) 1995 (Marin 2004). 
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provisions for Māori electorates, the size of parliament, and the parliamentary term 
length.60  
 
Registration Administration and Voting Administration 
Both types of election administration laws have proven substantial sources of partisanship, 
although it seems they have become less so under MMP. There were five partisan acts in 
the FPTP era that were controversial in part because of registration administration 
provisions but there was only a single act in the MMP era (the Electoral Amendment Act 
2014 was partisan for other reasons). Legislation that contained registration administration 
reforms made up 71 percent of all cases of partisan election lawmaking under FPTP but 
have made up only 18 percent of all cases under MMP. A constant source of partisanship 
for registration administration is the registration period. Originally closing on writ day, 
several members’ bills in the late 1970s and early 1980s proposed either repealing the 
requirement for registration altogether or extending the registration period to election day. 
The law itself did not change until Labour’s Electoral Amendment Act 1990 extended 
registration to the day before election day. The provision was contentious, though the 
opposition allowed the bill to pass without division on the third reading. National reversed 
this three years later with the highly partisan Electoral Amendment Act 1993. Both major 
parties agreed to extend the registration period to the day before election day in 1995. That 
consensus held for the following two decades. There is now renewed controversy with 
 
60 Although some claim a consensus has now developed for the retention of the Māori electorates so long as 
Māori wish them to exist (Interviews E, J), the actual record of party statements and proposed members’ bills 
suggests otherwise (see Geddis 2006a). 
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Labour’s Electoral Amendment Bill 2019 proposing to extend registration to election day 
itself. Rules for determining electors’ place of residence were only controversial under 
FPTP—especially with the Electoral Amendment Act 1989, which responded to the 
Wairarapa Electoral Petition. On the other hand, partisan controversy over provisions for 
continuous enrollment have only surfaced under MMP, namely with the Electoral 
Amendment Act 2002. 
There were two acts in each era that were controversial due to voting administration 
provisions (the Electoral Amendment Act 1993 was partisan for other reasons). 
Proportionally, however, there has been a decline: 43 percent of partisan election 
lawmaking under FPTP included voting administration changes, compared with only 18 
percent under MMP. The voting administration issues that are partisan have changed over 
time. The only major source of controversy in the FPTP era was a provision in the Electoral 
Amendment Act 1975 that required lists of candidates with party designations to be mailed 
out to electors ten days before polling day. This was repealed by National two years later, 
along with most other provisions in the 1975 act. A huge source of controversy in the 
interim period not covered by this analysis was the format of the ballot paper. Labour and 
National joined forces to pass the Electoral Amendment Act (No 2) 1995 over the objection 
of minor parties, thereby aligning the electorate and list boxes by party to discourage split-
ticket voting (Arseneau and Roberts 2015). The Electoral Amendment Act 2002 was highly 
controversial for enacting a provision that allowed the party vote of electors who voted in 
the wrong electorate to be counted. The Electoral Amendment Act 2014 was introduced 
initially without partisan controversy. This changed during select committee consideration, 
with the addition of a provision requiring electors to verbally confirm their name and the 
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removal of a provision that would have allowed use of the EasyVote enrollment 
confirmation card as proof of registration when voting.  
 
Franchise 
There has been a notable decline in the number of partisan election changes involving 
franchise reform, from five under FPTP to two under MMP. Seventy-one percent of FPTP-
era partisan election laws included franchise clauses, compared with only 18 percent of 
MMP-era partisan election laws. There has also been a sharp decline in the overall number 
of acts altering franchise rules, from 11 changes in the FPTP era to only two in the MMP 
era. Of the partisan election changes involving franchise reform, one in each era contained 
a franchise provision that was itself noncontroversial—the Electoral Amendment Act 1993 
(which made changes to mental health disqualification) and the Electoral Amendment Act 
2002 (which discontinued the allowance that persons who are not New Zealand citizens 
can stand as candidates if they were enrolled on 22 August 1975). Of the other acts, prisoner 
voting has been the most consistently partisan reform. The Electoral Amendment Act 1975 
expanded the franchise to all prisoners, which was undone by the Electoral Amendment 
Act 1977. Prisoners who were serving sentences of fewer than three years were then given 
the right to vote in the Electoral Act 1993 (see Robins 2006).61 However, the Electoral 
(Disqualification of Sentenced Prisoners) Amendment Act 2010 reversed this measure and 
 
61 This has been the only instance of non-partisan prisoner voting reform over the period of analysis. The 
circumstances were unusual, however. The 1992 Electoral Reform Bill originally copied the existing blanket 
ban on prisoner voting, but this provision was ruled an infringement on the Bill of Rights. This ruling of 
inconsistency likely played a role in the political decision to enfranchise prisoners with sentences of less than 
three years.  
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once again disenfranchised all sentenced prisoners.62 The issue continues to be 
controversial: the Waitangi Tribunal (2019) has ruled that the 2010 Act infringes upon the 
Treaty of Waitangi and the current Labour government has pledged to revert prisoner 
voting back to the provisions of the Electoral Act 1993 (Little 2019), while the National 
party leader has pledged to reverse any changes made by Labour in order to keep all 
currently sentenced prisoners disenfranchised (RNZ 2019). In contrast to prisoner 
disenfranchisement, the time requirement for residing in an electorate was controversial 
under FPTP (especially when the Electoral Amendment Act (No 2) 1985 shortened the 
length from three months to one) but has become much less so under MMP. 
 
Finance and Electioneering 
Acts affecting campaign finance, electioneering, and broadcasting have been the most 
frequent source of election lawmaking, with 30 separate reforms over the period of 
analysis—15 each in the FPTP and MMP eras. Politicians have consistently disagreed over 
these rules. Eighty-six percent of FPTP-era and 64 percent of MMP-era partisan election 
changes included finance and electioneering provisions. Two of the FPTP-era acts involved 
finance provisions that were themselves non-controversial—the Electoral Amendment Act 
1975 (increasing maximum election expenses from $1,500 to $2,000) and the Electoral 
Amendment Act 1977 (increasing maximum election expenses from $2,000 to $4,000). 
But in every other case, the finance and electioneering provisions were central sources of 
 
62 Geddis notes that National’s primary motivation for passing the legislation was partisan signaling: “[i]n 
this sense, the voting rights of some 3,000 New Zealanders were used purely as an instrumental weapon in 
the partisan battle for political power. That was and is quite deplorable” (2017: 226; see also Geddis 2011). 
110 
 
disagreement. One area of contention has been the degree to which the electoral roll is 
accessible to the public for the purposes of electioneering. Politicians clashed over making 
the dormant electoral roll public in the debate over the Electoral Amendment Act (No 2) 
1985, with the National opposition accusing Labour of “putt[ing] fingers into the ballot 
box and mak[ing] it easier for activist Labour supporters to fiddle elections” (468 NZPD 
8634, 3 December 1985). Broadcasting rules have been a source of conflict since the 
broadcasting allocation was introduced in 1989. Parties continue to disagree about the 
strictness of broadcasting regulations, the criteria for allocating broadcasting funds, and the 
amount to be allocated (Geddis 2003). Campaign finance regulation has seen a surge in 
partisan attention under MMP. Between 2006 and 2007, five highly partisan election acts 
focusing on finance reforms were passed, all following from illegal spending practices 
committed by both major parties during the 2005 election.63 A consensual process was 
followed to pass the Electoral (Finance Reform and Advance Voting) Amendment Act 
2010, calming partisan fervor on the issue. There are also lingering disagreements over the 
strictness of the ban on polling day advertising and electioneering. A provision that 
tightened the rules around these activities was removed from National’s Electoral 





63 These were, in order of passage, the Appropriation (Parliamentary Expenditure Validation) Act 2006, the 
Appropriation (Continuation of Interim Meaning of Funding for Parliamentary Purposes) Act 2007, the 
Electoral Amendment Act 2007, the Electoral Finance Act 2007, and the Broadcasting Amendment Act (No 




Changes to rules concerning the Representation Commission and the drawing of 
boundaries were common under FPTP but rarely made in a partisan manner. This is 
because most boundary rules are entrenched, preventing unilateral changes to the 
membership of the Representation Commission, the criteria for drawing boundaries, and 
the allowed tolerance quota.  One important exception to this is the Electoral Amendment 
Act 1975, which altered boundary rules by allowing the number of Māori electorates to 
fluctuate based on the size of the Māori electoral population. This provision was reversed 
the following year by the Electoral Amendment Act 1976, which again fixed the number 
of Māori electorates at four. The frequency of boundary reforms has declined sharply since 
the introduction of MMP. There were 10 amendments to boundary provisions under FPTP, 
most involving the Māori electorates. In contrast, only a single amendment to boundary 
provisions has been made under MMP, a reform in the Electoral Amendment Act 2017 that 
requires the online publishing of all objections to the Representation Commission’s 
proposed electoral boundaries. 
The political landscape of electoral boundary rules has been sharply altered by the 
introduction of PR. Elections previously hinged on a few marginal constituency districts. 
Each redistricting brought about intense partisan scrutiny, as it could completely alter the 
landscape of electoral politics. Under MMP, constituency districts matter much less, as the 
party vote largely determines the number of seats each party will get in parliament 
(Interviews U, Y, AG).64 This shift has transformed constituency boundaries from being 
 
64 An important exception being the coattails provision, which allows a party that wins one constituency seat 
to gain list seat votes even if they fail to receive 5 percent of the party vote. 
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one of the most controversial areas of election law to a relatively unimportant formality. 
Unsurprisingly, it has also meant that no partisan changes to the boundary provisions have 
passed under MMP.  
 
Ballot Initiatives and Governance 
Both ballot initiative and governance rules have rarely been amended and even more rarely 
disputed. Only three acts over the period of study involved changes to the rules governing 
ballot initiatives. The most notable case is the Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993, which 
instituted procedures for the holding of indicative referenda (Parkinson 2001).65 No 
reforms to the ballot initiative process have been partisan, although most ballot initiatives 
themselves have been fiercely contentious. There were more changes to electoral 
governance, with four each over FPTP and MMP eras. Just a single act in each era was 
partisan, and in both cases the governance provisions were not the source of disagreement. 
The 2010 and 2011 restructuring of electoral governance infrastructure, which involved 
merging the Chief Electoral Office with the Electoral Commission and the Chief Registrar 
of Elections, received broad political support.  
 
Member Qualifications 
The rules governing what actions can be taken as an MP have rarely been changed. There 
were only two amendments to member qualifications in the FPTP era. The Electoral 
 
65 The record of citizens’ initiated referendums in Aotearoa New Zealand has been markedly poor (see Catt 
1996, Geddis 2014; Goschik 2003; Morris 2004a). 
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Amendment Act 1981 altered rules around the disqualification of members who become 
state servants, while the Electoral Amendment Act 1993 suspended members for mental 
disorders. In neither case was the provision itself controversial. MMP has significantly 
altered the political landscape of member qualifications, creating the dilemma of “party 
hopping”—when sitting MPs leave their political party (Geddis 2006b). The Electoral 
(Integrity) Amendment Act 2001 enacted a highly controversial mechanism whereby a 
party leader could vacate the seat of any MP who left their party. This expired in 2005, but 
was reenacted in the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Act 2018—this time without a sunset 
clause—and has continued to incite fierce partisan divisions (Interview AB).66 Another 
significant dispute that developed under MMP was the disqualification of members who 
apply for foreign citizenship. The Electoral (Vacancies) Amendment Act 2003 was 
controversially passed in one day to save the seat of Harry Duynhoven, who had 
accidentally but technically been disqualified from sitting as a member by applying to 
renew his Dutch citizenship (Geddis 2004; Morris 2004b; Waldron 2004). The effect of 
the bill was to prevent a by-election from taking place. This issue was resolved the 
following year with the passage of the Electoral Amendment Act 2004. 
 
Māori 
Laws specifically targeting Māori voters tie into every other type of election rule discussed 
above. They have become significantly less common under MMP. Thirteen acts directly 
affecting Māori were passed in the FPTP era, whereas only four have been passed under 
 
66 It has also been almost universally panned by the country’s legal scholars (Geddis 2018). 
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MMP. Under FPTP, much partisan activity concerned the Māori electoral option. The 
Electoral Amendment Act 1975 introduced a Māori option for the first time, the Electoral 
Amendment Act 1980 delayed exercise of the option, the Electoral Amendment Act 1981 
reduced the option from three months to two, and the Electoral Amendment Act 1990 
altered the definition of the Māori population to include unregistered individuals of Māori 
descent. The procedures for determining the number of Māori electorates has been even 
more controversial. The Electoral Amendment Act 1975 allowed the number of electorates 
to fluctuate based on the Māori electoral population rather than keeping them fixed at four, 
but this was reversed when National took power the following year. The issue was partially 
settled by the introduction of MMP, as the Electoral Act 1993 again allowed the number 
of Māori electorates to fluctuate based on the size of the Māori electoral population. There 
has not been a single act under MMP that has altered Māori voting in a partisan way (the 
two partisan acts that contained Māori-specific provisions were divisive for other reasons). 
Even so, the status of the Māori electorates continues to be divisive, with frequent calls 
alternatively for their entrenchment or their elimination. The differential effect to Māori of 
certain electoral provisions continues to be an intense source of conflict, most notably with 
prisoner disenfranchisement in the Electoral (Disqualification of Sentenced Prisoners) 
Amendment Act 2010 (Waitangi Tribunal 2019).67 
 
 
67 This enactment negatively impacts turnout beyond prisoners by signaling to marginalized communities 
that their participation is not desired, thus reducing the likelihood that they vote (Interview AA). 
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Analysis of Proposed Members’ Bills 
An analysis of proposed members’ bills enriches the narrative of election reforms by 
detailing which rules politicians wanted to change but were unable to. Due to extreme party 
unity in Aotearoa New Zealand, government bills virtually always pass whereas non-
government bills virtually always fail. This means an analysis of members’ bills is mostly 
a story of aspirational reforms from the opposition. The analysis can also reveal latent 
partisanship over various types of election laws that lead to reactive political strategies—
whereby politicians block the passage of electorally harmful bills to maintain ingrained 
institutional advantages. The examination of proposed election bills is split into three parts: 
the first examining their prevalence, partisanship, and participatory effect; the second 
examining the party of the introducer; and the third examining the types of election law 
involved.  
 
Prevalence, Partisanship and Participatory Effect of Members’ Bills 
So far, substantial evidence has been brought to bear that Aotearoa New Zealand election 
lawmaking is regularly a partisan affair. An examination of proposed members’ bills 
reveals even more disagreement under the surface. Each proposed and failed members’ bill 
is a moment of partisan disagreement over the democratic rules of the game. Over the 
period of analysis, there have been 25 tabled members’ bills concerning election law that 
received first readings.68 There were an additional three government bills that were 
 
68 David McGee, the former Clerk of the New Zealand House of Representatives, views this as a surprisingly 
high number of members’ bills to be introduced on the subject (Interview AD). According to McGee, this 
indicates that members are substantially motivated by partisan considerations.  
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introduced but never passed and one members’ bill that was tabled but never debated.69 
Tables 5.22–25 show numerical and percentage values for the participatory effect and level 
of partisanship of these proposed members’ bills, one set each for FPTP and MMP. 
Table 5.22: FPTP-Era Members’ Bills— 





Demobilizing Neutral Mobilizing 
Partisanship 
Highly Partisan 0 4 5 9 
Less partisan 0 3 4 7 
Total 0 7 9 16 
 





Demobilizing Neutral Mobilizing 
Partisanship 
Highly Partisan 0% 25% 31% 56% 
Less partisan 0% 19% 25% 44% 
Total 0% 44% 56% 100% 
 
Table 5.24: MMP-Era Members’ Bills— 





Demobilizing Neutral Mobilizing 
Partisanship 
Highly Partisan 2 2 1 5 
Less partisan 0 3 1 4 
Total 2 5 2 9 
 
69 The three government bills are the Electoral Amendment Bill 1998 (which was eventually inserted into the 
Electoral Amendment Act 2002), the Broadcasting (Election Broadcasting) Amendment Bill 1999, and the 
Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill 2005. The first two failed despite being supported by the opposition 
because the coalition between National and New Zealand First fell apart during their consideration. The third 
bill was introduced as part of a coalition agreement between Labour and New Zealand First, though its 
passage was not a condition of the agreement. Because the circumstances surrounding these bills were quite 
distinct from members’ bills, they have been excluded from the main analysis and are mentioned where 
relevant. In Appendix J, their partisanship classification is the binary partisanship metric for enactments (third 
reading division) applied to the first reading. The members’ bill tabled but never debated is the Electoral 
Finance Amendment Bill 2008. There has only been one members’ bill amending election rules that has 
passed—the Electoral (Disqualification of Sentenced Prisoners) Amendment Act 2010. This has been 
included in the analysis of enactments. A members’ bill currently under consideration, the Electoral Access 
Fund Bill 2018, passed its second reading without division and seems likely to be enacted in 2020. 
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Demobilizing Neutral Mobilizing 
Partisanship 
Highly Partisan 22% 22% 11% 56% 
Less partisan 0% 33% 11% 44% 
Total 22% 56% 22% 100% 
 
There were notably more members’ bills concerning election law introduced under 
FPTP than under MMP—16 in the former compared to nine in the latter. The fact that large 
numbers of members’ bills in the FPTP era concerned election law indicates that election 
lawmaking was a highly contentious and partisan affair. Furthermore, significantly more 
members’ bills in the FPTP era were killed in their first reading rather than being allowed 
the courtesy of select committee review and a second reading. Nine bills were voted down 
in their first reading under FPTP, whereas only five have been treated as such under MMP 
(though the proportion of members’ bills that are highly partisan has remained the same). 
These divergences provide modest evidence that underlying partisanship in election 
lawmaking has declined under MMP. 
There are almost half as many members’ bills with participatory effects under MMP 
than under FPTP (four versus nine). This is the same trend that was observed with enacted 
election laws. It seems that MMP has reduced the incentives to propose or pass 
participatorily impactful election reforms. The story is more complex when broken down 
by direction of impact. There have been few members’ bills with demobilizing provisions 
over the period of analysis, an encouraging trend. Only two members’ bills would have 
demobilized participation if passed, totaling 8 percent of all members’ bills. In comparison, 
13 percent of enacted election reforms demobilized participation.  Both demobilizing 
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members’ bills occurred under MMP—counter to the trend presented for election 
enactments. 
The picture is very different in terms of mobilization. Members’ bills have 
frequently been a vehicle for mobilizing election ideas. Eleven mobilizing members’ bills 
were debated over the period of analysis. Nine occurred in the FPTP era, whereas only two 
were introduced under MMP. Furthermore, many of these bills contained provisions with 
large participatory effects. Of the 11, four (36 percent) would have had major mobilizing 
effects (defined as likely to boost turnout by at least 5 percentage points). The provisions 
in all four bills concerned registration administration and included radical reforms such as 
extending the registration period from writ day through to the end of polling day, putting 
the onus for registration on the government, and repealing the requirement for registration 
altogether. In comparison, 19 enacted reforms mobilized turnout, none of which had a 
major mobilizing impact.  
 
Members’ Bills and Introducer’s Party 
An examination of the introducer’s party provides another avenue to examine the 
relationship between party and election lawmaking. As can be seen in Table 5.26, many of 
the party-based participatory trends observed with enacted election reforms continue with 
members’ bills. Every single one of Labour’s six introduced bills with a participatory effect 
would have mobilized voter turnout. One the other hand, National’s lone bill with a 
participatory effect would have demobilized participation. This is in line with the findings 
from enacted reforms. Associated small parties have also pursued election changes in line 
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with expectations. The left-leaning Green, NewLabour, and Social Credit parties only 
proposed mobilizing and neutral bills, whereas the right-wing Act party’s lone members’ 
bill would have demobilized participation. 
Table 5.26: Introducer's Party and 
Participatory Effect of Members' Bills 
Demobilizes Mobilizes Neutral 
ACT 1 0 0 
Democrats 0 0 1 
Green 0 1 0 
Labour 0 6 6 
National 1 0 2 
NewLabour 0 2 0 
New Zealand First 0 0 2 
Social Credit 0 2 1 
 
 The relationship between party and partisanship, shown in Table 5.27, is more 
complicated. It is important to reiterate that every proposed members’ bill is partisan, 
although some are clearly more so than others. Labour members have pursued changes to 
election rules much more frequently than National members—a ratio of three to one. Of 
Labour’s 12 members’ bills, six were highly partisan and six were less so. In comparison, 
National members only put forward three members’ bills affecting election rules, but all 
three were quite partisan affairs. 
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Table 5.27: Introducer's Party and 
Partisanship of Members' Bills 
Lower Higher 
ACT 0 1 
Democrats 0 1 
Green 1 0 
Labour 6 6 
National 0 3 
NewLabour 1 1 
New Zealand First 1 1 
Social Credit 2 1 
 
 Members’ bills have been an important vehicle for small parties to propose ideas. 
Forty percent of proposed members’ bills have been put forward by MPs from small 
parties, including bills from Social Credit, Democrats, NewLabour, New Zealand First, 
ACT, and Green party members. Particularly astonishing is the fact that six of the ten 
occurred in the FPTP era, when small parties made up no more than a handful of seats in 
parliament. This is because small parties did not have other available means to influence 
policy discussions, leading them to more aggressively pursue members’ bills (Interview 
AD). Given that the FPTP electoral system actively disadvantaged small parties, they also 
had an incentive to push for reform. In the MMP era, the advent of coalition governments 
means that small parties can play an active role in shaping legislative bills (Malone 2008), 
reducing the need for members’ bills as a policy signaling device.  
 It is also important to consider instances when major parties joined forces to defeat 
members’ bills put forward by minor parties. There were two such cases over the period of 
analysis, both occurring in the FPTP era: the Electoral (Representation Commission) 
Amendment Bill 1986 (which sought to add political representatives from all parliamentary 
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parties onto the Representation Commission) and the Mixed Member Proportional 
Representation Poll Bill 1990 (which proposed a binding referendum on MMP at that 
year’s general election). This small parties versus major parties schism has been assumed 
to play a bigger role in the MMP era (Interviews J, L, AC). However, there has not been a 
single case of major parties teaming up to pass election reforms over the opposition of 
minor parties since 1996.70  
 
Members’ Bills and Election Law Type 
A breakdown of proposed members’ bills by the type of election rules involved, shown in 
Table 5.28, confirms both the broad base of partisan disagreements over election law and 
the trends of shifted partisanship observed earlier. Members’ bills involved every type of 
election law except for governance. There has been a notable decline of partisan interest in 
major electoral system, registration administration, voting administration, and boundaries 
reform. In contrast, there has been a notable increase of partisan interest in minor electoral 
system and member qualification reforms. 
 
70 One of the major reasons for the absence of this legislative dynamic may be because coalition agreements 
have included both big and small parties, making it difficult for governments to pass laws that skew election 
results against small parties (Interview L). The best evidence for this is the transitionary period between FPTP 
and MMP, which witnessed the passing of three controversial election laws along major-minor party lines. 
Minor parties fiercely opposed the Electoral Amendment Act (No 2) 1995 due to a provision altering the 
design of the ballot paper to align the list and electorate boxes by party, thus encouraging straight-ticket 
voting for the major parties (Geddis 2014; Interviews G, J). The Broadcasting Amendment Act 1996 and the 
Electoral Amendment Act (No 2) 1996, passed together, were opposed by small parties due to provisions 
allowing the government and opposition to each nominate a person to serve on the Electoral Commission for 
the purposes of determining the broadcast allocation. This shut out minor parties from representation for this 
important determination (Interview J). The Electoral Act 1993 also contained a provision fiercely opposed 
by minor parties: setting the representation threshold at 5 percent, rather than the 4 percent threshold 
recommended by the 1986 Royal Commission. All these inter-era cases occurred in an environment without 


























FPTP 4 0 4 2 1 3 3 2 0 0 2 
MMP 1 4 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 2 
Total 5 4 5 2 2 3 5 2 0 1 4 
Total Highly 
Partisan 
3 2 4 2 0 1 3 1 0 0 3 
Percent of All 
Members' Bills in 
FPTP Era 
25% 0% 25% 13% 6% 19% 19% 13% 0% 0% 13% 
Percent of All 
Members' Bills in 
MMP Era 
11% 44% 11% 0% 11% 0% 22% 0% 0% 11% 22% 
Percent of All 
Members' Bills 
Overall 
20% 16% 20% 8% 8% 12% 20% 8% 0% 4% 16% 
Percent of Type 
Highly Partisan  
60% 50% 80% 100% 0% 33% 60% 50% 0% 0% 75% 
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Many members’ bills involved major or minor reforms to the electoral system. 
More than one third of all members’ bills contained provisions affecting the electoral 
system. Notably, four of the five bills containing major electoral system reforms occurred 
in the FPTP era. Most of these concerned proposals to switch the electoral system to a 
proportional one—which understandably was no longer a concern after the implementation 
of MMP.  All four of the bills containing minor electoral system reforms were introduced 
under MMP. Two concerned the entrenchment or elimination of the Māori electorates, one 
attempted to reduce the number of MPs, and one attempted to reduce the electoral threshold 
to 4 percent and remove the one-seat threshold (as per the recommendations of the Electoral 
Commission’s 2012 review of MMP). A majority of the major electoral system bills and 
half of the minor electoral system bills were highly partisan.  
Five bills contained registration administration provisions and two bills contained 
voting administration provisions. Most were tabled in the FPTP era. All four of the 
members’ bills proposing changes to registration procedures were introduced between 
1978 and 1980 in response to major problems with the enrollment system that became 
apparent in the leadup to the 1978 general election. Incidentally, all four bills also proposed 
radical solutions for the election that, if implemented, would have had a major mobilizing 
effect on voter turnout. Three of the four were introduced by Gerald Wall (Labour MP for 
Porirua), and all four bills proposed substantially lowering registration barriers. Two 
sought to enact election day registration at a time when the registration period closed on 
writ day.71 The Voting Rights Protection Bill 1978 proposed doing away with the 
 
71 Incidentally, election day registration is just now being considered by parliament as part of the Electoral 
Amendment Bill 2019 and appears likely to pass. 
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requirement for electors to register before they become eligible to cast a valid vote, while 
the Electoral Amendment Bill (No 2) 1978 proposed putting the onus on the government 
to enroll all eligible voters. Almost every members’ bill containing registration and voting 
administration provisions was fiercely controversial. 
There are few members’ bills that involved changes to the franchise. Most 
significant is the Electoral Amendment Bill 1972, which sought to lower the voting age 
from 20 to 18 years of age. This was achieved two years later with the Electoral 
Amendment Act 1974. The Electoral Access Fund Bill 2018 proposes a fund to help cover 
disability-related costs of disabled candidates standing for office. It seems likely that the 
legislation will pass in 2020. All three proposed bills containing provisions relating to 
electoral boundaries occurred in the FTPT era, a similar trend to the enactments. Both the 
Electoral Amendment Bill 1978 and the Electoral (Representation Commission) 
Amendment Bill 1986 sought alterations to the membership of the Representation 
Commission to include formal representation for small parties. The fact that Labour and 
National alone are allowed political appointments to the commission continues to be 
controversial, though of much diminished importance considering the mechanics of MMP 
(Beever 2003; Interviews H, J, P). A handful of finance and electioneering bills were also 
proposed throughout the past 50 years, covering a diverse array of issues. As with enacted 
election laws, a significant percentage were intensely partisan affairs. 
Ballot initiative members’ bills were a rare occurrence; the only two were the work 
of Social Credit’s Gary Knapp.72 Knapp introduced identical bills in 1983 and 1984 seeking 
 
72 Knapp switched party affiliation to the Democrats in 1985 but continued a streak of election-related 
members’ bills. His Electoral (Representation Commission) Amendment Bill 1986 proposed adding political 
representatives from minor parties onto the Representation Commission. 
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the implementation of a binding referendum system. A non-binding initiative mechanism 
was realized ten years later in the Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993. No members’ bills 
concerned electoral governance, unsurprising considering the infrequent and non-partisan 
nature of governance changes that have passed. There was only a single members’ bill 
debated involving member qualifications—the Electoral (Party Registration) Bill 1997, 
which sought to prevent party-hopping.73  
Four members’ bills contained provisions directly affecting Māori voters, two in 
each era. Both FPTP-era bills concerned easing Māori voter registration restrictions on 
transferring between the general and Māori rolls, whereas both MMP-era bills concerned 
the future of the Māori electorates. The Electoral (Racially-Based Representation) 
Referendum Bill 2002 proposed a referendum to eliminate the electorates, while the 
Electoral (Entrenchment of Māori Seats) Amendment Bill 2018 proposed their 
entrenchment.  Three of the four members’ bills affecting Māori voters failed their first 
reading, indicating a high level of partisanship.
 
73 A temporary ban on party hopping was achieved four years later, expiring in 2005. A government bill was 
introduced in 2005 to extend the prohibition on party hopping but was never passed. The issue lay dormant 





























CHAPTER 6: ELECTION LAWMAKING IN AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND 
AND THE IMPACT OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION 
 
 
It is clear that election lawmaking in Aotearoa New Zealand is not consensual. It is equally 
clear that switching to a PR system has failed to reduce the incidence of partisan election 
lawmaking. Electoral system reform has seemed to contribute to a decline in the passage 
of demobilizing bills and, more broadly, any election rules with participatory effects. It has 
also shifted the areas of election law that are partisan. National members and National-led 
governments have a propensity to propose and pass demobilizing election laws, while 
Labour members and Labour-led governments have an even stronger tendency to pursue 
partisan election reforms. I have uncovered evidence that demobilizing election reforms 
disproportionately involve Māori voting provisions. I have also substantiated a relationship 
between leverage of non-voters and the incidence of partisan election lawmaking.  
 This chapter highlights main takeaways from the data presented in Chapter 5, 
considers whether to accept or reject the hypotheses presented in Chapter 4, and weighs 
the balance of evidence for the myriad other factors mentioned in Chapter 2 that may 
impact the politics of election lawmaking. It proceeds in five parts. The first three constitute 
core elements of analysis. The first part examines the degree to which Aotearoa New 
Zealand election lawmaking is consensual, the second analyzes the evidence for the central 
hypotheses and causal mechanisms, and the third considers a range of independent 
variables. The last two parts consider incidental areas of concern. The fourth evaluates 
which policy triggers have brought election reforms onto the agenda. The fifth examines 
the degree to which partisan election lawmaking has been random. 
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Is Aotearoa New Zealand Election Reform Consensus-Based? 
As described in Chapter 3, there is a persistent belief held by scholars that Aotearoa New 
Zealand’s election reforms are largely consensual and that highly partisan changes do not 
regularly occur here. This idea is central to McLeay’s (2018) book In Search of Consensus, 
which argues that passage of the Electoral Act 1956 established consensus-based election 
lawmaking in Aotearoa New Zealand as a norm. Similar views cropped up repeatedly in 
interviews with academics (D, E, H, I, O, S), government officials (F, J, R, V, AD) and 
politicians (N, AG). This sentiment is not new. In Hansard’s record of parliamentary 
debate, politicians have repeatedly expressed this consensus-based understanding of 
election law from the earliest years analyzed. Politicians are most likely to wax lyrical 
about the “good old days” of consensus-based election lawmaking in the mist of fiercely 
partisan debates over election reform. Such was the case when John Marshall (National 
MP for Karori) spoke in opposition to the Electoral Amendment Act 1975 (398 NZPD 
2097, 12 June 1975, emphasis my own): 
More than perhaps anything else, I regret that on several important matters there 
has been a division between the parties, and in that division we are departing from 
the bipartisan approach to electoral legislation. In the 1956 Act, which is the 
present law on parliamentary elections and for which I was responsible as the then 
Minister of Justice, we had a bipartisan approach to the electoral legislation, and it 
was passed unanimously by Parliament after a considerable period of discussion 
in a select committee. There was a spirit of compromise, and we were able to reach 
agreement on all matters. 
Because that was a bipartisan Bill which has been an accepted piece of 
legislation for the past 20 years, and has been the basis on which seven general 
elections have been held up to the election at the end of this year, we have been 
free from party political division in our electoral legislation. It has meant that 
both parties have accepted the electoral law as fair and reasonable, and there has 
been no suggestion that it favoured one party more than another. As a result of the 
changes introduced by the Government in this Bill the stability of our electoral law 
is likely to go by the board in several important respects. This could mean, as the 
Leader of the Opposition pointed out tonight, that whichever party becomes the 
Government there are likely to be some changes in that electoral law. So we will 
now have the unsatisfactory situation where the electoral law mean one thing when 
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one Government is in office and another thing, in some important respects…when 
another Government is in office. 
 
Marshall fondly remembered the prior several decades of election lawmaking, especially 
the Electoral Act 1956, which introduced the practice of entrenched election statutes. He 
also correctly foresaw that Labour’s reforms would lead to frequent partisan changes in the 
future—including the following two years, when the National government repealed many 
of the 1975 Act’s core provisions. But Marshall is on less certain ground with the assertion 
that parliament had been “free from party political division” on election law over the past 
two decades. The Political Disabilities Removal Act 1960, which restored the ability of 
unions to make levies for political purposes, was passed on a party-line vote. The Electoral 
Amendment Act 1965, which fixed the South Island quota at 25 seats without altering 
Māori representation, was also highly contentious (Christmas 2010).  
Thirty years later, politicians were at it again. In the debate over the Electoral 
Finance Act 2007, Leader of the Opposition John Key decried how “[y]ears and years of 
bipartisan support of electoral [election] reform will be sacrificed” for Helen Clark’s 
political benefit (644 NZPD 14031, 18 December 2007). Key seemed to forget about the 
nearly annual passage of partisan election reforms preceding this debate, including the 
Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Act 2001, the Electoral Amendment Act 2002, the 
Electoral (Vacancies) Amendment Act 2003, and the Appropriation (Parliamentary 
Expenditure Validation) Act 2006. Just a few years later, in the debate over the Electoral 
(Administration) Bill 2010, Labour MP Pete Hodgson made an extended statement on the 
history of consensus (663 NZPD 11012, 19 May 2010, emphasis my own): 
I want to make a point about consensus and to say that we do not, it appears, yet 
have consensus in this House. In fact, by one perspective we have never 
particularly had it—I will explore that a little—and we do not have consensus, or 
broad consensus, or mostly consensus on what I think will be the next few bills 
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regarding electoral [election] reform as it applies to donations, spending caps, 
parallel campaigning, and all of these things. We know what we are talking about 
here.  
 
I do not want to talk about the issues; I want to talk about the value of 
consensus. I acknowledge we have never had it, but in the 1980s and in the 
1990s when there was near-consensus throughout those decades—and they 
were turbulent enough in general but as far as electoral law was concerned 
they were rather quiescent—the main point of contention was when the rolls 
should close. Should they close 28 days prior, or should they close the evening 
prior? As Governments changed in that time, so did the electoral law. The point of 
that is that the electoral law is part of our constitution. We always say that we have 
an unwritten constitution; in fact, we have it written in several places, and the rest 
of it is just tradition or by arrangement. It is part of our written constitution, and it 
is not a good idea for the written constitution to change reliably upon the change 
of Government. If one is to address that, the question is how we get somewhere 
close to a near consensus on it. We are some distance away in respect of donations, 
spending caps, and parallel campaigning.  
 
In these remarks, Hodgson acknowledges that the idea of past consensus is illusionary and 
points out a history of frequent partisan changes to election law. Despite this recognition, 
Hodgson goes on to praise a supposed “near-consensus” that existed in the 1980s and 
1990s, describing the period as “rather quiescent”. What is particularly curious is that the 
1990s was the decade when the fierce battle over electoral system reform was waged. 
The last few years have witnessed a rash of parliamentary speakers extolling 
Aotearoa New Zealand’s cherished tradition of consensus-based election lawmaking. In 
the debate over the Electoral Amendment Act 2014, both sides of the aisle made statements 
to this effect while bemoaning the partisan conditions under which the bill was passed. 
Simon Bridges proclaimed that “New Zealand is a nation where we actively seek to build 
on the lessons learnt from previous elections, and where we take a multiparty approach to 
electoral [election] reform” (697 NZPD 16720, 13 March 2014), while Phil Goff noted that 
“[n]ormally with electoral legislation we try to deal with it in a different way” (697 NZPD 
16745, 18 March 2014)—with “different” in this context meaning consensually. In the 
debate over the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Act 2018, Nick Smith declared that “[t]he 
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general consensus is that we make electoral law changes only with … broad parliamentary 
support” (733 NZPD 7158, 27 September 2018). Chris Bishop went even further, calling 
bipartisan election lawmaking a “convention” and declaring the bill “unconstitutional” 
because “it is not being passed with bipartisan support” (733 NZPD 7175–76, 27 
September 2018).  
Parties have even used the supposed “convention” of non-partisan election reform 
as a reason to not pursue changes. This was certainly the case in National’s decision to 
ignore the recommendations of the Electoral Commission’s (2012b) review of MMP 
mandated by the outcome of the 2011 referendum (Interviews G, I, S, V). Minister of 
Justice Judith Collins stated in response to the commission’s report that “[e]nduring change 
to electoral law should be based as much as possible on consensus” and that, because 
consensus could not be reached, there would be no legislative action (Collins 2013; see 
also Edgeler 2013; Geddis 2017). The primary reason for the lack of consensus was that 
National opposed the commission’s recommendations.74 The party left no mystery as to 
the source of its opposition: National’s submission to the commission argued that the 
reforms would hurt their future electoral prospects (New Zealand National Party 2013). 
One of the most important findings of this thesis is that Aotearoa New Zealand’s 
election lawmaking is not consensus-based. As shown in Figure 6.1, election rulemaking 
has routinely been a partisan affair.75 Of the 55 election-related laws enacted over the 
period of analysis, 18 were highly partisan. This means that approximately one out of every 
 
74 ACT also opposed the changes, while New Zealand First thought that any reforms should require a 
referendum. Bennett (2013) argues that this specific instance of inaction underlines the need for 
extraparliamentary processes such as citizens’ assemblies on election reform (see also Hayward 2014). More 
generally, Nigel Roberts said that parties have used the supposed need for unanimity or near unanimity as “a 
huge cover” for self-interested inaction (Interview G). Therese Arseneau and Peter Aimer expressed similar 
sentiments (Interviews S, Z). 
75 Consistent with the rest of the analysis, Figure 6.1 excludes election laws passed between 1994 and 1996. 
132 
 
three laws affecting the rules of the game was passed on a divisive party-line vote. The 
total number of election-related enactments includes a handful of one-line omnibus bills 
that made extremely technical changes, so this presents a conservative measure of the 
extent of partisanship. An additional seven laws were moderately partisan, bringing the 
proportion of partisan election lawmaking close to 50 percent. The fact that 25 proposed 
members’ bills have also taken up legislative time, half of which were highly partisan, 
underlines the fact that politicians do not adhere to a consensual norm when engaging in 
changes to the democratic rules of the game.76  
 
 
76 At the same time, this study provides evidence for Jacobs and Leyenaar’s (2011) claim that non-partisan 
minor election reforms should be a common occurrence, as the electoral costs of opposing reform are more 
easily outweighed by the benefits of supporting change when the reform promotes positive normative values. 
Thirty-four of the 55 analyzed election enactments were passed without a third reading division and 13 
mobilizing election laws passed without a third reading division. However, their claim that politicians should 
be more likely to support electorally harmful minor reforms than major ones was not evidenced. Every case 
of major electoral system reform analyzed was passed without a third reading division, meaning that 














More generally, the record of Aotearoa New Zealand election lawmaking shows 
that changes to the rules of the game are a regular occurrence here. This is contrary to the 
idea espoused by a former Minister of Justice that election laws should be changed 
infrequently (Interview N).77 There were 55 election amendments over the 46 years of 
lawmaking studied. This translates into more than one enactment passed every single year. 
There have been on average 3.5 changes to the democratic rules of the game plus almost 
two proposed changes between every general election. Over the past 50 years, only one 
general election has taken place with election rules in the books identical to the previous 
general election: the 45th Parliament led by Jim Bolger and then Jenny Shipley (December 
1996 to October 1999). The only reason for this gap was that the National–New Zealand 
First coalition collapsed mid-term, preventing two government-sponsored election bills 
from proceeding.78 At the other end of the spectrum, John Key shepherded through no less 
than nine election-related enactments in the 49th Parliament (December 2008 to August 
2011).79 This evidence means that not only have election reforms frequently been partisan, 
but politicians have regularly tinkered with the rules of the game.  
 Why, then, has this belief in consensus-based election reform persisted? 
When presented with examples of partisan election reforms, several interviewees put 
Aotearoa New Zealand’s case in relative terms, saying it is much better than compared 
 
77 To the contrary, Robert Peden noted that, due to the triennial select committee review process, the Electoral 
Act is one of the most amended pieces of legislation (Interview Q). 
78 The Electoral Amendment Bill 1998 was carried over and incorporated into the Electoral Amendment Act 
2002. The Broadcasting (Election Broadcasting) Amendment Bill 1999 lapsed at the end of the session, but 
core elements were incorporated into the Broadcasting Amendment Act 2004.  
79 These were, in order of passage: the Electoral Amendment Act 2009, the Parliamentary Service 
(Continuation of Interim Meaning of Funding for Parliamentary Purposes) Act 2009, the Electoral 
(Administration) Amendment Act 2010, the Electoral Amendment Act 2010, the Electoral (Disqualification 
of Sentenced Prisoners) Amendment Act 2010, the Electoral (Finance Reform and Advance Voting) 
Amendment Act 2010, the Parliamentary Service Amendment Act 2010, the Electoral Referendum Act 2010, 
and the Electoral (Administration) Amendment Act 2011. 
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with the United States (Interviews D, E, G, S). Using one of the most egregious cases of 
partisan election lawmaking (Valelly 2016) as a point of comparison will inevitably return 
a favorable result. It is straw man logic to claim that, because Aotearoa New Zealand does 
not have the levels of partisanship found in the United States, partisan election lawmaking 
either does not happen here or does not happen at worrisome levels.  
 McLeay argues that the norm is one of process rather than outcome: it is the 
expectation that parties will seek consensus on election matters, even if they do not attain 
consensus in the end (Interview H).80 Parties who have infringed upon this norm have faced 
repercussions, in McLeay’s estimation. But there are numerous cases of parties abridging 
the normal legislative process and rushing through election reforms without attempting to 
gain consensus.81 And there are not always clear signs that such actions have damaged the 
offending party. Furthermore, even if parties follow a consensus-based process, it matters 
little if the government ignores the concerns of minority parties and decides to pass fiercely 
partisan legislation anyway.  
 Perhaps Aotearoa New Zealand academics have simply followed the international 
trend explored in Chapter 2, privileging wholesale election reforms over “minor” cases.82 
 
80 One element of McLeay’s claim is that parties are more likely to get consensual outcomes if they follow a 
consensual process. This seems very plausible and is a promising avenue for future scholarship (as explored 
in Chapter 7). 
81 The committee stage of both the Electoral (Vacancies) Amendment Act 2003 and the Appropriation 
(Parliamentary Expenditure Validation) Act 2006 was controversially skipped. The Electoral Amendment 
Act 1976, the Broadcasting Act 1989, and the Electoral Amendment Act 1989 are a few of the many cases 
where the legislative process was controversially abbreviated in other ways. Data for this observation derives 
from Claudia Geiringer, Polly Higbee, and Elizabeth McLeay’s database of Aotearoa New Zealand urgency 
motions, which they graciously shared with the author (see also Geiringer et al. 2011). The issue of 
democratic procedures is identified in Chapter 7 as an area for future scholarship.   
82 Former Prime Minister Sir Geoffrey Palmer explicitly made such a distinction, noting that the consensual 
norm exists for the essentials of the electoral system but not the “peripherals”. Palmer also clarified that the 
peripherals are not unimportant (Interview M). Similarly, Sir Kenneth Keith stated that the consensual norm 
only applies to “central features” of the electoral system (Interview AF). 
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If one only considers the two biggest election reforms in the country’s post-WWII 
history—the Electoral Act 1956 and the Electoral Act 1993—it seems easy to declare 
Aotearoa New Zealand’s election lawmaking to be consensus-based. However, doing so 
ignores the many other election-related reforms that have been enacted in the interim, 
several of which passed in highly partisan circumstances. Alternatively, scholars have 
pointed to the use of entrenchment as a sign that politicians have forced themselves to seek 
consensus on major changes to election rules (McLeay 2018). While certainly a valuable 
mechanism to discourage partisan changes to the rules of the game, this argument belies 
several important facts: that the entrenched provisions are rather arbitrary,83 that important 
election rules such as the number of Māori electorates and the right of prisoners to vote are 
not entrenched, and that many partisan enactments have altered non-entrenched provisions. 
Statistical tests indicate that the inclusion of entrenched provisions reduced the likelihood 
that election enactments receive party-line divisions in their third reading but did not make 
election enactments less partisan overall. 
 Terminological confusion may also play a role. As explored in Chapter 2, the 
assumed consensus on “electoral reform” could be taken to mean consensus on electoral 
system reform—that is, changes to rules determining the translation of votes into seats. It 
is true that major electoral system enactments have been relatively rare, and that the four 
most significant cases studied passed without a third reading division. Nevertheless, there 
are four problems with assuming the country’s alleged consensus over “electoral reform” 
 
83 As noted by McLeay (2018), the provisions that were entrenched were those that were on the political 
agenda in the 1950s and that for which cross-party agreement could be attained. The election rules that are 
divisive have certainly changed over the last 70 years, leaving its coverage patchy in some areas (Interview 
AG). National MP Nick Smith has advocated for entrenching all provisions of the Electoral Act to remedy 
this situation.    
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refers exclusively to major electoral system reform. First, although MPs may have voted 
in common on the legislation to bring about these changes, there actually has been a 
significant amount of partisan disagreement over their passage. Second, there has been 
even more partisanship in the passing of minor electoral system reforms. Third, the 
definition ignores significant disagreements over electoral system rules that have been 
expressed in members’ bills. And finally, it minimizes the importance of other types of 
election laws. Each of these points is worth exploring in more detail. 
 First, due to the provisions of the Electoral Act 1956, changes to the method of 
voting require three-fourths support in parliament to become law. This means that major 
electoral system reforms that alter the voting procedure cannot be passed without the 
agreement of both major parties. When considering the extent of partisanship expressed in 
parliamentary debate and the partisan effects of legislation, however, it becomes clear that 
there has still been a significant amount of partisan disagreement over passage of these 
laws. Of the four major electoral system reforms passed in the period of analysis, two had 
moderate levels of partisanship—the Electoral Referendum Act 1991 and Electoral Act 
1993, both with complex partisan scores of three out of a possible six.  
 Second, focusing on wholesale electoral system reform minimizes the more 
frequent yet equally important changes to other elements of the electoral system. There 
have been seven minor electoral system reforms enacted over the period of analysis, almost 
double the number of major ones enacted. Of these seven, three passed in a highly partisan 
fashion while two passed with moderate levels of partisanship. None of the seven passed 
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free of partisan discord.84 Notably, three involved contentious changes to the Māori 
electorates—one of the few elements of the electoral system that is not entrenched. Perhaps 
these “minor” reforms have been considered fair game by politicians, whereas “major” 
reforms are placed on a pedestal as demanding consensus. For all the reasons explored in 
Chapter 2, however, small changes to the electoral system can significantly impact 
democratic participation, election integrity, and electoral outcomes, and should not be 
written off as unimportant. 
 Third, the current understanding of “electoral reform” belies the fact that there has 
been a significant amount of disagreement over the electoral system expressed through the 
large number of proposed members’ bills introduced in parliament. As explored in Chapter 
5, electoral system reforms are one of the most frequent targets of members’ election-
related proposals. Of the 25 members’ bills analyzed, nine involved electoral system 
reforms—five with whole-sale change and four with minor elements. More than half of 
these electoral system reform bills were highly partisan affairs. Five died in their first 
reading on party-line votes, and two additional bills received only government support at 
this stage. Although none of these cases resulted in successful partisan reform, they 
demonstrate that politicians from a wide range of parties have regularly attempted to alter 
the electoral system without consensus. In line with enacted reforms, two of the four minor 
 
84 The three minor electoral system reforms passed with high levels of partisanship were the Electoral 
Amendment Act 1975 (allowing the number of Māori electorates to fluctuate based on the size of the Māori 
electoral population), the Electoral Amendment Act 1993 (requiring registered parties to follow democratic 
procedures in candidate selection), and the Electoral Amendment Act 2014 (clarifying the requirement of the 
reallocation of list seats in the event of a successful election petition)—although only in the first case was the 
provision itself the focus of partisan disagreement. Both moderately partisan acts contained minor electoral 
system changes that were the source of party-line contention. The Electoral Amendment Act 1976 again fixed 
the number of Māori electorates at four, whereas the Electoral Amendment Act 1990 altered the calculation 
used to determine the size of the Māori electoral population in preparation for a return to a fluctuating number 
of Māori electorates.  
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electoral system bills concern provisions affecting the Māori electorates. The Electoral 
(Racially-Based Representation) Referendum Bill 2002 sought their abolishment, while 
the Electoral (Entrenchment of Māori Seats) Amendment Bill 2018 sought their 
entrenchment.  
 Finally and perhaps most critically, the problem with a narrow definition of 
“electoral reform” is that it diminishes the prominence of other types of election laws that 
are important, including voting and registration administration, franchise rules, electoral 
governance, and campaign finance. Overlooking these rules in scholarship and in the media 
makes them even less visible to voters, which can give politicians more leeway to shape 
the rules of the game to their benefit. All types of election rules are worthy of attention. 
Once a more inclusive definition of “electoral reform” is adopted in relation to Aotearoa 
New Zealand, it becomes abundantly clear that the supposed norm of consensus-based 
election lawmaking simply does not exist. Of the 44 enacted election reforms that did not 
contain electoral system provisions, 15 were opposed along party lines at their third reading 
and an additional three were passed with moderate levels of partisanship. Among the 
important changes these controversial laws made were disqualifying prisoners from voting, 
altering the amount of time voters must reside in an electorate to be eligible to vote, altering 
the rules for determining residence, extending and curtailing the length of the registration 
period, creating a constitutional right to vote, banning party hopping, counting the party 
vote of those electors who vote in the wrong district, implementing continuous enrollment, 
and instituting a new regime of campaign finance law. When the totality of evidence is 
considered, the unavoidable conclusion is that Aotearoa New Zealand election lawmaking 
is not consensus-based and has not been for more than 50 years.  
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Analysis of Hypotheses and Causal Factors 
Hypothesis 1, that the introduction of MMP has reduced the incidence of partisan election 
lawmaking, is not evidenced by the analysis. There is, however, evidence for the expected 
ancillary relationship between effective number of parties and partisan election lawmaking, 
reflected in regressions of both simple and complex measures of partisanship. This finding 
was not replicated for other party system measures, demanding further scrutiny. Although 
MMP does not appear to have directly reduced the number of partisan election reforms, it 
certainly has affected the areas of election lawmaking that are partisan—removing partisan 
interest from boundaries and major electoral system reform and creating partisan interest 
in the electoral threshold, coattails rule, and party hopping.  
The expected causal mechanisms for Hypothesis 1 still deserve explanation. One 
reason why reduced incentives for pursuing marginal electoral shifts failed to diminish 
partisanship is that MMP is not a pure PR system. It has retained both de facto and de jure 
elements of a non-proportional system. The high party seat threshold creates a majoritarian-
like cutoff at 5 percent support. Because the difference between 5 percent support and 5 
percent minus one vote support could mean the difference between seven MPs and none, 
votes at the margin of that threshold have greatly increased worth. Parties near 5 percent 
should be particularly eager to find advantages to boost their support to ensure 
parliamentary representation after the election. Larger parties might be sympathetic to their 
aligned minor parties, making them willing to pursue partisan changes to maximize their 
chances at forming a government. This can make marginal changes in turnout electorally 
(and politically) worthwhile to pursue (Interview L).  
140 
 
The coattails provision is a non-proportional mechanism that has been used by both 
major parties to allow a coalition partner to gain party list seats when they would not 
otherwise qualify (Interviews E, G, J, L, S, Z, AB). This increases the impact of voters in 
a single electorate beyond that of other voters, as the results of that single electorate could 
prove the difference between seven parliamentary representatives and none. This was most 
prominently the case in the 2008 general election. ACT received 3.65 percent of the vote 
but won the Epsom electorate seat, granting it five MPs. In comparison, New Zealand First 
won more than 4 percent of the vote but no electorates, and thus were shut out from 
parliamentary representation (Interview S). Political culture also plays a role. Electorate 
seats are still valued by politicians over list seats (Ward 1998; Interviews G, AD). 
Individual politicians are therefore incentivized to pursue marginal electoral shifts to win 
their constituency seat, even if this does not affect the overall amount of party support. This 
FPTP electoral mentality among MPs may translate into party strategy when it comes to 
election lawmaking.  
The high party vote threshold also plays a role in the causal mechanism relating to 
increased number of veto players by shutting out parties from parliament that receive 
significant support.85 Fewer parliamentary parties has meant that there are fewer veto 
players in the way of controversial election reforms. Even though there are more parties 
under MMP than previously, there continues to be two major parties that collectively hold 
a significant majority of parliamentary seats. The average effective number of parties has 
 
85 Another mechanism that has kept the barriers to entry high for new parties is the generous parliamentary 
service resources granted to MPs (Edwards 2008). According to Bryce Edwards, MPs have designed the rules 
in their favor to create a strong incumbency advantage and keep extraparliamentary opponents out of 
parliament (Interview O). 
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increased by little more than 1, from 1.96 (for 1969–93) to 3.16 (for 1996–2017).86 This 
means that Aotearoa New Zealand’s party system under MMP is as fragmented as if there 
were about three equally sized parties in parliament, compared with about two under FPTP. 
Aotearoa New Zealand’s average effective number of parties under MMP is well below 
long-run averages of most established democracies with PR systems, including Norway 
(3.64), Denmark (4.57), India (4.80), Israel (5.18), and Switzerland (5.20) (Lijphart 2012). 
On one hand, there is some indication that the increased presence of minor parties has 
preempted some partisan electoral dynamics under MMP. There have yet to be any 
instances of big parties teaming up to pass election rules opposed by small parties. It is 
likely that coalition agreements between major and minor parties have given minor parties 
veto power in this regard, preventing the passage of laws that harm their electoral prospects 
(Interview L). On the other hand, coalition politics has worked at times to create instances 
of partisan election lawmaking that would not otherwise have occurred. Consideration of 
the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill 2005 was part of the confidence and supply 
agreement between Labour and New Zealand First (Malone 2008; Interview I). Similarly, 
Labour included New Zealand First’s controversial proposal for a ban on election polls in 
the month prior to polling day in the Electoral Amendment Bill 2002, before it was 
removed later in the legislative process. The highly divisive Electoral (Integrity) 
 
86 Averages are calculated using initial party seat totals after each election. As noted previously, the effective 
number of parties is a measure of party fragmentation. By taking into account the relative size of each party, 
it is a more conservative measure of party system than the number of parties in parliament, (which for 
Aotearoa New Zealand averaged 2.5 under the FPTP era and 6.875 under the MMP era). When there are only 
two parliamentary parties and they are unequal in size, the effective number of parties will always be less 
than 2.  
142 
 
Amendment Act 2018 was passed as a condition of New Zealand First’s supply and 
confidence agreement with Labour.87 
Assuming that, as hypothesized, there is a genuine relationship between the 
effective number of parties and partisan election lawmaking, there are two important 
questions that are considered in turn. One involves a comparison between the effective 
number of parties and era, and the other involves a comparison between various measures 
of party system.  
First, why would this relationship exist but not one between era and partisan 
election lawmaking? The answer is that the effective number of parties is more reflective 
of actual parliamentary dynamics than the underlying electoral system. In this logic, the 
main constraint on partisan election lawmaking is the number of veto players, not the value 
of the marginal voter. In other words, politicians will seek to manipulate election rules for 
partisan gain regardless of the chances that doing so will yield an electoral advantage. Their 
primary limitation is the barriers that stand in the way of reform. PR systems only guarantee 
a decrease in the value of the marginal voter. Although they tend to increase the number of 
veto players, there is great variation in the degree of impact. One need only look to 
Aotearoa New Zealand’s experience with MMP as an example, which has generally but 
not always resulted in parliaments with more veto players. Most governments have retained 
a major party feel, with Labour or National holding most of the needed seats. A few 
governments have relied more heavily on support from minor parties, giving those small 
 
87 According to former Green MP Jeanette Fitzsimons, Labour was also receptive to the provision because it 
was worried that New Zealand First might break up while in government, which would leave the coalition 
without a majority (Interview AB). Similarly, Labour passed the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Act 2001 
(with New Zealand First support) to protect itself against a breakup of the Alliance coalition.  
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parties a stronger position to influence policy decisions and act as veto players. There has 
been a trend of decline among minor parties as more elections are held under MMP. In 
numerical terms, the effective number of parties hovered around 2 under FPTP. This 
skyrocketed to 3.75 in the first several MMP parliaments but has dropped to 2.67 at the 
2017 election. This means Aotearoa New Zealand’s party system was “in effect” 
fragmented to nearly four equally sized parties in the early years of MMP but has since 
declined to the current equivalent of a “two-and-a-half” party system. In short, the effective 
number of parties captures veto player dynamics much better than era does. It therefore 
makes sense that a relationship with partisan election lawmaking is exhibited for one but 
not the other.  
Second, why would a relationship with partisan election lawmaking exist only for 
effective number of parties and not for other operationalizations of party system? The 
answer is along the same lines as above: this measure better accounts for the actual party 
dynamics at play than do the absolute number of parties in parliament, the number of parties 
to achieve at least 1 percent at the polls, and the number of parties on the ballot. All four 
metrics are displayed for comparison in Figure 6.2 (below). Both average number of 
candidates and number of parties that get 1 percent of the vote are extraparliamentary, and 
thus reflect competition at the ballot box rather than parliamentary dynamics. These 
measures certainly might influence the incentives to engage in partisan election 
lawmaking, but if this causal mechanism does not actually constrain political behavior, it 
makes sense that they would prove unexplanatory. The number of parties in parliament is 
a legislative measure of party dynamics, but a highly imperfect one. One-representative 
parties (which have existed in both FPTP and MMP eras) are given the same weight as 
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majority parties. The reason why a measure for the effective number of parties was 
developed was to better estimate the actual dynamics of parliamentary politics and the 
degree of fragmentation in the party system (Laakso and Taagepera 1979). Considering the 
relative size of each party achieves these twin goals. A high effective number of parties 
virtually guarantees the need for coalition governments and therefore the presence of 
additional veto players. The fact that a relationship between effective number of parties 
and partisan election lawmaking was evidenced but not for era or other measures of party 
system makes sense where the barriers to election lawmaking matter more than the 
incentives to engage in manipulations of the rules of the game.  
 
Hypothesis 2, that MMP has reduced the incidence of demobilizing election 
lawmaking, is evidenced by the descriptive data. There were few cases of demobilizing 
election lawmaking overall, making it difficult for chi-squared and logistic regressions to 







1969 1975 1981 1987 1993 1999 2005 2011 2017
Figure 6.2: Four Measures of Party System 1969–2017
Effective number of  parties Number of parties elected to parliament
Number of parties with 1% support Number of parties on ballot (average)
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lawmaking makes sense considering Aotearoa New Zealand has the key ingredient for it—
Māori can be considered marginalized subjects with discordant preferences. Indeed, three 
of the seven cases of demobilization directly concern Māori voters. An additional two cases 
concern the disenfranchisement of prisoners, a provision that disproportionately affects 
Māori (Waitangi Tribunal 2019). A statistically significant relationship was observed 
between the presence of demobilizing provisions and provisions that affect Māori votes.   
For the reasons explained earlier, it is unlikely that the reduced importance of 
marginal electoral shifts is the cause for less demobilization. More likely is that even 
though additional veto players have failed to stop partisan election changes, they have 
proven effective at deterring demobilizing election reforms. Most of the partisan election 
laws that have passed under MMP did not impact turnout. Coalition parties were willing to 
join their partners in supporting controversial but not participatorily impactful changes 
such as the 2001 and 2018 Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Acts and the electoral finance 
acts passed between 2006 and 2007. It might have been harder to bring coalition partners 
on board for election laws that demobilize voters, perhaps because of the different electoral 
bases of parties or due to the norm violations these laws usually entail. As predicted, fewer 
mobilization acts were passed under MMP as well, a change in line with the idea that 
coalition partners with different electoral bases of support would be hesitant to support 
reforms with participatory effects. A chi-squared test found a statistically significant link 
between MMP and fewer participatorily impactful election laws, providing evidence that 




Analysis of Other Explanatory Variables 
This section analyzes a variety of other explanatory variables. I begin with a recap of the 
results for electoral competitiveness and leverage, two independent variables directly tested 
in Chapter 5 that were unrelated to the central hypotheses. I proceed by examining the 
presence of a left-right SES cleavage structure, the preference gap between voters and non-
voters, the presence of marginalized subjects with discordant preferences, the level of 
inequality, the degree of political polarization, the importance of a government mandate, 
the exogenous institutional changes to parliament, the extent of constitutional control over 
procedures, the degree of federalism, and the normative desirability of consensual 
lawmaking. Although it is out of the scope of this study to test all these variables 
empirically, they are nonetheless important to keep in mind and should be at the forefront 
of future scholarship on election lawmaking.  
 
Electoral Competitiveness 
The idea behind electoral competitiveness is simple: when the polls show a close electoral 
race, there is a greater chance that manipulating election laws will prove decisive and thus 
parties are incentivized to pursue partisan election reforms. Although several scholars have 
proposed this link (Piven et al. 2009; Minnite 2010) and evidenced the relationship in 
American contexts (Bentele and O’Brien 2013; Vandewalker and Bentele 2015), this 
analysis failed to evidence such a relationship in Aotearoa New Zealand. Electoral 
competitiveness was unexplanatory in regressions of both partisanship and participatory 
effect. The time period provides little insight. Opinion polls became a regular occurrence 
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by the early 1970s, so politicians had access to polling information throughout the period 
of analysis.  There are a few potential explanations. Perhaps using the difference between 
the two highest-polling parties as measurement failed to capture the realities of a more 
complex multiparty race, especially from the late 1980s onwards (see Kayser and Lindstadt 
2015). Additionally, it seems the horse race changed rapidly at times, a point illustrated by 
the sharp jumps and dives in Figure 6.3 (below). Legislative action based on polls is 
difficult to predict if electoral conditions change dramatically between a bill’s introduction 
and passage. Many election bills follow a time-sensitive three-year legislative cycle 
between general elections. This makes the timing of most election legislation dependent 
on administrative necessity rather than political calculus. Finally, a more competitive 
electoral atmosphere increases the likelihood that parties pursuing election reform will 
incite public backlash for being viewed as manipulating the system (Interview L). The 















Figure 6.3: Electoral Competitiveness 1970–2019
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Leverage of Non-Voters 
The leverage of non-voters is their ability to alter an election outcome. The more non-
voters there are, the greater their leverage. When turnout is low, it should be easier for 
election reforms to achieve higher turnout and alter an electoral outcome and therefore 
more enticing for politicians to pursue partisan reforms. Turnout in Aotearoa New Zealand 
increased slightly between 1969 and 1981, from 80.9 percent to 85.5 percent of the voting-
eligible population (Nagel 1988; Vowles 1994; see Appendix G). It has dropped steadily 
thereafter, first to around 80 percent in the 1990s and then plummeting to a low of 68 
percent in the 2011 election. It has recently recovered slightly, reaching 73 percent at the 
2017 election. Overall, this marks a transformation in Aotearoa New Zealand from a 
country with one of the highest rates of participation in the world to one with only slightly 
above average turnout (Vowles 1994). Surprisingly, the introduction of MMP did not result 
in a sustained increase in turnout. Rather, it seems that shifting to a PR system simply 
slowed a trend of decline, which was practically guaranteed considering longer-term trends 
of decreasing electoral competition and the effects of generational experiences (Vowles 
2002, 2010).88  Diminished turnout means that non-voters now hold more power to sway 
an election result, if they were to vote. In other words, the leverage of non-voters has 
increased dramatically from the FPTP to MMP eras, a point illustrated by Figure 6.4. 
Increased leverage might encourage partisan election lawmaking, especially reforms that 
aim to mobilize voters—though this runs counter to the broader expectations of switching 
to a PR system. Perhaps increased leverage of non-voters is one reason why partisan 
 
88 The early years of MMP coincided with a series of relatively uncompetitive elections, which depress 
turnout. Vowles considers this one reason why the decline in turnout continued past the introduction of MMP 
with no noticeable bump (Interview D). 
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reforms have continued to be prevalent under MMP, although the number of mobilizing 
reforms actually decreased. 
 
 Leverage was calculated for each bill, allowing for more specific observations. In 
tests of partisan election lawmaking that included the effective number of parties, a 
statistically significant relationship (p < 0.05) with leverage was observed in the expected 
direction. All else equal, election laws were more likely to be partisan when passed in an 
electoral environment of low turnout. The MLR test allows this relationship to be 
quantified: ceteris paribus, a 10 percent boost in turnout would make an election law on 
average 2.6 points more partisan, or roughly the difference between being moderately and 
highly partisan. This indicates that leverage produces a strong, independent effect on the 
likelihood of election reform being partisan. Leverage held no explanatory power when era 
was included as a variable instead of effective number of parties. Perhaps the relationship 
is obscured in this case because of a strong correlation between leverage and era (r = 0.77). 
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Figure 6.4: Leverage of Non-Voters 1969–2017
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substantially less so (r = .67). No evidence was found for a relationship between leverage 
and the participatory effect of election laws. 
 
Left-Right SES Cleavage  
The existence of a core left-right SES cleavage means that voters choose parties primarily 
based on their income, education, occupation, and wealth. Traditionally, this means that 
left-wing parties disproportionately attract those with lower SES and right-wing parties 
those with higher SES. As explained in Chapter 2, those with lower SES typically turn out 
at reduced rates. Thus, a clear left-right SES divide indicates that left-wing parties will be 
incentivized to mobilize voters and right-wing parties to demobilize voters. The existence 
of such a cleavage means politicians can reasonably predict who would benefit from higher 
turnout, making election lawmaking a logical political strategy to win elections (James 
2012).  
Socioeconomic status is consistently the core cleavage of Aotearoa New Zealand 
politics, and one that has been remarkably stable over the past 50 years (Aimer 2015; 
Gibbons 2011; Miller 2005; Interviews L, Z).89 The strength of the country’s left-right SES 
cleavage is evidenced by the continuing endurance of a mostly two-party system under 
 
89 Vowles found a weakening of the class cleavage in the late 1980s and early 1990s and a strengthening of 
the urban-rural cleavage, perhaps the cause of demands for electoral system change itself. However, the 
strength of the class cleavage quickly rebounded after the switch to MMP. Additionally, Vowles notes that 
there have been important changes to the components of socioeconomic status that matter, giving SES 
“broadly defined” less explanatory power in describing voting patterns (Interview D). Occupational class 
(manual vs. non-manual) is no longer predictive. The level of education has a curvilinear relationship with 
left-right voting (higher and lower-educated persons lean left, moderately educated persons lean right), 
whereas assets and income still have strong linear relationships: those with more assets and higher incomes 
lean right. Despite these changes, the ideological left-right dimension is still dominant. On a different note, 
Gibbons argues that an “old politics” versus “new politics” cleavage is also important (Interview C). 
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MMP. In other words, one of the primary reasons why third parties have had trouble 
attaining and maintaining 5 percent support is because other potential cleavages such as 
postmaterialist (Green party), racial/ethnic (Māori party), and religious (Conservative 
party) are not nearly as strong (Aimer 2015; Miller 2005). The strength of the SES cleavage 
should encourage partisan interest in election rules, as increasing or decreasing barriers to 
the ballot box will be more likely to impact electoral results. The fact that Aotearoa New 
Zealand’s election lawmaking was found to be highly partisan is a strong indication of the 
link between an SES cleavage structure and partisan election reform.  
 
Preference Gap  
The larger the divergence in party preferences between voters and non-voters, the greater 
the chances that increasing turnout will alter an electoral result (Kohler and Rose 2010) 
and therefore the greater the incentive to pass partisan and participatorily impactful election 
laws. This metric is partially covered by the left-right SES division but can be tested 
independently. Vowles et al. (2017) analyze turnout from the 2014 general election, 
concluding that non-voters’ preferences indeed differ from voters’ preferences—but not 
enough to make a difference in the electoral outcome. The reason for this is that non-voters 
prefer small parties, many of which do not garner enough support to win seats (Interviews 
D, T). Māori have particularly low turnout, but in the 2014 election Māori non-voters 
would have voted for a Māori party that was too far off the 5 percent threshold mark to 
gain them representation. More generally, Vowles questions whether non-voters have 
stable and informed preferences, a sentiment in line with many other scholars (see Chapter 
2). Political parties certainly assume non-voters skew toward the left. Rob Salmond, the 
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director of the Labour Leader’s Office, noted that the party’s election lawmaking and 
campaigning operation is predicated on the assumption that higher turnout benefits Labour 
and that non-voters lean left (Interview L). Unfortunately, no evidence is available to test 
whether there have been changes in the preference gap between voters and non-voters over 
time, nor the relationship between the preference gap and election lawmaking.  
 
Marginalized Subjects with Discordant Preferences 
The presence of marginalized subjects with discordant preferences seems vital to creating 
an incentive to engage in demobilizing election lawmaking. If such underrepresented 
groups were to become fully represented at the ballot box and in parliament, then parties 
would have to change their policy positions and electoral strategy to stay competitive. 
Doing so would upset parties’ existing electoral coalitions, causing political instability. 
Parties are therefore incentivized to keep these groups underrepresented to maintain their 
current coalition structures—and may even join forces with oppositional parties to do so.   
As mentioned in Chapter 3, a large array of data indicates that Māori and Pasifika 
are marginalized groups (Walters 2018). Māori make up 16 percent of the population but 
more than 50 percent of the prison population. Pasifika are also overrepresented, making 
up 9 percent of the population but 11 percent of incarcerated individuals. Fifty-seven 
percent of Pākehā own a home, compared with 28 percent of Māori and only 18 percent of 
Pasifika. More than half of Pasifika children experience material hardship, compared with 
39 percent of Māori and 15 percent of Pākehā. Māori and Pasifika are twice as likely as 
non-Māori and non-Pasifika to be unable to collect a prescription due to cost, and Māori 
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make up 26 percent of all mental health service users. Māori have an average life 
expectancy seven years shorter than that of non-Māori. Disadvantages in education, 
employment, wealth, and health have feedback loops, meaning that they are passed on from 
one generation to the next. Although some disparities have lessened over the past fifty 
years, many remain significant. 
Māori and Pasifika also hold distinct political preferences from the Pākehā 
majority. Māori have much lower turnout rates (Vowles et al. 2017). In the 2014 general 
election, 16.8 percent of Pākehā did not vote, compared with 17.6 percent of Pasifika and 
26.8 percent of Māori (Stats NZ 2014). Both Māori and Pasifika are much more likely to 
vote for the Labour party than the National party and are also more likely to vote for minor 
parties (Vowles et al. 2017). Labour has dominated the Māori electorates historically, 
winning every available seat between 1969 and 1990 (Sorrenson 1986). Māori voters have 
periodically split away from Labour in favor of certain minor parties, supporting New 
Zealand First between 1993 and 1999 and the Māori party between 2005 and 2014 
(Sullivan 2016).90 The Mana Motuhake party also received primarily Māori support in the 
1980s and 1990s, with a few candidates entering parliament as part of the Alliance party 
between 1993 and 2002 (King 2003). Māori support for minor parties indicates a clear 
preference divergence from the mainstream. In short, both groups are clearly marginalized 
and hold divergent political preferences.91  
 
90 Lara Greaves notes that there is a divide between Māori who vote for Labour and Māori who vote for third 
parties (Interview T). Māori who traditionally voted for Labour stuck with the party, while Māori who 
traditionally voted for other minor parties concentrated their support on certain third parties that ended up 
winning parliamentary representation under MMP.  
91 The following analysis focuses on Māori because they make up a much larger proportion of the population 
than Pasifika and thus their presence has greater political and electoral implications.  
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The political ramifications for the presence of marginalized groups with discordant 
preferences are heightened incentives for parties to pass highly partisan and demobilizing 
election reforms. Insofar as Māori fit into a left-right SES division, their presence creates 
incentives for Labour to increase Māori representation and for National to decrease Māori 
representation. Insofar as Māori have discordant preferences that do not fit neatly into the 
left-right SES cleavage, there is a joint incentive for politicians from both major parties to 
keep Māori underrepresented. Labour might be worried about upsetting other parts of its 
coalition structure and therefore reluctant to push for election reforms to increase Māori 
representation.  
My analysis of election lawmaking uncovered numerous instances of election 
reforms that affect Māori and occasional instances of demobilizing reforms. I also found 
evidence of a link between the presence of demobilizing election provisions and election 
provisions that affect Māori voters. The analysis of election law type revealed that changes 
to Māori voting provisions are commonplace. Over the period of analysis, 17 enacted laws 
directly impacted Māori voters, five of which were highly partisan and an additional four 
moderately partisan. This amounts to almost one out of every three changes to the rules of 
the game specifically impacting Māori. Additionally, four proposed bills contained Māori-
specific provisions, three of which were highly partisan. There was a significant decline in 
legislative action between FPTP and MMP. Thirteen laws passed under FPTP directly 
affected Māori, compared with only four under MMP. Perhaps this marks an increased 
degree of consensus over Māori election issues generated by the introduction of MMP. It 
could also indicate increased barriers to election lawmaking under the new system.  
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In addition to frequent legislative changes to Māori voting, there have been seven 
demobilizing election reforms enacted over the period of analysis. The existence of 
marginalized groups with discordant preferences provides something of a prerequisite for 
the existence of demobilizing election lawmaking, so it makes sense that such reforms 
happen here. In statistical tests, a correlation was uncovered between the inclusion of 
Māori-specific provisions and the passage of laws that contained demobilizing provisions 
(r = 0.47). In logistic regression, the relationship was significant at the 10 percent level of 
confidence.92 In other words, the presence of Māori-specific provisions makes election 
laws more likely to contain demobilization provisions. This relationship is in line with 
expectations of a link between Māori voters and demobilizing election lawmaking.93 
It seems clear that the presence of Māori as a marginalized community with 
discordant preferences fundamentally shapes the character of election lawmaking in 
Aotearoa New Zealand. It has created incentives for parties to pursue both partisan and 
demobilization election reforms.94 There are numerous cases of fights between Labour and 
National over Māori representation and turnout, including the Māori electorates, the Māori 
roll, and the Māori electoral option. Even now that the introduction of MMP has seemed 
to calm legislative action on these rules, there are still lingering disagreements over the 
Māori electorates, with frequent calls by party leaders and pundits for their abolishment or 
 
92 When the effects of partisanship are removed, the relationship between Māori-specific provisions and 
demobilizing provisions became stronger (P < 0.05). 
93 Other statistical tests provided less compelling results. No evidence was found for a relationship between 
the passage of overall demobilizing laws and provisions affecting Māori voters, nor was a relationship 
between the presence of provisions affecting Māori voters and partisan election lawmaking substantiated.  
94 There is some evidence that the presence of Pasifika has also had a direct impact on election lawmaking. 
One of the main reasons that Labour decided to extend franchise rights to non-citizens in its Electoral 
Amendment Act 1975 was to gain the support of the burgeoning Pasifika immigrant population (Interview 
A; for a thorough analysis of this episode, see Barker and McMillan 2014). Both major parties agreed to 
tighten non-citizen franchise rights in 1980 from those “ordinarily resident” to permanent residents only.  
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their entrenchment (Braae 2018; Hurihanganui 2019; Korako 2018; Interview E).95 These 
disagreements have translated into legislative action. One recent members’ bill proposed 
entrenching the Māori electorates, while another proposed a referendum on their 
abolishment. There are also still frequent legislative fights over election rules that 
disproportionately impact Māori, including the registration period, the treatment of special 
votes, and prisoner disenfranchisement rules. 
There is some evidence to support the assertion that Labour’s eagerness to increase 
Māori participation has been tempered by a desire to maintain other parts of its electoral 
coalition. Labour chose not to vote against the Electoral Amendment Act 1976, which 
returned the number of Māori electorates to four. Additionally, it did not pursue an increase 
in the number of Māori electorates in the decades that followed, meaning Māori 
representation was not proportional to the Māori population until the introduction of 
MMP.96 Labour has not relaxed the strict rules around the Māori electoral option, which 
currently limit enrolled Māori voters to making a choice between the Māori and general 
roll once every five years. This is despite the Electoral Commission’s (2018) 
recommendation that Māori be allowed to change rolls at any point.97 The fact that Māori 
voters, when given the chance, have thrown their support behind a series of minor parties 
in recent years indicates that Labour has not always adequately accommodated the 
 
95 As noted by Geddis (2006a: 350–1), party positions on the future of the Māori electorates map closely onto 
each party’s assessment of the support it is likely to receive from Māori voters. 
96 Neil Atkinson notes that the reason for this is likely strategic on the part of Labour: because Māori 
electorates voted overwhelmingly for Labour candidates, they were a major source of wasted votes and hurt 
Labour’s electoral prospects (Interview E). 
97 According to the Justice Committee’s Report on the Electoral Commission’s Inquiry into the 2017 General 
Election, the Labour majority adopted the commission’s recommendation over National opposition due to 
concerns over tactical voting (whereby Māori could change rolls at the last minute to manipulate the election 
results). The Government has yet to translate this recommendation into a legislative proposal.  
158 
 
preferences of Māori voters. This is most obviously the case with the Foreshore and Seabed 
Act 2004, legislation explicitly tailored to Labour’s non-Māori electoral support. It is also 
true of Labour’s reaction to Don Brash’s 2004 Orewa speech attacking “Māori racial 
separatism”. Labour moved its policy focus away from racial equality in an attempt to 
regain electoral support (Vowles et al. 2017). Because MMP allows minor parties to gain 
parliamentary representation, disaffected Māori voters were able to retaliate against 
Labour’s policy decisions by supporting the Māori party in the 2005 general election. This 
would not have been possible under the FPTP system, meaning that Māori must have 
decided either to support the lesser of two evils (Labour versus National) or to stay home 
on election day. The record shows that many chose the latter option.  
  There is an argument to be made that Māori preferences are not as discordant as 
they once were and that there are incentives for both parties to vie for Māori support and 
encourage higher Māori turnout. The best evidence for this is the fact that politicians chose 
to expand the number of Māori electorates in the proposal for MMP rather than abolish 
them, as was originally recommended by the Royal Commission in 1986. Although 
certainly an admirable moment in the history of Aotearoa New Zealand election 
lawmaking, at best this demonstrates the competing normative and ideological values at 
play when politicians alter the rules of the game. In this case, the desire for representation 
and equality won out over calculations of political realism and electoral advantage. The 
entire record of election lawmaking tells a different story, one weighed heavily toward the 
presence of Māori as creating incentives for partisan and demobilizing election reforms.   
 Population trends portend increased incentives for politicians to pursue deleterious 
election reforms. Rapid growth of the Pasifika population over the period of analysis—
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from less than 1 percent of Aotearoa New Zealand’s population in 1970 to around nine 
percent currently (Stats NZ and Ministry of Public Island Affairs 2010)—means it is likely 
that they will be the focus of increased political interest, both in terms of party campaigning 
and election lawmaking. There has been significant Māori population growth as well, from 
about 10 percent of the population in 1970 to 16 percent today (Stats NZ 2019). Projections 
indicate that by 2038, Pasifika could reach 11 percent and Māori 19 percent of the total 
population (Stats NZ 2016a, 2017). The implications of Māori and Pasifika population 
growth on electoral politics are significant. As these minority groups increase their 
electoral clout, election rules designed to encourage or discourage their participation will 
have greater effects, thereby increasing the incentives to manipulate election laws for 
partisan gain. A significant body of scholarship from the United States has found evidence 
that larger African American populations and increased minority turnout make the passage 
of restrictive voting laws more likely (Bentele and O’Brien 2013; Biggers and Hanmer 
2017; Vandewalker and Bentele 2015; Voris 2016). Although Māori and Pasifika 
population growth has not yet appeared to translate into more frequent demobilizing 




Inequality works in tandem with many of the other factors mentioned to incentivize 
partisan and demobilizing election lawmaking. Heightened economic disparities can 
intensify the SES cleavage structure and increase the preference gap between voters and 
non-voters. Uniquely, inequality can enhance the preference gap between political elites 
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and the public, increasing the stakes of elections for politicians to maintain ingrained 
advantages. It can also further marginalize ethnic and racial minorities, creating easier 
targets for political exclusion and increasing resistance to the incorporation of discordant 
and disconnected communities within current party structures (Interview B). Inequality 
also increases the barriers to participation that existing election machinery imposes on low-
SES groups. Economic disparities can combine with social and political barriers to full 
inclusion to create interlocking webs of social marginality (Bentele and O’Brien 2013). In 
Aotearoa New Zealand, neoliberal economic reforms passed in the 1980s combined with 
punitive criminal justice policies and restrictive welfare policies to do just that—
contributing to greater economic, social, and political inequality (Mills 2018; O’Brien 
2013; Interview AA). This combination of policies also contributes to the social 
construction of the “unwanted” voter (Ferrer 2017; see also Guinier and Torres 2002).  
 As explored in Chapter 3, inequality has skyrocketed in Aotearoa New Zealand 
over the past 50 years (Creedy et al. 2018). The same time period has also witnessed the 
creation of a “political class”, where politicians have become increasingly stratified from 
the public and hold increasingly divergent interests and views (Edwards 2003; Interviews 
O, Y). These trends dovetail with electoral system reform, with heightened inequality one 
of the contributing factors to public calls for change. This complicates the picture of PR, 
as MMP is expected to decrease partisan and demobilizing election lawmaking whereas 
high inequality is expected to have the opposite effect. Perhaps increasing inequality is one 
reason why partisan election lawmaking has not diminished under MMP, and why 
demobilizing election lawmaking has not decreased more. It is beyond the scope of this 
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study to empirically discern the effects of inequality on election lawmaking, but this should 
prove a fruitful area for future scholarship. 
 
Political Culture 
Political culture refers to the level of divisiveness and polarization in Aotearoa New 
Zealand politics.98 Greater divisiveness and polarization in politics generally translates into 
more partisan lawmaking of every type, of which election lawmaking is one subset. More 
specifically, increasing polarization increases the stakes of elections because the outcome 
can mark sharp policy divergences. In a “win-at-all-costs” scenario, partisan election 
lawmaking becomes more appealing as a mechanism to achieve an electoral advantage. 
The divisiveness of politics is difficult to quantify, although several scholars have written 
on the subject (Mann and Ornstein 2012; Miller and Hoffmann 1999). There seems to be a 
perception that Aotearoa New Zealand politics has become more divisive and “dirty” over 
the past several decades (Hager 2006, 2014; Interview O). Polarization is more readably 
quantifiable. Gibbons’ (2011) analysis of party manifestos provides evidence that Labour 
and National have become more divergent over the period of analysis. Their policy 
promises converged in the early 1970s but have steadily grown apart thereafter. Gibbons 
observes that there is greater party polarization over economic issues now than at any point 
since 1950. The old politics–new politics dimension is more complex, with the major 
parties diverging in the 1980s, converging in the 1990s, and growing more polarized since 
 
98 This is a different meaning of political culture than that used in other contexts. For instance, McLeay et al. 
(1996) measure “political culture” as the attitudes of the public toward government and political parties and 
the level of citizen participation in politics. In several interviews, participants framed Aotearoa New 
Zealand’s political culture in terms of a high desirability for consensual election lawmaking (Interviews S, 
W, AG). This issue is considered separately later in this chapter.  
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then. Overall, this tells a story of gradually increasing political polarization. Together with 
claims of increased divisiveness, these two factors suggest a more conducive environment 
to partisan election lawmaking in the MMP era. They also provide another mitigating 
reason to explain why MMP has failed to curtail such reforms.  
 
Importance of Government Mandate 
In Aotearoa New Zealand, an electoral mandate is the idea that elections bestow elected 
governments with the right to enact policies specified during the election campaign. 
Greater importance bestowed on the popular mandate should reduce political opposition to 
previously promised changes (Mulgan 1978). Gibbons (1999) has found that 75 percent of 
government policy implementation related to manifesto policies between 1946 and 1979—
an indication that pledge fulfillment was quite strong under FPTP. Nathan McCluskey’s 
(2008) extensive study of manifesto pledges in Aotearoa New Zealand found a clear 
declining trend in the rate of manifesto pledge fulfilment. An average of 78 percent of 
manifesto pledges were fulfilled before 1984, compared with an average of 69 percent of 
pledges fulfilled between 1984 and 1993 and an average of 62 percent of pledges fulfilled 
since the introduction of MMP. The reason for this is straightforward: with the realities of 
coalition governments in MMP, parties must make trade-offs between policy proposals to 
secure coalition partners (Malone 2008). McCluskey also discovered a significant decline 
in the number of pre-election promises made for each election since 1990, from greater 
than 1000 for each major party to only a few hundred each.  
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These studies provide evidence that the electoral mandate has weakened over the 
past fifty years.99 The record of election lawmaking is less clear. There are two notable 
cases of opposition parties letting unwanted election reforms pass without a third reading 
division because of the majority party’s campaign pledges. Both were National-sponsored 
legislation: the Electoral Amendment Act 1976, which returned the number of Māori 
electorates to four, and the Electoral Amendment Act 2009, which repealed most of the 
Electoral Finance Act 2007 (Labour did not force a division in the former case and voted 
affirmatively in the latter). Even in the case of the Electoral Amendment Act 2009, 
however, Labour’s support was influenced as much by the realization that the Electoral 
Finance Act 2007 was an error as by National’s supposed electoral mandate to scrap the 
law (Geddis 2017; Watkins 2009; Interview N). Labour was also moved by National’s 
pledge that it would follow a consensus-based process to construct replacement legislation 
(New Zealand Herald 2009). Besides these instances, there do not appear to be many cases 
of parties giving election legislation a free pass due to manifesto pledges. A weakened 
popular mandate would suggest that oppositional cooperation because of an election result 
is becoming rarer, although it is already so rare in the case of election lawmaking as to be 
a non-factor. 
On the other hand, a “negative mandate”—the idea that there will be increased 
opposition to policies not previously promised in manifestos—appears to remain strong. 
 
99 A similar sentiment was expressed by McLeay, who stated that the weakening of the government mandate 
happened in two steps (Interview H). First, Labour governments of the 1980s and early 1990s failed to fulfill 
their promises, and second, MMP forced parties to dilute their manifesto promises due to the need to craft 
coalition agreements. Gibbons disagrees, however, arguing that parties still care about fulfilling manifesto 
commitments and still make specific promises with the intention of fulfilling them (Interview C). Rather than 
weakening the electoral mandate, the advent of MMP has meant that parties try to avoid big promises in the 
first place as they are harder to keep.  
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National opposed the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Act 2018 in part on the grounds 
that it was not announced as a coalition demand between Labour and New Zealand First 
until after the election, and thus was being unfairly sprung on the public. The Electoral 
(Vacancies) Amendment Act 2003 was also opposed for its ad hoc nature (Geddis 2004). 
With the trend toward shortening party manifestos and the growing importance of post-
election coalition agreements under MMP, opposition to election reforms due to a negative 
mandate may become more common. 
 
Exogenous Institutional Change 
Independent of electoral system reform, Aotearoa New Zealand’s parliament has 
undergone significant procedural changes that have fundamentally altered how legislation 
progresses through the legislative branch. Foremost in importance are changes to select 
committees. Starting from a more or less ad hoc system in the 1970s, a series of reforms to 
the parliamentary Standing Orders have made select committees a routine and formative 
part of legislative deliberation (Martin 2004; McLeay 2018). In 1979, automatic referral of 
legislation to select committees began, effectively embedded the role of select committees 
in the normal legislative process (Malone 2008). Thirteen permanent select committees 
were established in 1985 and divided into distinct subject areas. These committees were 
also given a new oversight role of the executive. Select committees’ terms of reference 
were expanded in a series of Labour reforms between 1984 and 1990. Starting in the 1990s, 
members’ bills that survived their first reading began to regularly receive select committee 
scrutiny. With the advent of MMP, select committee membership is now roughly 
proportional to each party’s membership in parliament. This means that not all select 
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committees have government majorities, granting minorities new powers to delay bills and 
wield leverage in negotiations. Select committees also have new obligations to scrutinize 
bills within a specified time frame, limiting the ability of minority parties to delay bills.  
 In short, select committees had become quite important toward the end of the FPTP 
era and they have grown more so under MMP (Malone 2008). In terms of election 
lawmaking, a stronger select committee system increases the likelihood that the election 
reform process is consensus-driven rather than divisive and acrimonious. Select 
committees are a useful mechanism for encouraging consensus and reducing the level of 
partisan fervor. For instance, the decision to use a cross-party select committee process for 
the replacement of the highly partisan Electoral Finance Act 2007 is one of the major 
reasons why the Electoral (Finance Reform and Advance Voting) Amendment Act 2010 
ended up passing with multiparty support (Interviews A, N). The strengthening of the select 
committee system should work in concert with MMP to make partisan election lawmaking 
less likely. This has obviously not been the case, a sign that executive dominance over 
parliament is still strong despite the strengthening of select committees. Governments can 
still have their way with election reforms over the objections of minority parties. Ryan 
Malone’s (2008) conclusion was along a similar vein: despite the strengthening of 




100 McGee (2007) argues that legislative procedures have changed to counterbalance the increased political 
constraints under MMP. Parliamentary rules now facilitate a quicker legislative process, preventing minority 
parties from stonewalling the government’s agenda. These changes include limits to the number of speakers 
and the length of speeches at each reading and the shift to non-debatable procedural motions (Interview AD).  
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Constitutional Control over Election Procedures 
The more constitutional control that legislatures have over the rules of the game, the greater 
the opportunity for politicians to manipulate those rules. Aotearoa New Zealand is one of 
only a handful of countries that lack a codified, “higher law” constitution. Its retention of 
the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy means that parliament has virtually unlimited 
authority to make and change election laws. While the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 recognized the right to vote, the legislation did not establish a mechanism to prevent 
parliament from unjustifiably infringing upon this “right.”101 Aotearoa New Zealand courts 
do not have the power to invalidate laws they find to be unconstitutional. 
The closest mechanism to a constitutional limit on parliament’s election lawmaking 
authority is entrenchment. First enacted in the Electoral Act 1956, a handful of election 
rules require three-fourths parliamentary support or a majority referendum decision to 
change. These provisions are the term length of parliament, the membership of the 
Representation Commission, the procedures for redistricting and tolerance for population 
differences among districts, the voting age, and the method of voting. The provision for 
entrenchment was not entrenched itself (i.e., it was “singly entrenched”), meaning it could 
be removed by a simple majority vote of parliament. At the time of passage, it was widely 
recognized that entrenchment held neither constitutional nor judicial force and was only 
self-enforceable by parliamentary convention (McLeay 2018). In the 60 years that have 
transpired, this parliamentary convention has held. Every time an entrenched provision has 
 
101 Instead, the legislation imposes a duty upon the Attorney-General to notify parliament when a bill appears 
to be inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. Parliament has frequently passed legislation after an adverse report. 
The Supreme Court has ruled that the judiciary may grant a formal declaration of inconsistency in relation to 
legislation that unjustifiably infringes upon a right guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, though such a declaration 
has no effect on the legislation’s status as law. See Attorney-General v Taylor [2018] NZSC 104. 
167 
 
been amended, it has received the necessary supermajority support. Some legal scholars 
have suggested that the entrenched provisions may now have gained legal force to the point 
where they can be adjudicated in the courts (Shiels and Geddis 2019). Thus, it seems that 
entrenchment provides some quasi-constitutional protection for Aotearoa New Zealand’s 
election machinery against self-interested politicians.  
On the other hand, entrenchment could benefit existing parties in power by 
enshrining preferential and exclusionary election rules. The entrenched voting age created 
an additional barrier to expanding the franchise from 21-year-olds to 18-year-olds. The 
entrenched membership of the Representation Commission has helped keep 
representatives from Labour and National on the Commission and representatives from all 
minor parties excluded from its ranks. And the entrenched method of voting made 
switching to a PR system very difficult, helping to preserve an unrepresentative status quo. 
Entrenchment fails to prevent major parties from teaming up against minor parties to 
manipulate election laws in their favor. The mechanism also symbolically privileges 
certain rules over others, protecting general electorates but not Māori electorates. 
Another trend worth noting is the growth and consolidation of Aotearoa New 
Zealand’s electoral management board (EMB), or the entity responsible for electoral 
governance. Prior to the introduction of MMP, two bodies oversaw the country’s national 
elections: the Chief Electoral Office, which ran the voting process and regulated 
candidates, and the Registrar of Electors, which handled voter registration. The Chief 
Electoral Office was housed within the Ministry of Justice, while the Registrar of Electors 
became a state-owned enterprise in the 1980s. The Electoral Commission was formed as 
an independent Crown entity in 1993 and was tasked with regulating parties and running 
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voter education campaigns. Until the merger of the Chief Electoral Office and the Electoral 
Commission in 2010, the Chief Electoral Office was potentially open to (the appearance 
of) partisan conflicts of interest in the running of elections because it was statutorily under 
the direction of the Minister of Justice (Interviews Q, W).102 However, there is no evidence 
that any government used their position to influence the Chief Electoral Office. There is 
no longer any opportunity for partisan involvement in the administering of Aotearoa New 
Zealand’s elections, as its EMB is now unified as an independent Crown entity. 
Furthermore, statutory independence has not affected parliament’s ability to change 
election laws and thus does not qualify as reduced parliamentary control over election 
procedures (Interview Q).103 
The record of election lawmaking uncovered in this analysis makes clear that 
politicians have availed themselves of the opportunity to alter election rules time and time 
again, regardless of the procedural constraints standing in their way. Simply put, 
governments can have their way with the democratic rules of the game. 
 
Degree of Federalism 
A high degree of federalism provides opportunities for election laws to be passed at lower 
levels of government (James 2011, 2012). This is certainly the case in the United States, 
 
102 The Registrar of Electors statutorily merged with the newly amalgamated Electoral Commission in 2012 
and operationally merged in 2016 (Interviews J, K, Q, V).  
103 Aotearoa New Zealand is not the only country to recently reform its electoral governance institutions. The 
United Kingdom has partially centralized their EMB to mixed results (James 2017), while the United States’ 
creation of the Election Assistance Commission has also had a limited impact (Montjoy and Chapin 2005). 
In contrast, independent, centralized EMBs have been shown to be a critical ingredient for effective election 
administration in both Africa (Mozaffar 2002) and Latin America (Hartlyn et al. 2008).  
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where national, state, regional, county, city, and district levels of governance create 
practically endless opportunities for partisan election lawmaking to take place. In contrast, 
Aotearoa New Zealand has maintained an almost completely unitary system of governance 
throughout the period of analysis. This should dampen the incentives to manipulate election 
laws for partisan interest, as there are less avenues and jurisdictions for partisan election 
lawmaking to take place. Most local election laws are passed at the national level, leaving 
little opportunity for local bodies to manipulate rules for their benefit.104 
 
Desirability of Consensual Lawmaking 
When the political costs of divisive election lawmaking or the political benefits of 
consensual election lawmaking increase, consensual election lawmaking becomes more 
desirable and therefore more likely. This is compatible with elite agency theory, where 
politicians are assumed to be rational actors conducting a cost-benefit analysis when 
deciding whether to pursue partisan election reforms. Christmas (2010) argues this calculus 
was at its peak between 1956 and 1974 but has partially broken down since then. However, 
Christmas bases this analysis on changes in the amount of consensus in election lawmaking 
rather than on a change in the desirability of consensus. It is difficult to measure the degree 
of desirability itself because few opinion polls have been taken on election reform in 
Aotearoa New Zealand outside of the referendums on electoral system change. It seems 
that parties have been punished at times for enacting particularly acrimonious election 
 
104 The important exception to this is the Local Electoral Act 2001, which allows local governments to decide 
which electoral system to use for their elections. This decision has brought with it an extraordinary amount 
of political calculation and contention (Drage and Cheyne 2018). 
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laws, especially Labour’s Electoral Amendment Act 1975 and Electoral Finance Act 2007 
(Interviews S, AG). The political backlash from the latter episode has led to a cautious 
election lawmaking strategy on the part of Labour in recent years (Interview L). This was 
recently evident when Jacinda Ardern quickly shot down a Green party proposal to lower 
the electoral threshold before the 2020 election (Devlin 2019b; Interview A). It has not 
stopped Labour from continuing to pursue partisan changes to election rules, including 
extending the registration period through election day, treating special votes as applications 
for registration, and enfranchising prisoners who are serving sentences of less than three 
years.105 In short, it seems that outcome-contingent benefits gained from partisan election 
reforms still frequently outweigh the act-contingent costs of divisive action. 
 
Policy Triggers in Aotearoa New Zealand Election Lawmaking  
The reasons why specific election reforms are brought onto the executive policy agenda 
has not been the focus of this study. That being said, the evidence gathered confirms James’ 
(2012) proposal of six such policy triggers: technology, declining turnout, administrative 
failure, external policy streams, judicial challenge, and citizen challenge. To this list I add 
an additional two: electioneering practices and previous legislation. Whereas James’ study 
focused solely on election administration, this research finds these triggers are applicable 
to all types of election laws.  
 
105 The first two provisions are in the Electoral Amendment Bill 2019, which is almost certain to pass over 
National party opposition in 2020. The Labour government has indicated that the prisoner enfranchisement 
provision will be passed before the 2020 election, but as of this writing, the government has not indicated 
whether it will be added to the Electoral Amendment Bill 2019 or introduced as a separate bill. It appears 




 Technology has played a role in almost every election-related enactment. A series 
of 1980s reforms responded to technological advancements in enrollment procedures made 
possible by computer technology (Interview J). More recently, legislation has started to 
address the promises and perils of the internet. The 2011 and 2014 Electoral Amendment 
Acts implemented online registration, the Broadcasting (Election Programmes and 
Election Advertising) Amendment Act 2017 allows political parties to use their funding 
allocation on internet advertising, and the Electoral Amendment Act 2017 allows the use 
of electronic pollbooks (Interview P). Interestingly, none of this technology has found its 
way into the poll booth or ballot box itself. The marking and counting of ballots for 
elections are still done solely by hand (Interview K).  
Declining turnout has always been used as an argument for mobilizing bills, but it 
has become a more pressing concern in the past few decades as participation rates have 
slumped.106 Combating low voter participation rates was one of the reasons for the 
inclusion of no-excuse advance voting in the Electoral (Finance Reform and Advance 
Voting) Amendment Act 2010 and the Electoral Amendment Act 2014’s implementation 
of full online enrollment. It is also a primary driver for mobilizing provisions in the current 
government’s electoral amendment bill.  
Administrative failures have also been a common reason for election lawmaking. 
The 1979 and 1980 Electoral Amendment Acts both fixed problems with registration 
procedures and the electoral roll that became apparent in the 1978 general election. The 
 
106 The Electoral Commission has also prioritized increasing voter participation in its operational reforms 
and in its recommendations to parliament (Interviews F, K, P, V). These recommendations have spearheaded 
changes such as implementing no-excuse advance voting in 2010 and enabling voters to enroll and vote at 
advance voting places in 2017 (Interview S).  
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Electoral Amendment Act 2002 made extensive changes to electoral governance and 
voting administration as a response to delayed preliminary results from the 1999 general 
election (Interviews J, Q). This also resulted in the creation of an interdepartmental select 
committee that recommended merging the country’s electoral governance into an 
independent Electoral Commission—a suggestion eventually realized with the 2010 and 
2011 Electoral (Administration) Amendment Acts. A legal problem with the 
Representation Commission’s calculation of the Māori electoral population necessitated a 
legislative enactment in 1992, while a printing error in the donation limit enacted by the 
Electoral Amendment Act (No 2) 1995 required passage of correcting legislation. 
 External policy streams, or foreign events that spill into the domestic arena, have 
been surprisingly absent as a reason for election reform. The Justice and Electoral 
Committee visited Australia in 2005 and 2007 to observe their election system, but neither 
trip resulted in legislative reform. The most important case of foreign influence is the Royal 
Commission’s consideration of other countries when analyzing proposals for electoral 
system reform (Jackson and McRobie 1998: 118). The commission decided to recommend 
MMP modeled on Germany’s use of the system. Both examples are cases where Aotearoa 
New Zealand has explicitly sought out other countries for guidance on specific policy 
issues. I was unable to identify any cases where battles over voting reform in other 
countries have directly impacted the direction of legislative action here. A rather distant 
example is the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 using as its inspiration the Bill of 
Rights from the United States and Canada (Interview AF).  
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Judicial challenges have regularly resulted in legislative reform.107 In the Re Hunua 
Election Petition 1979, the Supreme Court ruled that enrollment irregularities in the 1978 
election were not enough to invalidate the results. Controversially, they also ruled that 
incorrectly marked ballots must be disallowed, even if the intention of the voter was clear. 
This led to the disqualification of many ballots and changed the outcome of the election. 
The Court of Appeal (Wybrow v. Wright 1980) reached the unanimous conclusion that 
ballots should be counted if the voter’s intention was clear, but this judgment had no 
bearing on the effects of the disputed election. The electoral petition and other 
administrative problems with the 1978 election led to the creation of a committee of inquiry 
known as the Wicks Committee, which recommended a series of reforms that were enacted 
in the 1980 and 1981 Electoral Amendment Acts (Prebble 1980).108 The decision had wider 
repercussions as well, helping to convince Labour that a major review of the electoral 
system was necessary and leading to a pledge in the party’s 1981 manifesto to establish a 
Royal Commission on electoral matters (Atkinson 2003). Another important judicial case 
was the Re Wairarapa Election Petition 1988 judgement on residency rules, which 
established a narrow interpretation of residency requirements. This decision was 
overturned by the Electoral Amendment Act 1989, which created more leniency for voters 
to determine where to enroll. A court challenge to the 2010 prisoner disenfranchisement 
law as infringing on an entrenched statute was dismissed (Ngaronoa v. Attorney-General 
2018), but a challenge asking the court to declare the law inconsistent with the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights was successful (Attorney-General v. Taylor 2017; see also Geddis 
 
107 They have also regularly resulted in changes to electoral outcomes (see O’Connor 1990).  
108 Curiously, the ballot marking procedure itself was not changed to an affirmative tick until 1990. Until that 
time, voters had to cross out the names of every candidate except for their preferred choice. 
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2017, 2018b). This formal declaration of inconsistency by the courts, the first of its kind, 
may have contributed to Labour’s decision to reverse the law.  
Citizen challenges have played a vital role in bringing election reform onto the 
political agenda. Grassroots activism was crucial in translating the 1986 Royal 
Commission’s recommendations into the 1992 and 1993 referendums on electoral system 
reform, culminating in the approval of MMP in a binding referendum (Jackson and 
McRobie 1998; Renwick 2010). The implementing legislation was approved without a 
third reading division, even though both major parties opposed reform. Interestingly, the 
2011 referendum on retaining MMP was mostly due to lobbying from a small interest 
group rather than a mass citizen challenge (Grey and Fitzsimons 2012).109 
 Electioneering practices have frequently led to the passage of election legislation. 
After several candidates decided to inappropriately change their names to confuse voters 
in the leadup to the 1972 general election, a bill was passed to ban the practice. A series of 
enactments between 2006 and 2009 validated parliamentary expenditures that the Auditor-
General had found to be improperly used for electioneering (NZ Office of the Auditor-
General 2006). Additionally, Labour passed the Electoral Finance Act 2007 in response to 
troublesome electioneering practices that had occurred in the 2005 general election (Geddis 
2007, 2008).  
The enactment of previous legislation has also frequently been a trigger for 
additional enactments. Sometimes this has been a case of simple repeal due to a change of 
 
109 Arseneau posits that the elite-driven nature of the 2011 referendum is one of the reasons why the Electoral 
Commission’s mandated review of MMP in 2012 received such little public interest (Interview S). This helps 




government. National’s 1976 and 1977 Electoral Amendment Acts repealed most of 
Labour’s Electoral Amendment Act 1975, while the Electoral Amendment Act 2009 
repealed core provisions of the Electoral Finance Act 2007. In other cases, the time horizon 
has been even shorter. The Electoral Amendment Act (No 2) 1990 established a new 
system of handling parliamentary election broadcasting after an enactment passed earlier 
that year was found to be unsatisfactory to broadcasters.  
 
The Randomness of Partisan Election Lawmaking 
This study uncovered numerous instances where important election reforms were achieved 
without partisan disagreement or media attention, as well as cases where relatively 
unimportant changes were fiercely contested and received copious amounts of media 
coverage. One of my goals was to explain as much of this seeming randomness as possible 
by finding explanations for variations in political behavior. The results are encouraging but 
not overwhelming: my most powerful model explained about 37 percent of the variation in 
the level of partisanship of election reforms, even after accounting for the participatory 
effect of reforms and the party in power.110 This result leaves much more unknown than 
known. Perhaps political actors really are behaving unpredictably much of the time, 
especially when it comes to election lawmaking. James Christmas, the last person to 
conduct a study of the level of consensus in Aotearoa New Zealand election reforms, thinks 
this is the case (Interview A). As explored in Chapter 2, political actors face significant 
limitations when making decisions, including imperfect information, time and resource 
 




constraints, and short time horizons (Renwick 2010). This study proves explaining the 
behavior of politicians in manipulating election laws is certainly possible. It will be up to 


















CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
 
This thesis advances the political science of electoral systems by introducing a conceptual 
framework for the study of the politics of election lawmaking and empirically testing the 
effects of PR in Aotearoa New Zealand on the incidence of partisan and demobilizing 
election reforms. The analysis shows that partisan changes to election laws are more 
frequent than commonly understood, appearing in a country considered to have one of the 
strongest democratic systems. I have also shown that the introduction of MMP seems to 
have reduced the incidence of demobilizing reforms and has shifted the areas of election 
lawmaking that are partisan. Evidence has been brought to bear of a relationship between 
partisan election lawmaking and the effective number of parties in parliament, the leverage 
of non-voters, the participatory effect of legislation, and the party in power. This chapter 
concludes by revisiting the central hypotheses, exploring the implications of these findings, 
and suggesting directions for future scholarship. 
 
Central Hypotheses Revisited 
This section evaluates the hypotheses and claims made in Chapter 4 based on the evidence 
revealed in Chapters 5 and 6. It examines first partisan election lawmaking and then 





Partisan Election Lawmaking 
Hypothesis 1: Aotearoa New Zealand’s switch from a plurality to a 
proportional electoral system has reduced the incidence of partisan election 
lawmaking. 
The evidence uncovered by this thesis does not substantiate Hypothesis 1. As shown in 
Table 7.1 and Figure 7.1, the incidence of partisan election lawmaking increased from 
seven partisan election enactments under FPTP to 11 under MMP. As shown in Table 7.2 
and Figure 7.2, as a percentage of all election laws passed in the era it rose from 24 to 42 
percent. Using the complex partisanship scale, 12 FPTP-era election enactments passed 
with moderate or high levels of partisanship, compared with 13 under MMP. Chi-squared, 
logistic, and MLR tests all failed to reveal a statistically significant relationship between 
era and partisan election lawmaking. The number of proposed members’ bills debated 
provides the only countervailing evidence. There were 16 election-related proposed 
members’ bills in the FPTP era, nine of which were highly partisan. This compares with 
nine such bills under MMP, five of which were highly partisan—though the percentage of 
highly partisan members’ bills remained constant at 56 percent. Almost across the board, 
then, this study failed to reveal compelling evidence that MMP has reduced the incidence 
of partisan election lawmaking. 
Table 7.1: FPTP vs. MMP-Era Election 
Lawmaking—Number of Election Enactments 
  
Participatory Effect Total 
  Demobilizing Neutral Mobilizing 
Partisanship 
Partisan 2 → 2 2 → 7 3 → 2 7 → 11 
Non-partisan 3 → 0 10 → 10 9 → 5 22 → 15 






 Table 7.2: FPTP vs. MMP-Era 
Election Lawmaking—Percentages 
  
Participatory Effect Total 
  Demobilizing Neutral Mobilizing 
Partisanship 
Partisan 7% → 8% 7% → 27% 10% → 8% 24% → 42% 
Non-partisan 10% → 0% 34% → 38% 31% → 19% 76% → 58% 


























































































In contrast, the corollary to Hypothesis 1—that switching from a two-party to a 
multiparty system reduces the incidence of partisan manipulation of election laws—was 
evidenced. Logistic and MLR tests revealed a statistically significant relationship between 
the effective number of parties and partisan election lawmaking. The higher the effective 
number of parties, the less likely election reforms were to be partisan. However, this was 
not found to be true for the total number of parliamentary parties, nor for vote-based 
measures of the party system. It seems that increased fragmentation of the party system 
reduces the incidence of partisan election lawmaking—something that has happened 
unevenly under MMP. This result clues us into the causal mechanism that links PR and 
diminished partisan election lawmaking. The increased number of veto players seems to 
be a more compelling reason for the relationship than reduced incentives to pursue 
marginal electoral shifts.111 
I also uncovered evidence to support a relationship between the leverage of non-
voters and partisan election lawmaking, with logistic and MLR tests both producing 
statistically significant results. Higher leverage of non-voters (i.e., lower turnout) is 
correlated with more partisan election enactments. Conversely, the analysis failed to 
substantiate a relationship between electoral competitiveness and partisan election 
lawmaking. A wide range of additional factors are likely exacerbating the level of 
partisanship in Aotearoa New Zealand election lawmaking. The presence of a left-right 
SES cleavage structure, a strong preference gap between voters and non-voters, high 
inequality, elevated polarization, and the lack of constitutional constraints help explain the 
 
111 A few interviewees suggested this would be the case (Interviews J, W). 
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high degree of partisanship. The only two significant mitigating factors examined were a 
unitary state and increasing procedural constraints.  
The record of enacted election laws and proposed members’ bills revealed 
significant evidence that the areas of partisanship have changed from the FPTP to MMP 
eras. There has been a shift in disagreements over the electoral system from wholesale 
reform to minor changes such as to the electoral quota and one-seat coattails provision. 
Partisan disagreements over registration and voting administration laws have both 
diminished. They have also shifted; in the former case, from radical registration reforms 
and rules for determining place of residence to continuous enrollment, and in the latter 
case, from pre-election information mailers to the design of ballot papers and use of 
EasyVote cards. There has also been a decline in disagreements over franchise rules and 
boundary drawing provisions. On the flip side, there has been increasing partisanship over 
member qualifications, especially party hopping and dual citizenship provisions, and 
finance and electioneering rules.  
 
Demobilizing Election Lawmaking 
Hypothesis 2: Aotearoa New Zealand’s switch from a plurality to a 
proportional electoral system has reduced the incidence of demobilizing 
election lawmaking. 
The evidence confirms Hypothesis 2, with an important caveat. Table 7.1 (above) shows 
that there were five demobilizing election enactments under FPTP compared with only two 
under MMP. The percentage of election enactments that demobilized declined from 17 
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percent to 8 percent (Table 7.2 and Figure 7.2). Although the descriptive data is 
compelling, chi-squared and logistic regression tests did not uncover a statistically 
significant relationship. The small n-size involved likely plays a role, as statistical tests of 
rare events are more likely to lead to biased results. The analysis also failed to evidence a 
relationship between party system and the incidence of demobilizing election reforms, 
likely for the same reason.  
The analysis did support the claim that PR systems are likely to reduce the 
incidence of mobilizing reforms and (by extension) all reforms that affect participation. 
There were 12 mobilizing election-related enactments in the FPTP era, compared with 
seven in the MMP era. This translates to a decrease in mobilizing legislation from 41 
percent to 27 percent of all election laws passed in the respective eras. Overall, 17 out of 
the 29 election-related enactments in the FPTP era affected participation (59 percent), 
compared with nine out of 26 in the MMP era (35 percent). A chi-squared test revealed a 
statistically significant relationship between era and the passage of election reforms that 
affect participation. Of the two causal mechanisms proposed, reduced incentives to pursue 
marginal electoral shifts and increased number of veto players, the latter mechanism is 
more likely when considering the null result for partisanship. It would make little sense for 
reduced incentives to pursue election reforms to stop the enactment of participatorily 
impactful changes but not partisan ones. More plausible is that increased constraints from 
additional parliamentary veto players is making election laws that impact turnout more 
difficult to pass.  
Tentative evidence was uncovered for a relationship between demobilizing reforms 
and the leverage of non-voters. Counter to initial expectations, it seems that higher-turnout 
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elections correlate with more demobilizing election lawmaking. This implies that higher 
turnout simultaneously encourages demobilizing election lawmaking and discourages 
partisan election reforms—a finding demanding further study. Conversely, the analysis did 
not substantiate a relationship between electoral competitiveness and demobilizing election 
lawmaking. The presence of Māori as marginalized subjects with discordant preferences 
has seemed to exacerbate the incidence of demobilization. Additionally, the supposed 
relationship between party and demobilizing election lawmaking is supported. National-
led governments passed five demobilizing election laws, whereas Labour-led governments 
passed only two. Logistic regressions revealed this relationship to be statistically 
significant, both for election enactments that were overall demobilizing and for election 
enactments that contained demobilizing provisions. 
 
Implications 
One important implication of these findings is the fact that several aspects of Aotearoa 
New Zealand election law continue to be unsettled. The electoral threshold and one-seat 
coattails provision, prisoner voting, party hopping, campaign finance rules, the registration 
period, and provisions for Māori electorates continue to be fought over and regularly 
changed. There is every indication this situation will continue. Both a senior member of 
the Electoral Commission and a former Chief Electoral Officer noted that a thorough 
updating of the Electoral Act is long overdue (Interviews F, J), while Justice Minister Little 
has pledged a “ground up, thoroughgoing review” of election laws if the Labour 
government is re-elected in 2020 (740 NZPD 15421, 3 December 2019). Additionally, 
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population growth in the North Island is putting the mechanical power of MMP’s 
proportionality at risk by increasing the number of electorates at the expense of list seats 
(Interview V). The eventual solution for this—increasing the size of parliament, 
reallocating electorate seats to the North Island, or fixing by statute the proportion of 
electorate to list seats—is likely to incite fierce partisan disagreement.112  
Many components of Aotearoa New Zealand’s election system continue to present 
barriers to full participation. The onus for voter registration still lies with electors rather 
than the government, creating an unnecessary obstacle to the ballot box (Interview T). All 
prisoners are currently disenfranchised. Even if Labour goes ahead with its proposed 
reforms, prisoners serving sentences of more than three years will be denied suffrage. The 
country also lacks a meaningful public referendum mechanism and an enforceable right to 
vote. It is worth reiterating that 25 percent of eligible voters routinely do not participate in 
elections, equating to nearly one million people.113  
Unfortunately, the goals of consensus and mobilization are oftentimes at cross-
purposes. The source of partisan disagreement is usually the fact that laws might increase 
participation. Such is the case with the latest proposal for election reform, Labour’s 
Electoral Amendment Bill 2019. There are no clear normative judgements in such 
instances; the mobilizing aspect is desirable but the partisan aspect is undesirable. Neither 
aspect “wins”. Rather, we are left with moral ambiguity. One potential solution is the use 
of citizens’ assemblies for election reform, which would take some power-making decision 
 
112 The Electoral Commission in its 2012 Report on the Review of the MMP Voting System recommended 
the third option, with an electorate-to-list seat ratio of 60:40 favored (Electoral Commission 2012b: 30). 
113 Another barrier worth mentioning is the strict restriction on election day electioneering, which runs 
counter to creating an atmosphere conducive to youth engagement and participation (Interview AA). 
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out of the hands of self-interested politicians (Bennett 2013; Hayward 2014; Interview L). 
This model has been used in both Canada and the Netherlands and might prove a fruitful 
avenue in Aotearoa New Zealand. 
A related normative quandary raised by this study is that proportional electoral 
systems both protect against voter demobilization and inhibit reforms that expand 
participation. Is it a normative good to prefer proportional electoral systems if they depress 
both types of reforms? One argument in favor of PR is that it is more important for 
institutional structures to discourage demobilizing laws than it is to encourage mobilizing 
ones. Enactments that prevent or discourage democratic participation inherently erode 
confidence in the election system and create social norms of exclusion that are difficult to 
erase. Thus, demobilizing election reforms ultimately cause more harm to democracy than 
mobilizing laws prove beneficial. Another argument is that institutional structures should 
be created to discourage frequent changes to the rules of the game, regardless of their 
character or effect. Although it is obviously a normative good for mobilizing laws to be 
enacted, the priority for designers of government (and especially legislative) systems 
should be first and foremost to make the passage of demobilizing laws extremely difficult. 
My research indicates that PR systems are better equipped to do so than non-PR systems.  
This study has focused on the record of Aotearoa New Zealand election reforms 
and its switch to MMP. Its findings should be applicable to every established democracy. 
Despite the country’s reputation as a model democracy where consensus-based election 
reforms are the norm, partisan election lawmaking was found to occur regularly, and 
instances of demobilizing election reforms were also identified. Considering the severely 
understudied nature of election lawmaking internationally, this evidence suggests that the 
186 
 
manipulation of election rules may be a more widespread problem worldwide than is 
currently understood. This is especially so considering Aotearoa New Zealand’s strong 
culture of consensus and long record of stable elections and governance, making it 
something of a baseline for the presence of deleterious election lawmaking.  
Perhaps most importantly, the results indicate that proportionality alone is not 
enough to mitigate deleterious election reforms. Rather, the effect of proportionality on 
creating a multiparty electoral system is what generates barriers to partisan and 
demobilizing election lawmaking. This research should caution American scholars against 
claims that adopting a PR electoral system could diminish intense partisanship around 
election rules (see Minnite 2010; Piven et al. 2009). If electoral system reform fails to alter 
party dynamics and instead maintains a two-party system, it is unlikely for the reform to 
prove successful in ameliorating intense partisanship.  
 
Future Research Directions 
As this is a one-country case study, its findings are inherently exploratory rather than 
definitive. The logical continuation of this project is to undertake a broader cross-nation 
comparison of the relationship between electoral system and partisan/demobilizing 
election lawmaking. The reason why such a study has yet to be undertaken is likely due to 
the difficulty in finding simple empirical measurements for the variables of interest. This 
thesis makes a first attempt to define and operationalize partisanship and demobilization. 
This work can be replicated in new contexts to uncover more empirical evidence for the 
factors that determine the politics of election lawmaking.    
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My analysis substantiated a relationship between partisan election lawmaking and 
the effective number of parties, providing a promising path forward for future scholarship. 
Whereas Aotearoa New Zealand is the only case where an in-country analysis can be 
conducted on the effects of switching between non-PR and PR electoral systems, many 
countries have experienced significant fluctuations in the effective number of parties over 
time. This means additional research could examine the relationship between party system 
and election lawmaking across a variety of countries, utilizing a natural case study design 
to increase the chances of discerning a causal link. 
Another promising research direction concerns whether good democratic 
procedures have been followed to change the democratic rules of the game in Aotearoa 
New Zealand. While undertaking this study, I have uncovered several worrying instances 
of undemocratic procedures being used to change election rules. Governments have 
truncated the debate process, skipped select committee consideration, held middle-of-the-
night floor votes, passed urgency motions to eliminate cool off periods between readings, 
used supplementary order papers to bring in major election reforms at the last minute, and 
utilized other means to prevent election reforms from receiving full and open legislative 
deliberation. These practices continue to this day. As a case in point, the latest amendment 
to election law, the Electoral Amendment Act 2019, was passed in a single House sitting 
under urgency after being announced the very same day.114 It is especially worrisome when 
undemocratic procedures collide with partisanship and demobilization, making this a 
priority for additional study. This line of inquiry could also test whether consensus-based 
 
114 The legislation strengthened restrictions on foreign donations. 
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processes increase the chances of consensual outcomes, as suggested by McLeay 
(Interview H). 
An adjacent area of scholarship involves the voter turnout strategies employed in 
Aotearoa New Zealand. Do campaigns focus exclusively on voter mobilization? Or do they 
ignore certain segments of the population and intentionally demobilize unsupportive 
demographics? Demobilizing campaign strategies should go together with demobilizing 
election laws (Minnite 2010; Piven et al. 2009). Additionally, how have campaigns 
responded to (frequent) changes to the rules of the game? There is evidence that effective 
counter-mobilization strategies to the passage of restrictive laws in the United States can 
mitigate their effects (Rocha and Matsubayashi 2014; Valentino and Neuner 2017; Voris 
2016). There is little existing scholarship in Aotearoa New Zealand on the turnout effects 
of passed election reforms, but campaign strategy is an important piece of the puzzle that 
has received no attention thus far.115  
If anything, my findings present a clarion call for scholars everywhere to take the 
politics of election reform seriously and for additional scholarship to pinpoint which 
electoral and parliamentary arrangements best insulate democracies from harmful changes 
to election laws. In the face of worldwide democratic decline, this should form a central 




115 Encouragingly, the scholarship that does exist on turnout effects is recent, indicating this is currently a 
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Allowed certain polling places to be used for two districts and for more than one 
scrutineer to be at a polling booth simultaneously, updated provision 
disqualifying electors who are in prison or have serious mental illness, and 
increased the maximum amount of election expenses from $1000 to $1500. 
Electoral Amendment 
Act 1972 
Prevented candidates from being nominated under a new name less than six 
months before the close of nominations. 
Electoral Amendment 
Act 1974 
Lowered the voting age from 20 to 18. 
Electoral Amendment 
Act 1975 
Renamed non-Māori electorates as 'general’ electorates, introduced the Māori 
electoral option at five-year intervals, and allowed for variations in the number of 
Māori electorates based on the results of the Māori electoral option. Extended 
the franchise to prisoners, permanent residents, and those “ordinarily resident” 
in Aotearoa New Zealand. Proposed increasing the size of parliament to 121 
seats, but this provision was defeated. 
Electoral Amendment 
Act 1976 
Fixed the number of Māori electorates at four, repealing the provision of the 
Electoral Amendment Act 1975 for a varying number of electorates according to 
the size of the Māori electoral population. 
Electoral Amendment 
Act 1977 
Repealed several provisions in the Electoral Amendment Act 1975. Extended 
the requirement for residency in an electorate from one month to three, 
disenfranchised all prisoners, and disqualified unregistered but otherwise 
qualified electors from voting. Increased maximum election expenses from 
$2000 to $4000, reversed a ban on the use of loudspeakers, and expanded 
regulations on candidate advertisements. 
Electoral Amendment 
Act 1979 
Allowed the use of a single up-to-date composite roll for by-elections. A 
temporary solution to problems with the roll used in the 1978 general election.  
Electoral Amendment 
Act 1980 
Overhauled the registration system, transferred responsibility for roll revision 
from the Chief Electoral Officer to the Post Office, updated statutory language 
from "European" to "general", removed party designations from the ballot paper, 
restricted the franchise from those "ordinarily resident" to permanent residents, 
and delayed exercise of the Māori electoral option by a year. 
Electoral Amendment 
Act 1981 
Required the Representation Commission to consider minor party feedback and 
publish responses to criticism, reduced the Māori electoral option from three 
months to two, prevented switching enrollment outside the Māori option, 
increased accessibility of polling places, increased penalties for failing to enroll, 




Enfranchised those who turn 18 on the week of an election, itinerant voters who 
have not spent three months in any one electorate, those who were previously 
qualified for an electorate but recently moved, and those who were allocated to 
the wrong electorate due to official error. Allowed non-Māori registered for a 
general electorate while erroneously included on a Māori roll to be able to cast a 
valid vote without re-enrolling.  Made minor changes to roll registration, 
extended the prohibition against candidate name changes from six to 12 
months, clarified that electors must be qualified to vote at the time of voting and 
not earlier, increased the election expenses limit from $4,000 to $5,000, and 






Increased flexibility for the statutory timing of electoral tasks, including roll 
revision and the work of the Representation Commission. Extended the time 
period for registration applications from received by writ day to postmarked by 
writ day. Provided for the Māori electoral option to be carried out concurrently 
with general re-enrollment. 
Electoral Amendment 
Act (No 2) 1985 
Reduced the residential qualification for registration from three months to one. 
Made the dormant electoral file publicly available and authorized its updating. 
Electoral Amendment 
Act 1986 
Provided that Māori electoral boundaries be determined within six months of the 
Representation Commission’s formation, aligning them with the reporting of 
general electorate boundaries. 
Electoral Amendment 
Act (No 2) 1987 
Prevented the holding of a by-election in any seat that was or became vacant 
before the 1987 general election. 
Broadcasting Act 1989 
Established the Broadcasting Commission. Prohibited the broadcasting of 
election programs for a fee and required broadcasters to allow political parties 
to broadcast election advertisements free of charge in an election period. 
Empowered the Parliamentary Service Commission to determine the allocation 
of broadcasting time for each broadcaster and the allocation among qualifying 
political parties according to their electoral representation and public support. 
Empowered the Broadcasting Standards Authority to make rules prescribing 
standards on election programs. Required political parties to receive prior 
approval for their broadcasts to ensure compliance.  
Electoral Amendment 
Act 1989 
Created more leniency for voters to determine their place of residence for the 
purposes of enrollment, nullifying the Wairarapa electorate court decision. 
Broadcasting 
Amendment Act 1990 
Appropriated commercial radio airtime for political party broadcasts, 
substantially increasing the amount of free political advertising. Mandated the 
airing and simulcasting of opening and closing addresses on all television 
channels, free-of-charge. 
Broadcasting 
Amendment Act (No 2) 
1990 
Established a new system of parliamentary election broadcasting. Made 
broadcasters’ participation voluntary, instead inviting broadcasters to volunteer 
time for election programs. Provided for equitably proportioned, publicly funded 
radio and television for political party broadcasters. 
Electoral Amendment 
Act 1990 
Extended the registration period until the day before polling day and allowed for 
those with mental disabilities to receive assistance when registering. Altered the 
calculation of the Māori electoral population to include a proportion of 
unregistered individuals equivalent to the proportion of Māori who opt to enroll 
on the Māori roll. Implemented a question of Māori descent asked to all persons 
and mandated that only those identifying themselves as being of Māori descent 
be targeted in the Māori option. These clauses set up the machinery for a 
fluctuating number of Māori electorates. Altered the method of marking the 
ballot paper from crossing out names to an affirmative tick, allowed candidates 
to include their party affiliation on the ballot paper, raised the election expenses 
limit to $10,000, permitted the release of age-specific roll data to researchers, 
updated the definition of “electoral expenses”, and gave the House the ability, 
with a 75 percent majority, to cancel by-elections to be held within six months of 
a general election. 
New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 
Declared electoral rights for all adult Aotearoa New Zealand citizens. 
Term Poll Act 1990 
Established a referendum on increasing the parliamentary term from three to 






Provided for the appointment of deputies for the Representation Commission 
when members are incapacitated, ended the designation of party 
representatives as unofficial members, removed the position of Director-General 
of the Post Office (which had ceased to exist), enabled all parties in Parliament 
and any that receive 5 percent of the votes cast at the previous general election 
to make submissions to the commission. Added the chief executive of the 
Ministry of Māori Affairs and two Māori party voting members to the commission 
when determining the boundaries of the Māori electorates. 
Electoral Referendum 
Act 1991 
Provided for the holding of an indicative referendum on changing the electoral 
system. Presented voters with two questions, the first on retaining or changing 
the electoral system, and the second on the preferred alternative electoral 
system. Four alternatives were offered: preferential voting, MMP, 
supplementary member, and single transferable vote.  
Electoral Amendment 
Act 1992 
Rectified a legal problem in the Representation Commission's work after it was 
found that the figures contained in the report of the Government Statistician to 
the commission used to calculate the Māori electoral population had not been 
calculated in accordance with the law. Defined how to calculate the number of 
Māori children and validated the past interpretation of the law. 
Broadcasting 
Amendment Act 1993 
Updated election broadcasting regulations to allow more flexibility. Allowed 
relationships between parties to be considered when allocating airtime and 
funding for election programs. Permitted parties to spend their own funds to 
purchase airtime up to a specified level. Required state-owned broadcasting 
services and certain private broadcasters to carry the opening and closing 
addresses of all parties. 
Citizens Initiated 
Referenda Act 1993 
Instituted procedures for the holding of indicative referenda. 
Electoral Act 1993 
Detailed the specifics of the MMP electoral system reform put to voters in a 
binding referendum (see Table 3.1). Altered the ballot paper, giving voters a 
party vote and an electorate vote. Allocated list seats on a proportional basis. 
Increased the number of MPs to 120, adding 50 list seats. Established an 
Electoral Commission to regulate parties and conduct public information 
campaigns. Implemented a party vote threshold of 5 percent. Permitted the 
number of Māori electorates to vary based on the results of the Māori electoral 
option. Enfranchised prisoners with sentences of less than three years. 
Electoral Amendment 
Act 1993 
Closed the electoral rolls on writ day instead of the day before polling day. 
Increased candidate deposits. Created an Electoral Commission to register 
political parties, conduct public information campaigns, and report on electoral 
matters to the House. 
Electoral Referendum 
Act 1993 
Provided for the holding of a binding referendum on the electoral system. Gave 
voters a choice between retaining FPTP and switching to the MMP system 
detailed in the Electoral Act 1993. 
Referenda (Postal 
Voting) Act 2000 
Enabled the holding of indicative referendums by postal vote. Established a 
voting period of three weeks, the compilation of a nationwide electoral roll, and 
a mechanism for following up with any voters that had not received voting 
papers in the initial mail-out. 
Electoral (Integrity) 
Amendment Act 2001 
Provided that the seat of any MP becomes vacant when they cease to be a 
member of the political party for which they were last elected. Empowered party 
leaders to expel members under this mechanism, effectively banning party 






Implemented continuous enrollment, allowed for the early counting of advance 
and hospital votes, and validated the party votes of electors who voted in the 
wrong district. Made procedural changes to donation disclosure, allowed for the 
bulk nomination of candidates, and updated procedures for the death or 
incapacitation of candidates. Provisions banning the publishing of opinion polls 
in the month before an election and imposing tougher defamation laws were 
removed in the committee stages.  
Electoral (Vacancies) 
Amendment Act 2003 
Ensured that no member of the current parliament loses their seat because they 
swear allegiance to or obtain the citizenship of another country, so long as they 
do not renounce their Aotearoa New Zealand citizenship. Applied only to the 
current parliament.  Specifically enacted to prevent Harry Duynhoven’s 
disqualification for applying for Dutch citizenship, preventing a by-election from 
taking place. 
Broadcasting 
Amendment Act 2004 
Repealed the requirement for the Electoral Commission to invite broadcasters 
to provide free or discounted time for electoral broadcasting. Restricted eligibility 
for allocations of broadcasting time and money to registered parties. 
Electoral Amendment 
Act 2004 
Clarified provisions relating to the disqualification of sitting MPs for swearing 
allegiance to a foreign power. Excluded cases where an MP is entitled to 
citizenship by birth or descent, renews an existing foreign passport, or 
automatically acquires citizenship as a result of marriage. Ensured that only the 
Speaker can exercise the party-hopping provisions. Made minor changes to the 
Electoral Commission’s membership and quorum for election broadcasting 
matters. Implemented a regime to manage certain aspects of electoral signs.  
Electoral Amendment 
Act 2005 
Made a minor change to the submission of list candidates involving the consent 




Validation) Act 2006 
Retroactively validated Labour's "pledge card" spending using parliamentary 




Interim Meaning of 
Funding for 
Parliamentary 
Purposes) Act 2007 
Extended the Appropriation (Parliamentary Expenditure Validation) Act 2006. 
Continued the validation of improper campaign expenditures and the interim 
meaning of funding entitlements for parliamentary purposes until 2009. 
Broadcasting 
Amendment Act (No 2) 
2007 
Provided a common start date for candidates and parties for the broadcast of 




Increased penalties for corrupt and illegal practices, created a new power to 
investigate suspected illegal practices, removed the requirement for political 
representatives to be appointed to the Electoral Commission for the purposes of 
determining the broadcasting allocation, and made several changes 
consequential to the enactment of the Electoral Finance Act 2007. 
Electoral Finance Act 
2007 
A wide-sweeping act that regulated electioneering and electoral finance and 
placed extensive limits on election campaigning. Amended the rules for political 
donations, election expenses, and third-party advertising. Implemented a variety 
of new compliance and enforcement provisions.  
Electoral Amendment 
Act 2009 
Repealed the Electoral Finance Act 2007. Retained the act’s donation limits to 
political parties and candidates and provisions relating to the compliance and 






Interim Meaning of 
Funding for 
Parliamentary 
Purposes) Act 2009 
Extended the interim meaning of funding entitlements for parliamentary 
purposes established by the Appropriation (Continuation of Interim Meaning of 




Amendment Act 2010 
Amalgamated the Chief Electoral Office and the Electoral Commission. 
Established the Electoral Commission as an independent Crown entity. First of 





Amendment Act 2010 
Disqualified all prisoners from voting. Previously, only those serving a sentence 
of three years or more were disqualified. 
Electoral (Finance 
Reform and Advance 
Voting) Amendment 
Act 2010 
Established various regulations and restrictions on election advertisement, 
election spending, and campaign fundraising. Increased constraints on MPs and 
their political parties for using parliamentary funding for electioneering purposes. 
Instituted no-excuse advance voting. 
Electoral Amendment 
Act 2010 
Simplified the process for updating the electoral roll in the case of an elector's 
marriage or civil union. 
Electoral Referendum 
Act 2010 
Initiated a two-question indicative referendum on the MMP voting system. The 
first question asked voters whether they wished to retain MMP, and the second 
inquired about voters’ preferred alternative. Four alternatives were offered: 
FPTP, preferential voting, single transferable vote, and supplementary member. 
If MMP was retained, set in motion a review of MMP by the Electoral 
Commission. 
Parliamentary Service 
Amendment Act 2010 
Prevented parliamentary funding entitlements from being used for election-
related purposes. Defined what advertisements are considered "election 
advertisements". Prevented funds from being used for any persuasive election 
publicity during the regulated period or to influence referenda. 
Electoral 
(Administration) 
Amendment Act 2011 
Transferred statutory responsibility for enrollment functions from the Chief 
Registrar of Electors to the Electoral Commission. Second of a two-stage 
process amalgamating Aotearoa New Zealand’s electoral governance 
institutions. Allowed for the online updating of registration details. Improved the 




Made minor changes to how political party deposits can be paid. 
Electoral Amendment 
Act 2014 
Provided for full online enrollment and online exercise of the Māori electoral 
option using RealMe. Amended regulations for party logos, disclosure rules, 
campaign expenditures, and the handling of loans to parties and candidates. 
Clarified the procedure for the reallocation of list seats in the event of a 
successful election petition. Removed a requirement for the Minister of Justice 




Amendment Act 2017 
Modernized election broadcasting regulations to enable more flexibility in party 
communication. Removed the requirement that parties make opening and 
closing addresses and for Television NZ and RNZ to provide free time for these 
addresses. Allowed political parties to use their funding allocation on internet 






Simplified electoral forms by deprescribing their contents. Allowed the counting 
of advance votes to begin earlier. Prohibited electioneering inside and close to 
advance voting places. Removed references to the historical separation of 
election administration services between agencies. Required the publishing of 
all objections to proposed electoral boundaries online. 
Electoral (Integrity) 
Amendment Act 2018 
Almost identical to the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Act 2001. Provided that 
the seat of any MP becomes vacant when they cease to be a member of the 
political party for which they were last elected. Empowered party leaders to 

























APPENDIX B: ELECTION BILL DESCRIPTIONS 
 
*Indicates a government bill. All other bills are members’ bills. 
Name Description 
Electoral Amendment Bill 
1972 
Sought to lower the voting age to 18. 
Elections and Polls Bill 
1978 
Proposed leaving enrollment open through polling day and expanding 
provisions for election scrutineers. 
Electoral Amendment Bill 
1978 
Sought to alter the Representation Commission to include representatives 
from parties receiving at least 5 percent of the vote. 
Electoral Amendment Bill 
(No 2) 1978 
Sought to instruct the Electorate Officer to take all reasonable and 
necessary steps to ensure that all those eligible to vote are enrolled. Sought 
to validate the eligibility of electors who were formerly enrolled but, as the 
result of an electoral boundary change, became eligible to be enrolled in 
another district.   
Voting Rights Protection 
Bill 1978 
Proposed removing the registration requirement for voting eligibility. 
Electoral Amendment Bill 
1980 
Proposed leaving enrollment open through polling day and enacting an 
immunity clause against prosecution for failing to register. 
Second Ballot Bill 1980 
Proposed the holding of a second ballot between the top two candidates in 
electorates where no candidate wins a majority on the first ballot. 
Popular Initiatives Bill 1983 
Sought to implement a binding referendum system for initiatives that receive 
at least 100,000 signatures. 
Popular Initiatives Bill 1984 
Sought to implement a binding referendum system for initiatives that receive 




Sought to allow the participation of all bona fide political parties in the 
process of setting electoral boundaries. 
Political Advertising Bill 
1986 
Proposed prohibiting political advertising by ministers or MPs using public 
funds. 
Public Finance (Restraint 
of Political Advertising) Bill 
1988 
Sought to require the itemization of all money spent on advertising 
government policies and political parties or members. 
Electoral Expenses Bill 
1989 
Proposed abrogating the limit on total election expenses for the 1987 
general election to validate the campaign expenditures of Reg Boorman, 




Representation Poll Bill 
1990 
Proposed a binding referendum on MMP at the 1990 general election. 
Proportional 
Representation Indicative 
Referendum Bill 1990 
Proposed the holding of an indicative referendum on whether proportional 




Proposed a binding referendum on MMP in 1993 prior to the general 
election, and for the Representation Commission to prepare new district 





Registration) Bill 1997 
Sought to prevent party-hopping by mandating a vacancy when 
parliamentary members resign their party membership. 
Electoral Amendment Bill 
1998* 
Sought minor changes to the regulation of election expenses and 
donations, party list submissions, and procedures for declaring candidates 




Sought to remove the requirement for the Electoral Commission to invite 
broadcasters to make offers of free or discounted broadcasting time for 
election programs and to remove the allocation of broadcasting funds for 
by-elections. Elements of this bill were incorporated into the Broadcasting 
Amendment Act 2004. 
Electoral (Public Opinion 
Polls) Amendment Bill 
2000 
Proposed a month-long ban on the publication of opinion polls prior to a 
general or by-election. 
Electoral (Racially-Based 
Representation) 
Referendum Bill 2002 
Sought to hold a referendum on elimination of the Māori electorates. 
Required the results of the referendum to be referred to parliament if 
approved with two-thirds majority support. 
Electoral Options 
Referenda Bill 2002 
Proposed the holding of a two-step referenda process on electoral system 
reform: the first an indicative referendum on whether the electoral system 
should be altered, and the second a binding referendum on what that 
alternative system should be.  
Electoral (Integrity) 
Amendment Bill 2005* 
Almost identical to the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Act 2001. Provided 
that the seat of any MP becomes vacant when they cease to be a member 
of the political party for which they were last elected. Empowered party 
leaders to expel members under this mechanism if they have the support of 
at least two-thirds of their parliamentary party members. 
Electoral (Reduction in 
Number of Members of 
Parliament) Amendment 
Bill 2006 
Proposed a reduction of the number of MPs from 120 to 100 by reducing 
the number of list members to 20. 
  
Electoral (Adjustment of 
Threshold) Amendment Bill 
2013 
Sought to implement the recommendation of the Electoral Commission's 
review of MMP to reduce the seat allocation threshold from 5 percent to 4 
percent and remove the one-seat electorate rule. Proposed commencing 
another Electoral Commission review after three general elections. 
Electoral (Registration by 
Special Vote) Amendment 
Bill 2017 
Sought to allow unregistered voters to register by completing a special vote 
to ensure that their votes are counted.   
Electoral (Entrenchment of 
Māori Seats) Amendment 
Bill 2018 
Proposed entrenching the Māori electorate provisions. 
  
Electoral Access Fund Bill 
2018 
Proposes the creation of a fund to be used by disabled candidates to cover 







APPENDIX C: CLASSIFICATION OF ELECTION LAW TYPE 
 
A nine-part typology of election law type is used, dividing reforms into electoral system, 
registration administration, voting administration, franchise, boundaries, finance and 
electioneering, governance, member qualifications, and ballot initiatives. 
 The electoral system determines the translation of votes into seats. This category 
includes both “major” electoral system reform, consisting of shifts from one category of 
electoral system to another (á la Renwick 2010), and “minor” electoral system reform, 
which involves changes to single components of the voting system.116  Legislation in the 
latter category might alter the number of general or Māori electorates, the electoral quota, 
the formula used to allocate seats, and additional rules that affect the allocation of seats 
from votes cast. It also includes changes to the term length of parliament and the 
conditions under which by-elections are triggered. 
 Election administration is defined by James as “the administrative procedure used 
for casting votes and compiling the electoral register” (2012: 3). Considering the 
significant breadth of this categorization, I split election administration into its two 
constituent components: laws dealing with registration and laws dealing with voting. 
Registration administration includes when and how citizens can register, who takes 
responsibility for registration (the government or the individual), how frequently the roll 
is updated and what technology is used in the process, whether registration is required, 
and whether identification is needed to do so. Voting administration includes rules 
concerning how the physical task of voting is conducted, ballot design, the number and 
location of polling places, poll worker procedures, voter identification, the voting date, 
polling hours, polling place scrutinizers, early voting, postal and absentee voting, vote 
compulsion, voter information cards, vote-counting, and election security.  
 Franchise laws, also commonly known as suffrage rules, concern who is legally 
eligible to vote. Even in an era of supposedly universal voting rights, restrictions still 
exist in established democracies on the basis of age, mental capacity, citizenship, 
residence, and criminal status. This category also includes nomination rules (the 
requirements for individuals or parties to stand for election to parliament), ballot access 
(the rules for getting on the ballot), and general electoral rights. 
 Electoral boundaries, also known as redistricting or redistribution, refers to the 
process of redrawing electorate boundaries for parliament. To maintain equal district 
sizes, the boundaries of electorates must be redrawn on a regular basis to accommodate 
population fluctuations. In Aotearoa New Zealand, this happens every five years 
following a census and is undertaken by the Representation Commission. The category 
 
116 These “categories” of electoral systems according to Renwick include single-member plurality (first-past-
the-post), block vote, alternative vote, two-round system, list proportional representation, single transferable 
vote, mixed-member proportional, mixed-member majoritarian (parallel systems), single non-transferable 
vote, and cumulative vote. Renwick’s classification is, in turn, based largely on Reynolds et al. 2005. 
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consists of changes to the redistricting process, for instance to the criteria for deciding 
new boundaries, the district tolerance for variations in population size, the membership of 
the Representation Commission, and the location of electorate districts. It does not refer 
to routine redistricting decisions, as these are non-legislative changes delegated to the 
Representation Commission. 
 Campaign finance and electioneering legislation concerns the funding and 
operation of election campaigns. Finance legislation can alter the source of campaign 
funding (i.e., private or public), who is legally allowed to donate to campaigns, how 
much they can donate, and what information they must disclose to do so. Finance laws 
determine spending limits on parties and candidates, regulations on political advertising 
and election-related parliamentary service expenditures, and broadcasting allocations for 
parties. This category also encompasses the what, where, and when of campaigning for 
parties and individual candidates, illegal and corrupt electioneering practices, and the 
penalties for these infractions. 
 Electoral governance refers to the regulation of election institutions, or the 
person(s) or body who oversees the running and regulating of elections. Laws in this 
category concern which institutions run national elections, their membership and 
statutory independence, and their competencies. Governance bodies might be granted the 
ability to administer elections, adjudicate election complaints, advise electoral 
participants and the public on compliance with election laws, educate the public on 
upcoming elections, and recommend legislative reforms.  
 Member qualifications concern what actions can be taken by MPs once they 
become representatives. Laws in this category affect the formal independence of elected 
officials while in office. If candidates are elected with certain disqualifying features but 
are seated, are they allowed to continue as members? Can list MPs change their party 
affiliation when in office, or does this disqualify them from holding office? The latter 
question, known as party hopping, has proven to be one of the most divisive issues in 
election law under MMP. 
Ballot initiatives, also known as referendums or citizen initiatives, are a form of 
direct democracy where electors vote on a policy question rather than on an individual or 
party to represent them. This category involves the machinery governing the ballot 
initiative process rather than the initiatives themselves. Legislation in this category 
determines whether there is a ballot initiative process, the administrative aspects of that 
process, the requirements for initiating a referendum, and the legal effect of the 
referendum’s outcome (i.e., whether the result is binding or merely indicative). Bills that 
initiate a referendum on aspects of election law are categorized into the subject matter 
they concern rather than as ballot initiatives. Bills that initiate one-off ballot initiatives or 








Date Location Name Affiliation (If Applicable) 
A April 12, 2019 Phone James Christmas 
 
B April 19, 2019 Phone Lorraine Minnite Rutgers University-Camden 
C April 29, 2019 Wellington Matthew Gibbons Victoria University of Wellington 
D April 29, 2019 Wellington Jack Vowles Victoria University of Wellington 
E 
April 30, 2019 Wellington Neill Atkinson Chief Historian/Manager, 
Heritage Content at the Ministry 
for Culture and Heritage 
F 
May 1, 2019 Wellington Anonymous Senior Member, Electoral 
Commission 
G May 2, 2019 Wellington Nigel Roberts Victoria University of Wellington 
H May 2, 2019 Wellington Elizabeth McLeay Victoria University of Wellington 
I May 2, 2019 Wellington Ryan Malone 
 
J June 19, 2019 Wellington Robert Peden Former Chief Electoral Officer 
K 




L June 19, 2019 Wellington Rob Salmond Director, Labour Leader's Office 
M 
June 19, 2019 Wellington Sir Geoffrey 
Palmer 
Former Prime Minister; Victoria 
University of Wellington 
N June 19, 2019 Wellington Anonymous Former Minister of Justice 
O June 20, 2019 Wellington Bryce Edwards Victoria University of Wellington 
P 
June 20, 2019 Wellington Anonymous Senior Member, Electoral 
Commission; Former Secretary, 
Representation Commission 
Q June 20, 2019 Wellington Robert Peden Former Chief Electoral Officer 
R July 7, 2019 Phone Anonymous Ministry of Justice 
S 
July 29, 2019 Christchurch Therese 
Arseneau 
University of Canterbury 
T August 12, 2019 Auckland Lara Greaves University of Auckland 
U 
August 12, 2019 Auckland Lewis Holden Research Officer, Royal 
Commission on the Electoral 
System 
V 
August 12, 2019 Auckland Sir Hugh Williams Former Chairperson, Electoral 
Commission  
W August 12, 2019 Auckland Anonymous Formerly Ministry of Justice  





Date Location Name Affiliation (If Applicable) 
Y August 13, 2019 Auckland Barry Gustafson University of Auckland 
Z August 13, 2019 Auckland Peter Aimer University of Auckland 
AA 
August 13, 2019 Auckland Celestyna Galikci Public Policy Institute – 
University of Auckland 
AB 
August 20, 2019 Phone Jeanette 
Fitzsimons 













Wellington Craig Thompson Chair, Representation 
Commission; Counsel, Royal 





Wellington Sir Kenneth Keith Victoria University of Wellington; 
Member, Royal Commission on 























APPENDIX E: PROVISIONS IN ELECTION ENACTMENTS THAT AFFECT 
ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION 
 
Note: Provisions in red were included with the legislation as introduced but removed 
prior to passage. They were not considered in determining the overall participatory effect 
of each act.  






Allows group polling places for two or 




Harmonizes Chatham Islands voting 
procedures with the rest of the country, 
extending poll closing time from 4 pm to 
7 pm. 
mobilizes marginal 
Franchise Disqualifies accused persons who are 
unfit to plead or to be tried in criminal 
proceedings, persons acquitted on 
account of insanity, persons found on 
conviction to be mentally disordered, 












Māori electoral districts no longer fixed 
at four but vary based on size of the 




Māori defined by self-identification 
rather than blood quotient, can choose 
whether to register on the Māori roll or 
general roll, and can change this 




A person is qualified to vote if they are 
qualified to be registered, are not 
registered, but believe on reasonable 
grounds that they are or should have 





The responsibility for enrolling electors 
and compiling the electoral rolls is 




Applications for registration do not need 




Increases the maximum fine for failing 
to register as a voter from $4 to $20, 
and the maximum fine for failing to 
deliver an application for registration 










A list of all candidates with their party 
designations and a list of all polling 
places are mailed to each residential 




Ballot papers are to show the party 




Allows blind voters to take a nominated 
person into the voting booth with them 
to assist in the ballot's marking, 
removes the requirement for the Deputy 
Returning Officer to witness the vote, 
and removes the requirement for the 
person assisting a blind, disabled, or 
illiterate person to sign the back of the 




A ballot paper is not to be disallowed as 
informal by reason of some error or 




Increases the deposit required for 
running as a constituency candidate 
from $20 to $100. 
demobilizes marginal 
Franchise Expands the franchise to non-citizens. mobilizes minor 
Franchise Expands the franchise to prisoners. mobilizes marginal 
Franchise Expands the franchise to mental health 
patients. 
mobilizes marginal 
Franchise Reduces the period of residence in an 
electorate required for enrollment from 
three months to one. 
mobilizes marginal 
Franchise Reduces the residential qualification for 








Māori electoral districts are again fixed 
at four and are no longer based on the 







Removes the provision that a person is 
qualified to vote if they are qualified to 
be registered, are not registered, but 
believe on reasonable grounds that 
they are or should have been registered 




Removes the requirement that a list of 
all candidates with their party 
designations, and a list of all polling 
places are mailed to each residential 
letter box ten days before polling day. 
demobilizes marginal 
Franchise Voting rights are retained for those 
abroad for more than three continuous 









Franchise Increases the period of residence in an 
electorate required for enrollment from 
one month to three. 
demobilizes marginal 






Allows persons to apply for registration 
with any Registrar of Electors, not just 
the Registrar for the district they are 
qualified for. 
mobilizes  marginal 
Registration 
administration 
Simplifies the registration procedures 
for marriages of women. 
mobilizes  marginal 
Registration 
administration 
Delays the Māori electoral option by a 
year. When the census and election 
take place in the same year, postpones 





Removes party designations from the 
ballot paper. 
demobilizes marginal 
Franchise Disenfranchises citizens who are 
outside Aotearoa New Zealand and 
have not been to the country within the 
last three years. 
demobilizes minor  
Franchise Disenfranchises permanent residents 
who are outside Aotearoa New Zealand 
and have not been to the country within 
the last 12 months. 
demobilizes marginal 
Franchise Restricts the franchise from those 
"ordinarily resident in New Zealand" to 
citizens and permanent residents only. 
demobilizes marginal 
Franchise Disenfranchises persons detained in 
hospitals under the Mental Health Act 
1969 and who are subject to a 
reception order. 
demobilizes marginal 
Finance Expands restrictions on polling day 
advertising to include the use of party 
names, emblems, slogans, and logos, 
except for ribbons, streamers, or 
rosettes in the party's colors. 
demobilizes marginal 
Boundaries Persons in psychiatric hospitals and all 
inmates of penal institutions (excepting 
persons detained in police lock-ups 
pursuant to a conviction) are excluded 











Requires a person to apply for 
registration within one month if they are 
qualified to register but are removed 
from a roll during a roll revision 
exercise. Increases the fines for failing 
to enroll from $20 to $50, and for 




Allows applications by physically 
disabled persons to be signed on their 





Allows the Registrar to accept 
applications for registration received 
shortly before the close of writ. Grants 
them six days after the close of the writ 





Reduces period of Māori electoral 




Allows the Registrar to reject 
applications for registration that are not 
signed or fail to include the applicant's 




Does not allow changes between the 
Māori and general roll outside Māori 




At least one polling place within the 
limits of each district shall provide 





Electors enrolled in a Māori electorate 
can cast a special vote at any general 
polling place, rather than only general 
polling places more than two miles from 




Blind, disabled, and illiterate voters can 
be given greater assistance in the 
polling place. 
mobilizes marginal 
Finance The accessibility of polling places is to 
be indicated in advertisements for 
polling places. 
mobilizes marginal 
Finance Advertisements for candidates and 
polling places are to include the party 










Where a qualified elector is registered 
in more than one district or on both the 
Māori and general rolls, their 
registration is not invalid only by reason 




Electors no longer need to fill in a 
normal application for registration when 
they fill in a roll revision card showing 
they have changed electorates more 




The Registrar must notify applicants of 
registration received shortly before the 
issues of the writ if the application is 
ineligible. The applicant may be 





After a roll revision period, every elector 
who has completed a roll revision form 





Where an elector has been registered 
by error and has exercised their vote in 
good faith and without notice of the 
error, their vote shall not be disallowed 
by reason only of that error. 
mobilizes marginal 
Franchise Allows electors who attain three 
months' residence in a new electorate 
during the week before an election to 
qualify for that election.   
mobilizes marginal 
Franchise Ensures that a person who has never 
resided continuously in any one 
electoral district for at least three 
continuous months but is otherwise 
eligible to vote can vote in the electoral 
district in which they currently or last 
resided. Previously this provision was 
limited to certain specified occupations. 
mobilizes marginal 
Franchise Allows those who turn 18 during 
election week to vote. 
mobilizes marginal 
Franchise Persons must be qualified to be 
registered as an elector for the district 
at the time they vote, rather than simply 
being lawfully on the electoral roll and 
qualified to vote. In other words, they 
must be qualified to vote at the time 




Legislation Type Key provisions Direction Magnitude 
Electoral 
Amendment Act 
(No 2) 1985 
Franchise Reduces the period of residence in an 
electorate required for enrollment from 
three months to one. 
mobilizes marginal 
Finance Candidates and political parties may 








Extends the time within which late 
applications for registration can be 
accepted, from received by 6 pm on writ 




Holds the roll revision concurrently with 




Makes clear that the Registrar can 
place the name of a person omitted 





Electors have nine days after polling 
day, rather than seven, to satisfy the 




(No 2) 1987 
Electoral system 
(minor) 
No writ shall be issued for a by-election 
before the next general election. 
Stopped a by-election from being held 







Allows voters to register at the place 
where they choose to make their home, 
rather than their "usual" place of 
residence. In practice, allows students 








Closes the registration roll at 4 pm the 
day before polling day rather than on 
writ day. Allows those who register after 
writ day but before 4 pm the day before 
polling day to vote by special vote. 
Previously, only those who became 





Persons with mental disabilities can 




Those who are 17 years and 9 months 
old can lodge an application for 
registration, rather than waiting to turn 




Increases the maximum fine for failing 
to enroll to $100 on a first offence and 
$200 on subsequent convictions, and 











In future Māori options, only those 
persons who have previously identified 
themselves as being of Māori descent 




Persons who have been sentenced to a 
full-time custodial sentence will now 




Method of vote indication changed from 
crossing out all candidates not wanted 




Candidates may include the name of 
their political party or the word 




Increases the deposit required for 
running as a constituency candidate 
from $100 to $200. 
demobilizes marginal 
Boundaries The definition of the Māori population is 
changed to include unregistered people 











Binding referendum on the electoral 
system, providing the opportunity to 








Requires registered parties to follow 





Those who are 17 years, rather than 17 
years and 9 months, can lodge an 




Closes the registration roll on writ day 
(postmarked) instead of at 4 pm the day 
before polling day. The Registrar will 
have 6 days after writ day to determine 
whether last-minute registrations are 
valid. Allows those who become 
qualified to vote between writ day and 
the day before polling day to register 
and cast a special vote. These electors 
have nine days after polling day to 




Those who have reading disabilities or 
are illiterate may receive assistance 
with the marking of ballot papers (not 










Establishes an Electoral Commission 
responsible for promoting public 
awareness of electoral matters by 





Increases the required number of 
accessible polling places in each district 




Increases the deposit required for 
running as a constituency candidate 
from $200 to $300. 
demobilizes marginal 
Electoral Act 1993 
Electoral System 
(major) 
Switches Aotearoa New Zealand's 
electoral system from FPTP to MMP. 
Increases the number of MPs to 120. 
Sixty will be elected through party lists 
and 60 through single member 
constituencies. Includes a 5 percent 




Permits the number of Māori 
electorates to fluctuate based on the 
proportion between the Māori electoral 
population and the general electoral 
population. When creating Māori 
electoral districts, consideration will be 
given to communities of interest among 
Māori tribes. Provides for Māori to be 
able to exercise a fresh electoral option 





Requires registered parties to follow 





Closes the registration roll on writ day 
(postmarked) instead of at 4 pm the day 
before polling day. The Registrar will 
have 6 days after writ day to determine 
whether last-minute registrations are 
valid. Allows those who become 
qualified to vote between writ day and 
the day before polling day to register 
and cast a special vote. These electors 
have nine days after polling day to 




Those who have reading disabilities or 
are illiterate may receive assistance 
with the marking of ballot papers (not 




Increases the required number of 
accessible polling places in each district 




Legislation Type Key provisions Direction Magnitude 
Electoral Act 1993 
Voting 
administration 
Increases the deposit required for 
running as a constituency candidate 
from $200 to $300. Changes the 
required votes needed to return the 
deposit from one-fourth the 
constituency candidate winner to 5 
percent of the total constituency 
electorate votes. 
demobilizes marginal 
Franchise Enfranchised prisoners with sentences 
of less than three years. 
mobilizes marginal 
Governance Establishes an Electoral Commission 
responsible for promoting public 
awareness of electoral matters by 




Voting) Act 2000 
Ballot initiative Enables the holding of indicative 
referendums by postal vote. Establishes 
a voting period of three weeks. 
mobilizes N/A 
Ballot initiative Establishes a follow-up mechanism for 
any voters that have not received voting 
papers in the initial mail-out. Application 
must be made before noon on the 
fourth to last day of the voting period. 
mobilizes N/A 
Ballot initiative All papers received before 7 pm on the 
last day of voting are valid. Voting 
papers may be returned as late as four 
days after the last day of voting, so long 
as they are postmarked within Aotearoa 
New Zealand no later than the last day 
of the voting period, or before the last 
day of the voting period if postmarked 







Provides for a system of continuous 
enrollment. Previously, electors had to 
return an enrollment form periodically to 
remain registered. Electors now remain 
on the roll even if they do not return the 
form, and only must return it if their 
details have changed. If the inquiry card 
is returned undeliverable, the voter will 




If a registration inquiry form or Māori 
option form cannot be delivered for 
some reason, the Registrar must make 
enquiries as to the whereabouts of the 





Māori on the dormant roll will now be 











Persons who are disabled, mentally 
incapable, or outside Aotearoa New 
Zealand can allow designated 
individuals to sign the registration 
application form and the Māori option 




Provides for information matching 
between several government 
departments to identify persons who 
are qualified to register, encourage 
these persons to register, and keep the 




Counts the party votes of registered 





Māori voting facilities are to be in every 
polling place rather than in separate 
tangata whenua locations. This means 
that Māori only must fill in a special vote 
if they are outside their electorate, not if 





Deprescribed the method of receiving 
and returning ballots from Aotearoa 
New Zealand overseas dependencies, 




Implements a $1000 deposit 
requirement for parties submitting party 
lists of candidates, returned if the party 
obtains at least 0.5 percent of the total 
party vote or wins a constituency seat.  
demobilizes marginal 
Franchise Discontinues the allowance that 
persons who are not Aotearoa New 
Zealand citizens can stand as 
candidates if they were enrolled on 22 
August 1975. 







Members' seats are not vacated if they 
involuntarily acquire foreign citizenship 
through marriage or maintain dual 
citizenship. The seats of members 
elected to the 47th Parliament are not 
vacated by acquiring dual citizenship. 









Franchise Disqualifies all prisoners from voting. 
Previously, only those serving 











Simplifies the process for updating the 
electoral roll where changes to an 
elector's details are required as a result 









Implements no-excuse advance voting. 
Previously, voters had to assert certain 
special grounds to vote before polling 








Introduces online enrollment of electors 
using RealMe, giving voters the option 
to re-enroll and update enrollment 
details online without having to 




Electors' immigration status checked at 
the same time as their enrollment 
applications are processed, rather than 
after they are enrolled. Allows 
information for new and renewed 
Aotearoa New Zealand passports to be 
provided to the registrar of electors for 
enrollment purposes and provides a 
notice of procedure for applicants that 








Allows full online enrollment, but 
electors must first register a verified 









Registered electors who give late notice 
to the Registrar of Electors of a change 
in address are not liable to be 





An elector who applies to vote must 
verbally give or confirm their name and 
any other particulars necessary to find 
their name or may do so with a gesture 
or by means of assistance. Might 
remove the ability of certain electors to 




EasyVote cards can be used as a 
record that an ordinary vote has been 
cast and in lieu of a declaration form for 
special voters, reducing the number of 








Finance Reduces the allowed exemption to the 
prohibition of electioneering on election 
day from the wearing of ribbons, 
streamers, rosettes, and lapel badges 
by any persons who is not an electoral 
official to only the wearing of rosettes 







Same-day enrollment implemented, so 
voters can simultaneously enroll and 






Deprescribes enrollment and voting 
information forms such as nomination 
and polling place information, allowing 
the Electoral Commission to make them 






Enables the Electoral Commission to 




Implements real-time enrollment 
information so that voters can 




Allows electors to inform the Electoral 
Commission of a residence change a 
month in advance. Once the one-month 
residency requirement is met, the 
















APPENDIX F: PROVISIONS IN PROPOSED BILLS THAT AFFECT 
ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION 
 
Note: Provisions in red were included with the legislation as introduced but removed 
prior to passage. They were not considered in determining the overall participatory effect 
of each act.  
*Indicates a government bill. All other bills are members’ bills. 








Polls Bill 1978 
Registration 
administration 
Repeals provisions for closure of 
the rolls, extending registration 




Voters registered for wrong 
electoral district may transfer 
their registration to the correct 





Grants immunity from 
prosecution for past non-





Allows Māori enrolled in a 
general or Māori district contrary 
to their intention to transfer their 
registration to the electoral district 




(No 2) 1978 
Registration 
administration 
Places the responsibility for 
enrollment on the government. 
Instructs the Electorate Office to 
take "reasonable and necessary" 
steps to ensure that all those 




Ensures that electors affected by 
electoral boundary changes are 







Removes the requirement for 
persons to be enrolled to cast a 
valid vote. Those who are not 




Registration period extended 





Special voting declarations 
operate as new enrollments or 





Legislation Type Key provisions Direction Magnitude 
Voting Rights 




Voters registered for the wrong 
electoral district may transfer 
their registration to the correct 
electoral district before the close 
of polls or make a special voting 




Persons who will become entitled 





Allows Māori enrolled in a 
general or Māori district contrary 
to their intention to transfer their 
registration to the electoral district 






Votes will not be disallowed 








Repeals provisions for closure of 
the rolls, extending registration 




Grants immunity from 
prosecution for past non-





Ballot Initiative Requires a binding referendum to 





Ballot Initiative Requires a binding referendum to 






Poll Bill 1990 
Electoral system 
(major) 
Provides for a binding 
referendum on electoral system 
reform. If approved by a majority 
of voters, switches Aotearoa New 
Zealand's electoral system from 
FPTP to MMP. Increases the 
number of MPs to 120. Fifty-six 
will be elected through party lists, 
four will be Māori electorates, and 
60 elected through single-
member constituencies. Includes 











Provides for a binding 
referendum on electoral system 
reform. If approved by a majority 
of voters, switches Aotearoa New 
Zealand's electoral system from 
FPTP to MMP. Increases the 
number of MPs to a minimum of 
100. Forty-six will be elected 
through party lists, four will be 
Māori electorates, and 50 will be 
elected through single-member 
constituencies. Includes a 4 
percent party or one-seat 
threshold, and grants parliament 
the ability to wave the threshold 







Implements a $1000 deposit 
requirement for parties submitting 
party lists of candidates, returned 
only if the party obtains at least 
0.5 percent of the total party vote 









Referendum on elimination of the 
Māori electorates in parliament. 
Requires the results to be 
referred to parliament if approved 







Provides for the holding of both 
an indicative and binding 
referendum on electoral system 
reform, with the proposed 
alternatives being FPTP, 
preferential, supplementary 










Unregistered electors can 




Electors can use a special vote to 
update their registration details. 
mobilizes minor 
Electoral Access 
Fund Bill 2018 
Suffrage Disabled candidates can access 
funds to support their 
participation in general elections. 
mobilizes marginal 
Finance Not-for-profit entities can utilize 
funds to make election education 
events accessible. 
mobilizes marginal 
Finance Registered political parties can 
utilize funds to support access 






















(100% − VEP 
Turnout) 
Notes and Sources 
1969 Nov 29 1,655,663 1,519,889 1,340,168 88.9% 80.9% 19.1% Age-eligible population, number 
voted, and VEP: Nagel 1988 
1972 Nov 25 1,758,960 1,583,256 1,401,152 89.1% 79.7% 20.3% Age-eligible population, number 
voted, and VEP: Nagel 1988 
1975 Nov 29 1,999,636 1,953,050 1,602,777 82.5% 80.2% 19.8% Age-eligible population, number 
voted, and VEP: Nagel 1988 
1978 Nov 25 2,083,549 2,487,594 1,710,173 79.9% 82.1% 17.9% Original official turnout: 69.2%. 
Corrected official turnout: 79.9%. 
Age-eligible population, number 
voted, and VEP: Nagel 1988 
1981 Nov 28 2,166,835 2,034,747 1,801,303 91.4% 83.1% 16.9% Age-eligible population, number 
voted, and VEP: Nagel 1988 
1984 Jul 14 2,255,096 2,111,651 1,929,201 93.7% 85.5% 14.5% Age-eligible population, number 
voted, and VEP: Nagel 1988 
1987 Aug 15 2,282,660 2,114,656 1,883,394 89.1% 82.5% 17.5% VEP: Chief Electoral Office 2009 
1990 Oct 27 2,400,360 2,202,157 1,877,115 85.2% 78.2% 21.8% VEP: Electoral Commission 
Enrolment and Voting Stats 
1990–2002 Report 
1993 Nov 6 2,506,110 2,231,664 1,978,092 85.2% 78.9% 21.1% VEP: Electoral Commission 
Enrolment and Voting Stats 
1990–2002 Report 
1996 Oct 12 2,642,400 2,418,587 2,135,175 88.2% 80.8% 19.2% VEP: Electoral Commission 
Enrolment and Voting Stats 
1990–2002 Report 
1999 Nov 27 2,755,800 2,509,365 2,127,245 84.8% 77.2% 22.8% VEP: Electoral Commission 
Enrolment and Voting Stats 
1990–2002 Report 
2002 Jul 27 2,835,240 2,670,030 2,055,404 77.0% 72.5% 27.5% VEP: Electoral Commission 
Enrolment and Voting Stats 
1990–2002 Report 
2005 Sep 17 2,990,300 2,847,396 2,304,005 80.9% 77.1% 23.0% VEP: Chief Electoral Office 2009 
2008 Nov 8 3,138,000 2,990,759 2,376,480 79.5% 75.7% 24.3% VEP: Chief Electoral Office 2009 
2011 Nov 26 3,276,000 3,070,847 2,278,989 74.2% 68.0% 32.0% VEP: Vowles 2015a 
2014 Sep 20 3,391,100 3,140,417 2,446,279 77.9% 71.0% 29.0% VEP: Vowles 2015a 
2017 Sep 23 3,569,700 3,298,009 2,605,854 79.8% 73.0% 27.0% Electoral Commission 2018 
*Additional sources: 1969–2002 data is from Atkinson 2003, except where noted. Method of calculating official turnout 
changed over this time period; before 1978, it was valid votes plus informal votes as a percentage of total enrolled 
electors plus allowed special votes. From 1981 onwards, it was valid votes, informal votes, and disallowed special 
votes as a percentage of total enrolled electors. 2005–11 data (excepting VEP and age-eligible population) is from 
Electoral Commission 2012a. 2014 data and 2005–11 voter age-eligible data is from Electoral Commission 2015. 
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1969 Nov 29 1.99 2 3 3.65 
1972 Nov 25 1.87 2 4 5.3 
1975 Nov 29 1.87 2 4 4.77 
1978 Nov 25 2.01 3 4 4.58 
1981 Nov 28 2.08 3 3 3.67 
1984 Jul 14 2 3 4 4.88 
1987 Aug15 1.94 2 3 4.37 
1990 Oct 27 1.76 3 5 6.95 
1993 Nov 6 2.16 4 5 6.82 
1996 Oct 12 3.76 6 7 21 
1999 Nov 27 3.45 7 9 22 
2002 Jul 27 3.76 7 10 14 
2005 Sep 17 2.95 8 8 19 
2008 Nov 8 2.78 7 6 19 
2011 Nov 26 2.98 8 8 13 
2014 Sep 20 2.96 7 7 15 









3.16 6.88 7.63 17.38 
*Note: For FPTP elections, the number of parties on the ballot is calculated by 
dividing the total number of candidates for each general election by the number 
of electorates. For MMP elections, the number of parties is measured by the 





APPENDIX I: CLASSIFICATION OF ELECTION ENACTMENTS 
 












Electoral Amendment Act 1977 
Electoral Amendment Act 1993 
Electoral (Vacancies) Amendment Act 
2003 
Electoral (Disqualification of Sentenced 






Broadcasting Amendment Act (No 2) 1990 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Act 2001 
Appropriation (Parliamentary Expenditure Validation) 
Act 2006 
Appropriation (Continuation of Interim Meaning of 
Funding for Parliamentary Purposes) Act 2007 
Electoral Amendment Act 2007 
Electoral Finance Act 2007 
Broadcasting Amendment Act (No 2) 2007 
Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Act 2018 
Electoral Amendment Act 1975 
Electoral Amendment Act (No 2) 1985 
Electoral Amendment Act 1989 
Electoral Amendment Act 2002 















Electoral Amendment Act 1976 
Electoral Amendment Act 1980 



















Electoral Amendment Act 1972 
Electoral Amendment Act 1979 
Electoral Amendment Act 1986 
Broadcasting Act 1989 
Broadcasting Amendment Act 1990 
Term Poll Act 1990 
Electoral Amendment Act 1991 
Electoral Referendum Act 1991 
Electoral Amendment Act 1992 
Broadcasting Amendment Act 1993 
Broadcasting Amendment Act 2004 
Electoral Amendment Act 2004 
Electoral Amendment Act 2005 
Parliamentary Service (Continuation of Interim Meaning 
of Funding for Parliamentary Purposes) Act 2009 
Electoral Amendment Act 2009 
Electoral (Administration) Amendment Act 2010 
Electoral Referendum Act 2010 
Parliamentary Service Amendment Act 2010 
Electoral Amendment Act 2013 
2017 Broadcasting (Election Programmes and Election 
Advertising) Amendment Act 
Electoral Amendment Act 1971 
Electoral Amendment Act 1974 
Electoral Amendment Act 1981 
Electoral Amendment Act 1983 
Electoral Amendment Act 1985 
Electoral Amendment Act 1990 
Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993 
Electoral Act 1993 
Electoral Referendum Act 1993 
Referenda (Postal Voting) Act 2000 
Electoral (Finance Reform and Advance 
Voting) Amendment Act 2010 
Electoral Amendment Act 2010 
Electoral (Administration) Amendment Act 
2011 








APPENDIX J: CLASSIFICATION OF PROPOSED ELECTION REFORMS 
 











Representation) Referendum Bill 2002 





Second Ballot Bill 1980 
Electoral (Representation Commission) Amendment Bill 1986 
Political Advertising Bill 1986 
Public Finance (Restraint of Political Advertising) Bill 1988 
Electoral (Public Opinion Polls) Amendment Bill 2000 
Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill 2005* 
Electoral (Adjustment of Threshold) Amendment Bill 2013  
Elections and Polls Bill 1978 
Voting Rights Protection Bill 1978 
Electoral Amendment Bill 1980 
Popular Initiatives Bill 1983 
Mixed Member Proportional 
Representation Poll Bill 1990 
Electoral (Registration by Special 












Electoral Amendment Bill 1978 
Electoral Expenses Bill 1989 
Proportional Representation Indicative Referendum Bill 1990 
Electoral (Party Registration) Bill 1997 
Broadcasting (Election Broadcasting) Amendment Bill 1999* 
Electoral (Reduction in Number of Members of Parliament) 
Amendment Bill 2006 
Electoral (Entrenchment of Māori Seats) Amendment Bill 2018 
Electoral Amendment Bill 1972 
Electoral Amendment Bill (No 2) 
1978 
Popular Initiatives Bill 1984 
Mixed Member Proportional 
Referendum Bill 1992 
Electoral Access Fund Bill 2018 
  
 
*Indicates a government bill. All other bills are members’ Bills.
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APPENDIX K: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
Models of partisan election lawmaking with other measures of party system: 
Table K.1: Regression with Number of Parliamentary Parties 
                               Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)    
(Intercept)                    -1.33201    2.39875  -0.555  0.57869    
Government National            -4.28994    1.43807  -2.983  0.00285 ** 
Māori                           0.89234    0.96562   0.924  0.35543    
Entrenchment                   -1.33230    1.54296  -0.863  0.38788    
Participatory Effect Mobilizes -2.99554    1.45437  -2.060  0.03943 *  
Participatory Effect Neutral   -3.92322    1.66265  -2.360  0.01829 *  
Competitiveness                 0.08169    0.06354   1.286  0.19852    
Leverage                        0.17855    0.14738   1.212  0.22570    
Parties Parliamentary           0.06934    0.24584   0.282  0.77791    
—- 
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
    Null deviance: 69.545  on 54  degrees of freedom 





Table K.2: Regression with Number of Parties Receiving 1 Percent Support 
                               Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)    
(Intercept)                    -2.18524    2.34966  -0.930  0.35236    
Government National            -4.89036    1.70991  -2.860  0.00424 ** 
Māori                           0.79935    0.94918   0.842  0.39970    
Entrenchment                   -1.90953    1.63856  -1.165  0.24387    
Participatory Effect Mobilizes -3.07884    1.47909  -2.082  0.03738 *  
Participatory Effect Neutral   -4.14555    1.73755  -2.386  0.01704 *  
Competitiveness                 0.07200    0.06607   1.090  0.27579    
Leverage                        0.31762    0.20057   1.584  0.11329    
Parties1Percent                -0.22186    0.33790  -0.657  0.51145    
—- 
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
    Null deviance: 69.545  on 54  degrees of freedom 



















Table K.3: Regression with Number of Parties on Ballot 
                               Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)    
(Intercept)                    -1.09243    2.29291  -0.476  0.63376    
Government National            -4.25121    1.42822  -2.977  0.00291 ** 
Māori                           1.06270    1.00934   1.053  0.29240    
Entrenchment                   -1.17626    1.50455  -0.782  0.43433    
Participatory Effect Mobilizes -3.08603    1.46044  -2.113  0.03459 *  
Participatory Effect Neutral   -3.93318    1.66861  -2.357  0.01842 *  
Competitiveness                 0.08151    0.06418   1.270  0.20411    
Leverage                        0.14500    0.12651   1.146  0.25175    
Parties Ballot                  0.06717    0.07887   0.852  0.39442    
—- 
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
    Null deviance: 69.545  on 54  degrees of freedom 




Model of demobilizing election lawmaking with effective number of parties: 
Table K.4: Regression of Demobilizing Election Lawmaking with Effective Number 
of Parties 
Coefficients: 
                    Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)    
(Intercept)         -3.64522    3.40936  -1.069  0.28499    
Parties Effective    2.23154    1.76245   1.266  0.20546    
Government National  4.56695    1.94238   2.351  0.01871 *  
Māori                0.50455    1.38121   0.365  0.71489    
Entrenchment         0.10807    1.88375   0.057  0.95425    
Partisan Scale       1.03178    0.37893   2.723  0.00647 ** 
Competitiveness      0.03887    0.08894   0.437  0.66206    
Leverage            -0.51557    0.29502  -1.748  0.08054 .  
—- 
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
    Null deviance: 41.929  on 54  degrees of freedom 











Model of any demobilization provisions excluding partisanship measure: 
Table K.5: Regression of Demobilizing Provisions Excluding Partisanship 
                     Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)   
(Intercept)         -1.676695   2.771525  -0.605   0.5452   
Era                 -0.320689   1.401987  -0.229   0.8191   
Government National  0.721174   0.879280   0.820   0.4121   
Māori                1.716873   0.769159   2.232   0.0256 * 
Entrenchment         1.241332   1.125046   1.103   0.2699   
Competitiveness      0.003622   0.059101   0.061   0.9511   
Leverage            -0.023448   0.154908  -0.151   0.8797   
—- 
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
    Null deviance: 64.455  on 54  degrees of freedom 






















APPENDIX L: DATA TABLES 
 
Table L.1: Level of Partisanship by Era (Scale) Partisanship Scale 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Era 
FPTP 4 7 6 3 2 1 6 
MMP 8 2 3 2 0 4 7 
 
Table L.2: Level of Partisanship by Era (Categories) Partisanship Scale 
None Low Moderate High 
Era 
FPTP 4 13 5 7 
MMP 8 5 2 11 
 
Table L.3: Level of Partisanship by Era (Complex binary) Level of Partisanship 
None/Low Moderate/High 
Era 
FPTP 17 12 
MMP 13 13 
 
 
